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ABSTRACT
This dissertation collects three essays on microeconomic theory.
The first chapter studies a new robustness concept in mechanism design with interdependent
values: interim dominant strategy incentive compatibility (IDSIC). It requires truth-telling is
an interim dominant strategy for each agent, i.e., conditional on her own private information,
the truth-telling maximizes her expected payoff for all possible strategies the other agents
could use. In a simple setting with two alternatives and no transfers, we characterize IDSIC
together with two other well studied concepts: dominant strategy incentive compatibility
(DSIC) and ex post incentive compatibility (EPIC). While both DSIC and EPIC permit
only constant mechanisms in sufficiently rich environments, non-constant IDSIC mechanisms
exist in any environment. The characterization of IDSIC suggests a simple class of (indirect)
binary voting rules: Each agent reports Yes/No. Moreover, if the binary voting rule is also
additive, then the indirect mechanism is versatile: It admits an interim dominant strategy
equilibrium on all payoff environments and all corresponding type spaces. This chapter is
based on the working paper “Robust Binary Voting” (Feng and Wu, 2020).
The most critical issue in evaluating policies and projects that affect generations of individ-
uals is the choice of social discount rate. The second chapter shows that there exist social
discount rates such that the planner can simultaneously be (i) an exponential discounting
expected utility maximizer; (ii) intergenerationally Pareto—i.e., if all individuals from all
generations prefer one policy/project to another, the planner agrees; and (iii) strongly non-
dictatorial—i.e., no individual from any generation is ignored. Moreover, to satisfy (i)–(iii),
if the time horizon is long enough, it is generically sufficient and necessary for social discount-
ing to be more patient than the most patient individual’s long-run discounting, independent
of the social risk attitude. This chapter is based on the paper “Social Discounting and
Intergenerational Pareto ” (Feng and Ke, 2018).
The third chapter studies a decision maker DM who faces a binary choice. DM does not
know which alternative is better, but a group of experts do. However, the experts would
like DM to make the wrong choice. Given the opposing preferences, is it still possible for
ix
DM to extract useful information from the experts using mechanism design? We answer
“Yes”: There are mechanisms where truth-telling is a Bayesian or even ex post equilibrium,
even though the information leak benefits DM and hurts the expert. On the other hand, if
truth-telling is required to be an interim or ex post dominant strategy, then no mechanism
extracts information in favor of DM. This chapter is based on the working paper “Getting
Information from Your Enemies ”(Feng and Wu, 2019).
x
CHAPTER I
Robust Binary Voting
This chapter studies a new robustness concept in mechanism design with interdependent
values: interim dominant strategy incentive compatibility (IDSIC). It requires truth-telling
be an interim dominant strategy for each agent, i.e., conditional on her own private infor-
mation, the truth-telling maximizes her expected payoff for all possible strategies the other
agents could use. In a simple setting with two alternatives and no transfers, we charac-
terize IDSIC together with two other well studied concepts: dominant strategy incentive
compatibility (DSIC) and ex post incentive compatibility (EPIC). While both DSIC and
EPIC permit only constant mechanisms in sufficiently rich environments, non-constant ID-
SIC mechanisms exist in any environment. The characterization of IDSIC suggests a simple
class of (indirect) binary voting rules: Each agent reports Yes/No. Moreover, if the binary
voting rule is also additive, then the indirect mechanism is versatile: It admits an interim
dominant strategy equilibrium on all payoff environments and all corresponding type spaces.
I.1 Introduction
To vote wisely is not easy. To that end, an agent needs to carefully evaluate the candidates
and understand how other people will vote. Such strategic consideration can get complex
and exhausting. Therefore, an ideal mechanism would make it easy for agents to determine
their unambiguously best vote without having to resort to intricate strategic considerations.
In addition to easing agents’ cognitive burdens, such a mechanism would also function in a
more stable or robust fashion, because an agent is likely to adopt that unambiguously best
strategy regardless of the many confounding factors she may encounter.
The notion of robustness is captured by the concept of dominant strategy incentive
compatibility (DSIC) that has been heavily studied in the literature. However, the literature
This chapter is based on the working paper “Robust Binary Voting” (Feng and Wu, 2020).
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is based on the keynote that DSIC is too restrictive. Indeed, as the famous Gibbard–
Satterthwaite Theorem states, when there are at least three alternatives and preferences are
private-value only dictatorships achieve DSIC on unrestricted preference domain (Gibbard
(1973) and Satterthwaite (1975)). By this logic, it is then foreseeable that DSIC becomes
even more difficult to achieve in the more general interdependent value setting where private
information does not pin down one’s preference. This we confirm. By studying a model
where agents need to collectively choose from two alternatives, we observe that, despite
there being fewer than enough alternatives to entail the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem,
DSIC is nonetheless too restrictive because of preference interdependence. Typically, only
constant mechanisms satisfy DSIC, that is, even dictatorships fail the DSIC scrutiny. A non-
constant DSIC mechanism exists only if some voters’ preferences are de facto private-value,
and the mechanism is responsive only to these voters.
Many collective choice situations in real life fit the interdependent value setting bet-
ter, particularly when information about the values of the alternatives is fragmentarily dis-
tributed among the population. Classical examples include decision making in committees,
legislatures, and juries. It is thus important to understand whether, in the interdependent
value setting, there are mechanisms that retain a reasonable degree of robustness but are not
as austere as ones that satisfy DSIC. This is the main question we address in the paper.
We observe that, in the interdependent value setting, DSIC captures a strong notion of
robustness. Given DSIC, an agent can unambiguously determine the best strategy free of
any belief about (1) other people’s information that directly affects her own preference, and
(2) other people’s strategies. In other words, DSIC has two orthogonal properties:
1. Informationally belief-free: For each agent, there is a strategy that remains a best
response given any interim belief about the distribution of the other agents’ types,
conditional on equilibrium strategies.
2. Strategically belief-free: For each agent, there is a strategy that remains a best
response given any belief about the other agents’ strategies, conditional on her interim
belief about the distribution of the other agents’ types.
The informationally belief-free property implies that to come up with a best response,
agents do not need to confer with (or even to be conscious of) their own possibly very
complicated belief hierarchies. Therefore, indeterminacy in what beliefs the agents would
have does not shake the mechanism designer’s confidence that they will follow the belief-
free optimal strategies, as long as everyone expects everyone else to follow those strategies.
In other words, mechanisms that have the informational belief-free property are robust to
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misspecification, or the lack of specification, of the agents beliefs about the other agents’
types (“informational beliefs”).
In contrast, the strategic belief-free property implies that there is an interim dominant
strategy for every agent that remains a best response regardless of whether she has a correct,
or any at all, strategic belief about the other agents’ strategies. Hence it is easy for an agent
to find and take that interim dominant strategy regardless of how she reasons about other
people’s strategies. Mechanisms that have the strategic belief-free property are robust to the
possibility that agents lack adequate strategic sense or understanding (“strategic beliefs”).
DSIC mechanisms are exactly the mechanisms that possess both belief-free properties.
Having both properties at once certainly makes DSIC mechanisms attractive to a mechanism
designer who only has limited or unreliable knowledge about the agents’ informational and
strategic beliefs. The cost is, as we have pointed out, of course the restrictiveness of DSIC.
To mitigate this conflict between robustness and leniency, we take the approach of exploring
the middle ground by maintaining one belief-free property a time while relaxing the other.
Mechanisms that have the informational belief-free property are, as is well known in the
literature (Bergemann and Morris (2005)), ones that satisfy ex post incentive compatibility
(EPIC). We develop a characterization for the set of all EPIC (direct revelation) mechanisms
in our simple setting with two alternatives and no transfers, and use the characterization to
find necessary and sufficient conditions for there to be non-constant EPIC mechanisms. If all
agents have the same ex post preference and every agent’s preference changes monotonically
in her and the other agents’ payoff-relevant information in the same fashion, then there exist
non-constant EPIC mechanisms.1 Moreover some of them are ex post Pareto efficient.
Should we be excited about the positive results? To explore how generic environments
that admit non-constant EPIC mechanisms might be, we look at continuous type spaces
subject to standard regularity conditions. We find that, as long as there is enough preference
interdependences and preference heterogeneities so that when indifference curves intersect
they do not overlap locally beyond the point of intersection, then every EPIC mechanism
must be constant.
Now let us turn to mechanisms that have the strategically belief-free property. We call
a mechanism interim dominant strategy incentive compatible (IDSIC) if it has the strategic
belief-free property, because in such a mechanism every player has an interim dominant
strategy given her private information. The strategically belief-free property is a popular
motivation for DSIC (or strategy-proofness in the literature of voting and market design)
mechanism design in complete information or private value settings. However, when it comes
to the interdependent value setting, the strategically belief-free property by itself has not
1The classical Condorcet Jury model, or common value voting in general, assumes this condition.
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received the due attention that we think it deserves.2 When the strategically belief-free
property is discussed in the interdependent values setting, it is discussed as an addendum to
DSIC and is hence not analytically separated from the informationally belief-free property.
As a result, while DSIC mechanism design prevails, IDSIC mechanism design almost does
not exist in the literature. We think ISDIC deserves more attentions than it has. First,
as in a complete information or private value setting, a mechanism with the strategically
belief-free property allows agents, who might not be strategically sophisticated or “correct”
in anticipating an equilibrium, to have an unambiguous optimal strategy and hence behave in
a predictable fashion. Second, as we show in the paper, IDSIC is more permissive than DSIC
in the interdependent values setting, because non-constant IDSIC mechanisms always exist.
This additional permissiveness is desirable for the design of actual mechanisms, especially
in cases where there is little ambiguity about the underlying type space and hence the
informational belief-free property that comes with DSIC is less important, for instance,
when the type space is a common prior type space where the type-generating process is
objective and straightforward. Last, as we will also show, even though an agent’s interim
dominant strategy depends on her type, i.e., her infinite belief hierarchies, in effect only her
first-order belief matters. In other words, the agent can determine her interim dominant
strategy without being aware of her higher-order beliefs.3 Therefore, although in an IDSIC
mechanism an agent needs to examine her belief to come up with a best response — whereas
in a DSIC or EPIC mechanism such examination is not needed at all — this examination is
relatively simple.
In the paper, we characterize the set of IDSIC (direct revelation) mechanisms, show that
non-constant IDSIC mechanisms always exist, and that they have a very simple structure:
For the same agent, all types that have the same strict interim preference regarding the two
alternatives are treated equally. The simple structure implies that IDSIC allows a mechanism
to dispense with all the bells and whistles that would otherwise be necessary to cater to the
rich type space where belief hierarchies could be complicated, because interim preference can
be pinned down with just first-order belief. In other words, any IDSIC choice rule can be
implemented in a reduced direct mechanism where the agents only report their payoff type
and first-order belief. IDSIC mechanisms have a distinct feature that a IDSIC mechanism
can only elicits preference rankings (not intensities), intensity still constrains it. Further
more, the characterization of IDSIC suggests a class of straightforward indirect mechanisms,
which we call binary additive voting mechanisms. In a binary additive voting mechanism,
2To the extent that there still lack commonly agreed terminologies for the property and the associated
incentive compatibility condition. See the Literature subsection for more detailed discussion.
3This result applies to more general settings with any finite alternatives.
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each agent casts a Yes/No vote. Unlike majority voting mechanisms in which an agent’s vote
is either pivotal or not, the effect of an agent’s vote in binary additive voting mechanisms is
independent of the other agents’ votes. We show that a binary additive voting mechanism
is versatile: it is IDSIC for any type space with respect to any payoff environment.
Literature
There is a massive literature that emphasizes what we mean by robustness, and DSIC is
held up as the most thorough. In particular, the literature on robust social choice and vot-
ing mostly draws upon the celebrated Gibbard–Satterthwaite impossibility result (Gibbard
(1973) and Satterthwaite (1975)) and its extension Hylland (1980), which states that in the
private value setting, when there are at least three candidates and any preference profile is
possible, then only (random) dictatorship satisfies DSIC.
Follow-up papers look for more positive results in two natural ways. The first one is
restricting the preference domain. 4 In contrast, by allowing interdependent preferences,
our setting is distinctly different than, and in some cases embeds, the private value setting
with unrestricted preference domain that underlies the impossibility results. Moreover, in
our setting there are only two candidates, for if there were more then our passage would
also be blocked by the impossibility results as long as the private setting with unrestricted
domain is embedded in our model, because DSIC, IDSIC and EPIC are equivalent in the
private value setting.
The other way of exploring positive results is weakening DSIC in the private value set-
tings. Azevedo and Budish (2019) proposes strategy-proofness in the large (SP-L) which
shares the same spirit as IDSIC. SP-L weakens DSIC in two ways. First, it only requires
truth-telling be approximately optimal in a large market. This part is orthogonal to ID-
SIC. Second, SP-L requires that in the interim stage, truth-telling be best responding to a
subset (full support, iid distributions) of all possible other agents’ reports, rather than best
responding to all ex post realization of other agents’ reports as IDSIC asks. Both SP-L and
IDSIC evaluate ICs in the interim stage, but IDSIC is reduced to DSIC with private values
and is stronger than SP-L.
There is a growing literature that studies EPIC mechanisms. As far as we know, ours
is the first paper that studies EPIC mechanisms for general social choice or voting. Jehiel,
Meyer-ter Vehn, Moldovanu and Zame (2006) shows when the payoff state spaces are con-
tinuous, agents have interdependent values and multidimensional signals, generically, any
deterministic EPIC mechanism (with transfers) is constant. Jehiel et al. is a direct compar-
4for example, Moulin (1980), Gershkov, Moldovanu and Shi (2016), and see Barbera` (2011) for an excellent
survey.
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ison with our impossibility result in EPIC. While we do not allow for transfers which makes
it harder to find non-constant EPIC mechanisms, we allow for stochastic choice functions
and do not require agents’ signal be multidimensional. There are several cases that open the
door to positive results in Jehiel et al., for example, separable values and one-dimensional
signals, neither of which would work in our setting.
The notion of IDSIC is not new (Cre´mer and McLean (1985)), although it has received
far less attention than what we think it deserves. Out of a similar robustness concern, Bo¨rgers
and Li (2019) proposes a condition, termed as “strategic simplicity”, that resembles IDSIC.
The main difference is that, under strategic simplicity, an agent has a strategy that is a best
response to any scenario that (1) is consistent with her interim belief and (2) where the other
agents do not play weakly dominated strategies, whereas, under IDSIC the interim dominant
strategy is a best response to any scenario that satisfies (1).5 Therefore, strategic simplicity
is a conceptually weaker condition than IDSIC. Bo¨rgers and Li (2019) show that, in private
value voting, strategically simple mechanisms are “local dictatorships” in general. There
is a large literature on robust mechanism design where robustness is interpreted differently
from what we mean in the paper: A mechanism is said to be robust if it is interim incentive
compatible6 with respect to many type spaces a` la Harsanyi (1967/1968), or to a very rich
type space. There, robustness is interpreted as versatility. In a seminal paper, Bergemann
and Morris (2005) show that a mechanism is interim incentive compatible with respect to
every type space (or to the universal type space a` la Mertens and Zamir (1985)) if and only if
it is an EPIC mechanism. Therefore EPIC mechanisms are robust in this sense, too. IDSIC
also has a robustness-as-versatility flavor, since an IDSIC mechanism is expected to function
well in all situations that share the same type space but differ in the voters’ ideas about
other people’s strategies.
Organization
This chapter is organized as follows. Section I.2 describes the environment and solution con-
cepts. Section I.3 discusses dominant strategy incentive compatibility. Section I.4 presents
results on ex post incentive compatibility. Section I.5 considers interim dominant strategy
incentive compatibility. Section I.6 concludes. Section I.7 presents minor results on ex post
incentive compatibility and Section I.8 collects the proofs.
5Although Bo¨rgers and Li (2019) focus on the private value setting, the condition can be generalized to
the interdependent value setting.
6Interim incentive compatibility generalizes Bayesian incentive compatibility to non-common prior type
spaces. See Bergemann and Morris (2005).
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I.2 Model
Environment
N agents I = {1, 2, . . . , N} need to make a collective choice from two alternatives a ∈ A =
{S,R}. Every agent receives a payoff of 0 if S — the S tatus quo or Safe option — is chosen.
On the other hand, if R — the Reform or Risky option — is chosen, payoffs to the agents
depend on an N -dimensional payoff state of the world θ = (θ1, ..., θN) ∈ Θ1 × ...×ΘN = Θ.
In particular, the payoff to agent i from R being chosen in state θ is expressed as ui(θ). In
most part of the paper we assume that Θ is finite; however, in one subsection in section I.4
we allow Θ to be infinite. We fix sets I and A through out the paper and call 〈Θ, {ui}i∈I〉 the
payoff environment of the collective choice problem. This payoff environment is common
knowledge among the agents.
Information about the true state θ is dispersed among the agents. More specifically,
agent i only privately observes θi, which we say is agent i’s payoff type. Agent i also has
a (subjective) belief about the other agents’ payoff types, and this belief is said to be agent
i’s first-order belief. Moreover, agent i also has a belief about the other agents’ payoff types
and first-order beliefs, and this belief is said to be agent i’s second-order belief. Agent i’s
higher-order beliefs are defined analogously ad infinitum. We call βi, the agent’s (infinite)
belief hierarchy, her belief type. The agent’s payoff type and belief type constitute her
type.
Types are cumbersome objects to think about and work with because they involve
infinite belief hierarchies. Harsanyi (1967/1968) and Mertens and Zamir (1985) show that
any type space has a much simpler formulation. Following Bergemann and Morris (2005),
the type space is defined as follows. We denote the set of all probability measures on the
Borel field of a metric space X by ∆(X).
Definition I.1. A type space is a list T = 〈Ti, θˆi, βˆi〉i∈I where for each agent i, Ti is a
nonempty finite set of types, and θˆi, βˆi are functions of the form:
θˆi : Ti → Θi and βˆi : Ti → ∆(T−i)
which respectively reflect type ti’s payoff type and belief type.
For each type ti ∈ Ti of agent i, θˆi(ti) is her payoff type and βˆi(ti) is her belief type.
For each payoff type θi, there at least exists one type ti such that θˆi(ti) = θi. We denote
βˆi(ti)[E] the probability that type ti of agent i assigns to other agents having types t−i in a
measurable set E ⊂ T−i.
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The infinite belief hierarchy of an agent can be recovered from the simple formulation
of types given in Definition I.1. For example, agent i’s first-order belief function bˆi : Ti →
∆(Θ−i) (which will be of particular importance) can be computed as follows:
bˆi(ti)[E
′] =
∑
{t−i|θˆ−i(t−i)∈E′}
βˆi(ti)[t−i],
so that bˆi(ti)[E
′] is the probability that type ti of agent i assigns to the event that the other
agents’ payoff type profile θ−i is in E ′ ⊂ Θ−i.
We fix the type space through out the paper except in subsections I.5.4 and I.5.5.
Mechanisms
We investigate mechanisms by which the agents arrive at a collective decision without the use
of side payments. We formulated a mechanism as a messaging game with a choice function
as follows.
Definition I.2. A mechanism is a list 〈M1, · · · ,MN , q〉 such that for each i ∈ I the set Mi
is a nonempty set of messages, and q : M1 × · · · ×MN → [0, 1] is a choice function that
indicates the probability with which alternative R is chosen.
Side payments are ruled out because the theoretical objective of this paper is to explore
and contribute to the theory of mechanism design with non-transferable utilities. Moreover,
not using transfers is a typical constraint to which the design of actual collective choice
mechanisms, specifically voting mechanisms, is subject.
On the other hand, we do not require that the mechanism is deterministic. In other
words, devices like lotteries can be used in a mechanism such that even if the agents take
actions deterministically, the outcome can still be uncertain.
Two classes of mechanisms are of particular interest: The direct mechanisms where
Mi = Ti for every i ∈ I, and the fully reduced direct mechanisms where Mi = Θi for
every i ∈ I.7 Under the direct mechanisms, the agents are asked to report their respective
types, whereas under the fully reduced direct mechanism, they are instead asked to report
their respective payoff types.
Social Choice Rule
A social choice rule f : T → [0, 1] is a function which maps agents’ types to outcomes.
7We save the terminology “reduced direct mechanism” for later use.
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Solution Concepts
As outlined in the Introduction, we analyze mechanism design subject to three incentive
compatibility (IC) conditions:
• Dominant strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC)
• Ex post incentive compatibility (EPIC)
• Interim dominant strategy incentive compatibility (IDSIC)
In the upcoming sections we will formally define these IC conditions. Roughly speaking,
DSIC requires that every agent has a (weakly) dominant strategy that maximizes her ex post
payoff given any message profile from the other agents in any payoff state θ. 8
EPIC requires that there is an ex post equilibrium in which every agent’s equilibrium
strategy maximizes her ex post payoff in any payoff state θ conditional on other agents fol-
lowing their equilibrium strategies. IDSIC requires that every agent has a (weakly) interim
dominant strategy that maximizes her expected payoff given any message profile from the
other agents conditional on her interim belief about the payoff state θ. There is one other
IC condition, Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC), that is popular in the literature. BIC
requires that there is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium such that every agent’s equilibrium strat-
egy maximizes her expected payoff conditional on her interim belief about the payoff state
θ and that other agents follow their equilibrium strategies. We do not discuss BIC because
it lacks the robustness properties that we focus on in the paper.
DSIC is the strongest IC condition and BIC is weakest. IDSIC and EPIC are in be-
tween, as they arise from respectively relaxing the informational and the strategic belief-free
properties from DSIC.
I.3 Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility
In this section, we characterizes all DSIC mechanisms and confirm the claim that DSIC is
too restrictive in settings with interdependent values.
Dominant strategy incentive compatibility is formally defined as follows:
Definition I.3. The strategy profile σ∗ is a dominant strategy equilibrium of the mechanism
〈M1, · · · ,MN , q〉 if
ui(θˆ(t))q(σ
∗
i (ti),m−i) ≥ ui(θˆ(t))q(mi,m−i)
8We will abuse notations when there are no confusions. In particular, we require the optimal strategies
be truth telling when we say a direct mechanism is DSIC. The same applies to EPIC and IDSIC.
9
for all m ∈M and all t ∈ T , and all i ∈ I.
That is, for each agent i and type ti, σ
∗
i (ti) maximizes her ex post utility for all possible
messages m−i other agents could send and all possible realizations of other agents’ types t−i.
If a mechanism admits a dominant strategy equilibrium, then it satisfies dominant strategy
incentive compatibility.
By the revelation principle, we can focus on truth-telling dominant strategy equilibria
of fully reduced direct mechanisms. Hence, without further specifications, all mechanisms in
this section refer to fully reduced direct mechanisms.
Definition I.4. A fully reduced direct mechanism 〈Θ1, · · · ,ΘN , q〉 is dominant strategy in-
centive compatible if
ui(θ)q(θi, θ
′
−i) ≥ ui(θ)q(θ′i, θ′−i)
for all θ, θ′ ∈ Θ, and all i ∈ I.
That is, truth telling is a dominant strategy in the ex post stage, i.e., it maximizes each
agent’s ex post utility for all possible messages θ′−i other agents could send and all possible
realizations of other agents’ payoff types θ−i.
I.3.1 Characterization
The following definitions will be useful of the characterization.
Definition I.5. A correspondence φi : Θi ⇒ {−1, 0, 1} is an indicator correspondence of
agent i if
φi(θi) 3

1, if ui(θi, θ−i) > 0 for some θ−i ∈ Θ−i
0, if ui(θi, θ−i) = 0 for some θ−i ∈ Θ−i
−1, if ui(θi, θ−i) < 0 for some θ−i ∈ Θ−i
. (I.1)
φi(θi) contains agent i’s possible ex post preferences over {S,R} when her private signal
is θi. For example, φi(θi) = {1,−1} means there exists θ−i and θ′−i such that ui(θi, θ−i) > 0
and ui(θi, θ
′
−i) < 0, i.e., given her private signal θi, it is possible agent i prefers R over S or
prefers R over S in the ex post stage.
The following lemma establishes the link between indicator correspondences and DSIC
mechanisms.
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Lemma I.1. q is DSIC if and only if for any i = 1, ..., N and θi ∈ Θi:
1. If 1 ∈ φi(θi) then q(θi, θ−i) = maxθ′i∈Θi q(θ′i, θ−i) for any θ−i ∈ Θ−i.
2. If −1 ∈ φi(θi) then q(θi, θ−i) = minθ′i∈Θi q(θ′i, θ−i) for any θ−i ∈ Θ−i.
An immediate implication of Lemma I.1 is that if there exist one private signal θi such
that agent i is uncertain about her ex post preferences over {S,R} then a DSIC mechanism
cannot be responsive to her private signal. Lemma I.2 formalizes the observation.
Definition I.6. A mechanism q(θ1, · · · , θN) is responsive to θi if there exist θi, θ′i ∈ Θi
and θ−i ∈ Θ−i such that q(θi, θ−i) 6= q(θ′i, θ−i).
Definition I.7. Agent i has quasi-private values if there does not exist θi ∈ Θi such that
{−1, 1} ⊂ φi(θi).
An agent who has quasi-private value is certain of whether S is weakly superior to R or
R is weakly superior to S based on her private information. In other words, a quasi-private
value agent’s interim preferences over {S,R} are the same as her ex post preferences.
Lemma I.2. Suppose q is dominant strategy incentive compatible. Then q is responsive to
θi only if agent i has quasi-private values.
Lemma I.2 allows us to focus on mechanisms that only heed to agents of essentially
private values. Let PI be the set of agents who have quasi-private valuations. We then
introduce the binary relation ⇒i on Θi where i ∈ PI: θi ⇒i θ′i if φi(θi) 3 1, φi(θ′i) 3 −1, or
θi = θ
′
i. The binary relation captures the dominant strategy incentive compatibilities.
Proposition I.1. q is DSIC if and only if
1. q(θ) = q(θ′) if θi = θ′i for all i ∈ PI;
2. q(θ) ≥ q(θ′) if θi ⇒i θ′i for all i ∈ PI.
The first part of the proposition captures the essence of Lemma I.2: A DSIC mechanism
cannot be responsive to any agents other than those have quasi-private values. Also note
that if PI = ∅ then the first part holds for all s and s′. Hence, only constant mechanisms
are DSIC. The second part suggests the mechanism needs and only needs to respect quasi-
private value agents’ ordinal preferences to elicit private information from them. In other
words, the mechanism is only informed by ordinal preferences.
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According to Proposition I.1, any DSIC choice rule can be indirectly implemented by a
mechanism that only collects reports from those who have quasi-private values. Excluding
the agents not having quasi-private valuations essentially transforms the environment into a
private value setting, and therefore the proposition implies that preference interdependence
is in sharp conflict with the existence of non-trivial DSIC mechanisms. In other words, DSIC
cannot survive in general interdependent value setting.
Practically, a DSIC mechanism only respects those who have a strong opinion regarding
the relative values of R vis-a`-vis S, i.e. those who cannot be swayed by additional input
from the other agents. In other words, DSIC only allows those who are stubborn to have
their voices heard, possibly against objections from all the others agents. Since the purpose
of mechanism design is often exactly to rectify the unfortunate situation that would arise in
the absence of such a mechanism, DSIC does not achieve much in this respect.
I.3.2 A Partnership Example
Here we use a simple example to illustrate our results. This example will be re-examined
when we introduce the other IC conditions.
Two agents need to decide whether they form a partnership or not. Both agents have
two possible payoff types, H(igh) or L(ow). S represents the joint decision of no partnership,
and R represents partnership. The value of partnership depends on the types. Partnership
between two high types is very productive, in which case both agents receive a payoff of
4. Partnership between two low types is less productive, in which case both agents receive
a payoff of 1. Partnership where types mismatch is counterproductive, in which case both
agents receive a payoff of −2.
ui(θ) H L
H 4 −2
L −2 1
For simplicity, assume that there is a unique belief type associated with each payoff type
(and when discussing this example we simply use the payoff type to represent the type of an
agent), and the beliefs all come from a common prior such that every state has a probability
of 1/4.
Neither agent has quasi-private values, because for either type of the same agent, the
sign of her payoff depends on the other agent’s type, and hence she is uncertain about her
preference ranking regarding S and R despite her private information. It follows from Propo-
sition I.1 that only constant mechanisms are DSIC in this environment. This observation is
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striking because there is no conflict of interest between the two agents, yet it is still impossi-
ble to robustly (in the DSIC sense) incentivize truthful revelation of private information for
non-trivial collective decision making.
I.4 Ex Post Incentive Compatibility
In this section, we first give a characterization of EPIC and two sufficient conditions on the
payoff environment for the existence of non-constant EPIC mechanisms. Later, we show that
when the payoff type space is continuous and the payoff environment is sufficiently rich, any
EPIC mechanism is constant.
Ex post incentive compatibility is formally defined as follows.
Definition I.8. The strategy profile σ∗ is an ex post equilibrium of the mechanism 〈M1, · · · ,MN , q〉
if
ui(θˆ(t))q(σ
∗(t)) ≥ ui(θˆ(t))q(mi, σ∗−i(t−i))
for all mi ∈Mi and all t ∈ T , and all i ∈ I.
That is, for each agent i and type ti, σ
∗
i (ti) maximizes her ex post utility all possible
realizations of other agents’ types t−i conditional on other agents would play their equilibrium
strategies. If a mechanism admits a ex post equilibrium, then it satisfies ex post incentive
compatibility.
By the revelation principle, we can again focus on fully reduced direct ex post incentive
compatible mechanisms. Again, without further specifications, all mechanisms refer to fully
reduced mechanisms in this section.
Definition I.9. A fully reduced direct mechanism q is ex post incentive compatible if for any
θ ∈ Θ, i ∈ I and θ′i ∈ Θi,
ui(θ)q(θi, θ−i) ≥ ui(θ)q(θ′i, θ−i).
Therefore, under an EPIC mechanism, truth-telling is a best response for every agent
even if the state is common knowledge (given agent i’s strategy set is Θi not Θ). It equiv-
alently means that truth-telling is a best response regardless of an agent’s belief about the
distribution of the other agents’ signals. In contrast with DSIC, EPIC requires every agent
to (correctly) believe that the other agents are truthful.
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I.4.1 Characterization
Given a payoff environment 〈Θ, {ui}i∈I〉, define a binary relation→ over Θ as follows: θ → θ′
if there exists i ∈ {1, ..., N} such that: (1) θ−i = θ′−i and (2) ui(θ) > 0 or ui(θ′) < 0.
If a list of states (θ1, ..., θJ)9 satisfies θ1 → θ2... → θJ , then this list is called a path.
Moreover, if θ1 = θJ , then it is a cycle. The notation θ  θ′ is used to denote that there is
a path from θ to θ′, and θ! θ′ denotes that there is a cycle from θ to θ′.
It is clear that  and ! are both reflexive10 and transitive, and moreover ! is also
symmetric. Since! is reflexive, symmetric and transitive, it is an equivalence relation. Let
C∗ denote the equivalence class partition induced by! on Θ, i.e. θ, θ′ are in the same cell
in C∗ if and only if θ! θ′.
It will be useful to abuse notation and extend the → relation to sets of states: For a
pair of sets of states c and c′, we say c→ c′ if there exist θ ∈ c and θ′ ∈ c′ such that θ → θ′.
We extend  and ! to sets of states analogously.
A partition C of Θ is said to be acyclic if there does not exist distinct c, c′ ∈ Θ such
that c! c′. In one of the proofs we will show that C∗ is the finest acyclic partition of Θ
Proposition I.2. q is EPIC if and only if there are probabilities {qc}c∈C∗ such that:
1. q(θ) = qc if θ ∈ c.
2. qc ≥ qc′ if c c′.
Proposition I.2 shows that EPIC mechanisms are mechanisms that respect the  re-
lation and the corresponding finest acyclic partition C∗ on the state space. If two states
θ, θ′ are in the same cell of C∗, then EPIC requires the same probability of choosing R in
them; if two states are in different cells, then relationship between q(θ) and q(θ′) needs to
agree with the  relation. In other words, EPIC mechanisms are only responsive to ordinal
information.
The proposition illustrates what EPIC entails in the binary voting environment: Since
there are only two alternatives, then in any state an agent either prefers that R be chosen
with higher probability or L be chosen with higher probability, modulo indifference. EPIC
thus requires that, for any agent, unilaterally deviating to reporting untruthfully weakly
reduces the probability of R being chosen in any state where she prefers R, or increases
the probability whenever she prefers S. The states are therefore chained by such potential
unilateral deviations, and the probabilities of R being chosen must cascade down along the
 chain to prevent any upstream traffic which represents an untruthful deviation.
9The same state is allowed to appear multiple times in the list.
10The singleton list {θ} is a (degenerate) path and cycle
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I.4.2 Examples
The Partnership Example
Here we come back to the partnership example introduced in previous section. Recall that
the payoff matrix is
ui(θ) H L
H 4 −2
L −2 1
In this example, each state is a cell of the finest acyclic partition C∗, and all ex post incentive
compatible mechanisms can be characterized by the following four inequalities implied by
the second part of Proposition I.2: the probabilities of choosing R when both agents prefer
R, q1 and q4, shall be greater than their conterparts, q2 and q3, when both agents prefer S.
Generalized Condorcet jury
We analyze a classical example of a binary social choice problems—Condorcet jury voting
as an example. We consider a generalized version of it.
Each agent each gets a binary signal θi taking value of 0 or 1. There exists a payoff
function u such that ui(θ) = u(θ) for all i and u is permutation invariant, so the value of R
depends on how many 1-signals obtain. Define (θ) :=
∑N
i=1 θi. Suppose u(θ) ≥ u(θ′) if and
only if (θ) ≥ (θ′), that is, R is more valuable if there are more 1-signals. This situation
generalizes the Condorcet Jury model with the interpretation that the agents are jurors to
determine whether to convict or acquit a defendant. A 1-signal is a partial evidence that the
defendant is guilty, thus the more 1’s the more guilty the defendant could be. S represents
the decision to acquit and R to convict. The jurors prefer to acquit if there’s not enough
guilty evidence or to convict otherwise.
Figure I.1 is an example with N = 3. Each vertex of the cube is a state with the
corresponding payoff u(θ) underneath it. For example, the vertex (0, 0, 0) is the state every
agent gets signal 0, and the payoff of choosing R in this state is −4 which is below the vertex.
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Figure I.1. Condorcet Jury with N = 3
The  relation over states and the finest acyclic partition C∗ and are represented by
the arrows and colored sets in the figure. The partition C∗ and the  relation over sets of
states are represented by Figure I.2.
Figure I.2. Finest Acyclic Partition C∗
Hence, a mechanism is EPIC if and only if all the states in the blue cell share the same
probability of choosing R, q1, all the states in the blue cell share the same probability of
choosing R, q2, and q1 ≥ q2.
I.4.3 Existence of Non-constant EPIC Mechanism
We discuss the existence and uniqueness of non-constant EPIC mechanism in this subsection.
Proposition I.3. The following statements are equivalent:
1. There exists a non-constant EPIC mechanism.
2. C∗ is not a singleton.
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3. Θ can be bipartitioned into cA and cB such that cB 6→ cA.
4. There exist θ, θ′ ∈ Θ such that θ 6 θ′.
How useful Proposition I.3 is for a particular environment depends on how easy it is
to determine C∗. If the state space is large and has no obvious structure, then determining
C∗ could be computationally exhausting. Moreover, since the proposition is formulated not
directly in terms of the environment parameters, but instead indirectly in terms of the ab-
stract structure underpinning the environment, it is difficult to extract much intuition about
when and why a non-constant mechanism exists. To have a better understanding in this
respect, we propose two sufficient conditions for the existence of non-constant mechanisms
that are formulated directly in terms of the environment parameters.
The first condition is directly inherited from the observation in Proposition I.1 that
there are non-constant DSIC mechanisms if and only if there are agents with quasi-private
values. Hence, we have the following corollary.
Corollary I.1. Suppose there exists at least one agent with quasi-private values. Then there
exist non-constant EPIC mechanisms.
Since a DSIC mechanism must also be an EPIC mechanism, the existence of agents with
quasi-private values obviously implies that there are non-constant EPIC mechanisms.
The second condition is motivated by the Condorcet jury voting example: It is not
unusual that agents might have identical ex post preferences. Formally,
Definition I.10. Agents have common interests if there exists a payoff function u such that
sgn(ui(θ)) = sgn(u(θ)) for all i ∈ I and θ ∈ Θ.
Proposition I.4. Suppose agents have common interests. Then the ex post Pareto efficient
mechanism q∗ is EPIC where
q∗(θ) =
1, u(θ) ≥ 00, u(θ) < 0
Proposition I.4 indicates common interests is a sufficient condition for the existence of
non-constant EPIC mechanisms.
That the Pareto efficient mechanism is EPIC is not surprising given common interests.
It is easy to see that the truth-telling strategy profile that simultaneously maximizes every
agent’s ex post payoff is an ex post equilibrium, because it is impossible for any agent to
increase the payoff by unilateral deviation as the upper bound is already reached.
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These two sufficient conditions for existence of non-constant EPIC mechanisms — the
existence of agents with quasi-private values and common interests — are satisfied in many
common environments, yet there are many other environments in which they are violated.
Indeed, any general environment in which there is sufficient preference interdependence and
preference heterogeneity would violate both conditions. Do non-constant EPIC mechanisms
exist in those environments? Yes, there might exist non-constant mechanisms. 11 However,
as we will show in the extension to continuous payoff state spaces in the next subsection,
these two sufficient conditions are “almost necessary” for the existence of non-constant EPIC
mechanisms, in the sense that any continuous type space that violates mild generalizations
of both conditions only admits constant EPIC mechanisms.
I.4.4 Continuous Type Spaces: A Negative Result
In this subsection, we consider continuous payoff state spaces and show that, apart from
mild generalizations of quasi-private values and common interests, all other environments
admit only constant EPIC mechanism.
To simplify exposition, we assume I = {1, 2}, Θ = [0, 1]2, and ui is continuously differ-
entiable on Θ.12
Let us introduce some useful notation: For agent i, let ICi denote the set of all payoff
states in which i is indifferent between S and R, and let BDi denote the set of all payoff
states θ such that for any  > 0, there is a payoff state where i strictly prefers S to R and
there is also a payoff state where i strictly prefers R to S in the −neighborhood of θ under
the Euclidean norm. Clearly BDi ⊂ ICi because ui is continuously differentiable.
Definition I.11. Given Θ, the agents’ preferences are generically interdependent if for
any i ∈ I, θ ∈ BDi and j 6= i,
∂ui(θ)
∂θj
6= 0.
If preferences are generically interdependent, then when agent i is in a state where
she is indifferent between S and R, a slight change in the payoff type of agent j breaks
the indifference. In other words, a slight change in j’s payoff type matters to i when i is
indifferent between S and R. This, of course, cannot hold if i has quasi-private values.
11The example illustrated in Figure I.3 in the appendix is a non-constant EPIC mechanism in such an
environment.
12If non-constant EPIC mechanisms do not exist in a two agent collective choice problem, it does not exist
in other collective choice problems.
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Definition I.12. Given Θ, the agents’ preferences are generically heterogeneous if for
any θ ∈ BD1 ∩ BD2 and any  > 0, there exists θ′ in the −neighborhood of θ such that
u1(θ
′)u2(θ′) < 0.
If preferences are generically heterogeneous, then for any payoff state where both agents
are indifferent between S and R, there is a close enough payoff state where the agents have
opposite preferences. Generic preference heterogeneity says that the two agents cannot agree
everywhere: In the least, when both of them agree that S and R are equally good, a slight
change in the state can cause them to disagree.
We denote Θ \ (IC1 ∪ IC2) by Θ¯ which is the set of payoff states in which both agents
have strict ex post preferences. Since u is continuously differentiable, the set IC1 ∪ IC2 is of
Lebesgue measure zero in R2.
Proposition I.5. If the agents’ preferences are generically interdependent and generically
heterogeneous, then any ex post incentive compatible mechanism is constant over Θ¯.
Proposition I.5 shows that EPIC can be restrictive at times, and we would like to
suggest that this is often the case, as environments where preferences are not generically
interdependent and heterogeneous are exceptions rather than the norm. To illustrate the
point, suppose in addition that u1 and u2 are both strictly increasing in θ. Therefore BD1
and BD2 both are curves cutting through the [0, 1]
2 square. The proposition implies that
all EPIC mechanisms are constant as long as there is not a vertical section on the BD1
curve, there is not a horizontal section on the BD2 curve, and the two curves overlap only
on finitely many points.
Why do non-constant mechanisms fare better on finite payoff sate spaces? One way
to understand the reason is thinking about the finite state space as a coarse, low-resolution
discretization of the continuous space. For example, instead of being fully conscious of
her exact payoff type which can be any real number between 0 and 1, agent i = 1, 2 only
roughly rounds the her payoff type to the first decimal place, and consequently she in effect
has only 10 payoff types: < 0 ∼ 1 >, ..., < 0.9 ∼ 1 >. On the continuous payoff space,
such rough rounding implies that the BDi curve traces along the t1 = 0, 0.1, ..., 1 and t2 =
0, 0.1, ..., 1 grid lines. Obviously this irons the otherwise swerving BDi curve into horizontal
and vertical sections, and moreover the two curves, otherwise not overlapping, are more
likely to be squeezed onto the same section of a grid line. Therefore discretization makes the
preferences less generically interdependent and less generically heterogeneous, thus admitting
non-constant EPIC mechanisms.
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I.5 Interim Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibil-
ity
It is useful to first define what interim dominant strategies are.
Definition I.13. For agent i, strategy σi is an interim dominant strategy in mechanism
〈M1, · · · ,MN , q〉 if Ui(σi(ti), σ−i|ti) ≥ Ui(mi, σ−i|ti) for any ti ∈ Ti, mi ∈ Mi and σ−i :
T−i → M−i, where Ui(σi, σ−i|ti) denotes agent i’s interim expected payoff if she follows
strategy σi, other agents follow strategies given by σ−i, and her type is ti.
In plain words, σi prescribes for every type ti of agent i a strategy that maximizes her
interim expected payoff regardless of what strategies other agents follow. It is worth noting
that agent i’s subjective belief βˆi(ti) is used in computing her interim expected payoff.
We can then define interim dominant strategy equilibrium and interim dominant strat-
egy incentive compatibility as follows.
Definition I.14. Strategy profile σ∗ is an interim dominant strategy equilibrium of mecha-
nism 〈M1, · · · ,MN , q〉 if σ∗i is an interim dominant strategy for every agent i = 1, ..., N .
If a mechanism admits an interim dominant strategy equilibrium, then it satisfies interim
dominant strategy incentive compatibility.
As usual, there is a general revelation principle that can simplify analysis by allowing
us to focus on direct mechanisms. Later on will discuss a variation of the direct mechanism
and respectively develop another revelation principle.
Lemma I.3. (Revelation Principle 1) Let σ∗ be an interim dominant strategy equilibrium
of any mechanism 〈M1, · · · ,MN , q〉. Construct a direct mechanism 〈M1,M2, . . . ,MN , q〉 as
follows:
1. M i = Ti for all i ∈ I.
2. q(t) = q(σ∗(t)) for any t ∈ T .
Then in this direct mechanism, the strategies given by σ∗i (ti) = ti for all i ∈ I and ti ∈ Ti
form an interim dominant strategy equilibrium. Moreover, σ∗ and σ∗ are outcome equivalent.
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Definition I.15. A direct mechanism 〈T1, ..., TN , q〉 is interim dominant strategy incentive
compatible if
Ui(ti, σ−i|, ti) ≥ Ui(t′i, σ−i|, ti)
all σ−i : T−i → T−i, for all ti, t′i ∈ Ti and all i ∈ I, where
Ui(t
′
i, σ−i|, ti) =
∑
t−i∈Ti
βˆi(ti)[t−i]q(t′i, σ−i(t−i))ui(θˆ(ti, t−i))
is agent i’s expected payoff of reporting t′i given her type is ti and other agents’ strategy is
σ−i.
I.5.1 IDSIC Mechanisms are Higher-Order Belief-Free
An IDSIC mechanism is by definition strategically belief-free, but it is not informationally
belief-free, because whether a strategy is interim dominant depends on an agent’s belief.
In this section, though, we show that an agent’s first-order belief is sufficient to determine
whether a strategy is interim dominant, whereas higher-order beliefs do not matter.
Recall that agent i’s first-order belief, when her type is ti, assigns probability bˆi(ti)[θ−i]
to the event that the type profile of the other agents is θ−i.
Definition I.16. An strategy profile σ is higher-order belief-independent if σi(ti) =
σi(t
′
i) for any ti, t
′
i such that θˆi(ti) = θˆi(t
′
i) and bˆi(ti) = bˆi(t
′
i).
In words, a higher-order belief-independent strategy profile prescribes the same strategy
for all types of agent i that have the same payoff type and first-order belief.
We are ready to start showing the connection between IDSIC and the higher-order
belief-free property, To set the stage, let us introduce one more notation: Let IDMi(ti)
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denote the set of all messages mi such that there is some interim dominant strategy σi
where σi(ti) = mi. It is obvious that σi is an interim dominant strategy if and only if
σi(ti) ∈ IDMi(ti) for every ti ∈ Ti.
Lemma I.4. IDMi(ti) = IDMi(t
′
i) for any i ∈ I and any ti, t′i ∈ Ti such that θˆi(ti) = θˆi(t′i)
and bˆi(ti) = bˆi(t
′
i).
The Lemma essentially shows that if two types of agent i has the same payoff type and
first-order beliefs, then they are strategically “identical” if we focus on interim dominant
strategy equilibria, because the two types are presented with the same set of messages that
13IDM represents “interim dominant messages”
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dominate other messages at the respective interim stages. This observation leads to the
following Proposition.
Proposition I.6. Mechanism 〈M1, ...,MN , q〉 has an interim dominant strategy equilibrium
if and only if it has an interim dominant strategy equilibrium that is higher-order belief-
independent.
The Proposition shows that, in addition to the built-in strategically belief-free prop-
erty, any IDSIC mechanism also has what we may call the “informationally higher-order
belief-free” property, as there is always an interim dominant strategy equilibrium that does
not depend on higher-order beliefs. In comparison, the informationally belief-free property
introduced in the Introduction is, in this sense, informationally higher-order and first-order
belief-free.
Proposition I.6 and Lemma I.5 suggest that, to find an interim dominant strategy equi-
librium, or to find an IDSIC mechanism, it is without loss of generality to focus only on
higher-order belief-independent strategy profiles where only payoff types and first-order be-
liefs matter. Since the payoff types and first-order beliefs type are of a particular importance
with respect to IDSIC, it is useful to refer to them with special terminology:
Definition I.17. Agent i’s reduced type hi := (θi, bi) consist of her payoff type and her
first-order belief. Agent i’s reduced type space is Hi := Θi ×Bi.
Naturally, there is a Revelation Principle with respect to reduced types.
Lemma I.5. (Revelation Principle 2) Let σ∗ be a higher-order belief-independent interim
dominant strategy equilibrium of a mechanism 〈M1,M2, . . . ,MN , q〉. Construct a reduced
direct mechanism 〈M1,M2, . . . ,MN , q〉 as follows:
1. M i = Hi for all i ∈ I .
2. q(h) = q
(
σ∗(h)) for all h ∈ H = H1 × ...×HN .
Then in this reduced direct mechanism the strategies given by σ∗i (ti) = (θˆi(ti), bˆi(ti)) for
all i ∈ I and ti ∈ Ti form an interim dominant strategy equilibrium that is higher-order
belief-independent. Moreover, σ∗ and σ∗ are outcome equivalent.
In the reduced direct mechanism as constructed in the Lemma, an agent reports her
reduced type, instead of her original type. It may seem that reporting the reduced type hi =
(θi, bi) seems to be a more tedious job than reporting the original type ti, as agent imight need
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to derive her payoff type and first-order belief from her type ti, which introduces additional
labor. This appearance, though, is merely an artifact of the Harsanyian formulation of the
type space. Indeed, the type ti is an abstraction of an agent’s infinite belief hierarchies,
which the agent is likely to be conscious of, whereas her payoff type and first-order belief
are more concrete and salient objects and hence are more likely to be in her awareness and
more easily to be explicitly reported.
Remark I.1. All results in this subsection are not restricted to the special two-alternative
setting of the paper, as they also apply to settings with any finite number of alternatives.
I.5.2 Characterization
In this subsection we characterize the set of all IDSIC reduced direct mechanisms.
For any agent i and hi = (θi, bi) ∈ Hi define
αi(θi, bi) :=
∑
{θ−i|ui(θi,θ−i)>0}
bi(θ−i)ui(θi, θ−i),
αi(θi, bi) :=
∑
{θ−i|ui(θi,θ−i)<0}
bi(θ−i)ui(θi, θ−i),
and
αi(θi, bi) :=
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
bi(θi)ui(θi, θ−i).
Clearly we have αi(hi) ≤ 0 ≤ αi(hi) and αi(hi) + αi(hi) = αi(hi). The sign of αi(hi) is
positive/negative when agent i at the interim stage prefers R/S. αi(hi) is the expected
payoff to agent i of reduced type hi from the choice rule that chooses R whenever R is ex
post preferred to S. Similarly αi(hi) is the expected payoff from the choice rule that chooses
R whenever S is ex post preferred to R.
Define H+i := {hi ∈ Hi|αi(hi) > 0}, H−i := {hi ∈ Hi|αi(hi) < 0}, and H0i := {hi ∈
Hi|αi(hi) = 0} for each i ∈ I. H+i is the set of reduced types in which agent i strictly
prefers R over S in the interim stage, H−i is the set of reduced types in which agent i strictly
prefers S over R in the interim stage, and H0i is the set of reduced types in which agent i is
indifferent.
The following lemma will be useful for us to develop a characterization of IDSIC reduced
revelation mechanisms.
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Lemma I.6. q is IDSIC if and only if for any i = 1, ..., N , hi, h
′
i ∈ Hi, and h−i, h′−i ∈ H−i:
αi(hi)
(
q(hi, h−i)− q(h′i, h−i)
)
+ αi(hi)
(
q(hi, h
′
−i)− q(h′i, h′−i)
) ≥ 0. (I.2)
The Lemma is based on the observation that, among many possible incentive constraints,
the only one that is binding for agent i of reduced type hi corresponds to the case that the
other agents coordinate on on the same message profile (h−i) whenever agent i of type hi ex
post prefers S, or they coordinate on another message profile (h′−i) whenever agent i of type
hi ex post prefers R.
The characterization of IDSIC reduced direct mechanisms will depend on crucial pa-
rameters defined as follows: For agent i and reduced type hi,
ρi(hi) :=

αi(hi)
−αi(hi)
if hi ∈ H+i
1 if hi ∈ H0i
−αi(hi)
αi(hi)
if hi ∈ H−i
And for agent i,
ρi := min
hi∈Hi
ρi(hi).
It is easy to verify that ρi ≥ 1.
We first characterize IDSIC reduced direct mechanisms where there are no types indif-
ferent between S and R at the interim stage. The general characterization is given later on
at Proposition I.8.
Proposition I.7. Suppose H0i = ∅ for all i. A reduced direct mechanism q is IDSIC if
and only if for any agent i and hi ∈ H−i, there are two numbers qi(h−i) and qi(h−i), where
qi(h−i) ≥ qi(h−i), such that:
1.
q(hi, h−i) =
qi(h−i) if hi ∈ H+iq
i
(h−i) if hi ∈ H−i
2.
max
h−i∈H−i
(
qi(h−i)− qi(h−i)
)
≤ ρi min
h−i∈H−i
(
qi(h−i)− qi(h−i)
)
.
Condition 1 is noteworthy in that all types with the same interim ordinal preference
are treated equally by the mechanism. In other words, an IDSIC reduced mechanism elicits
preference rankings but has to ignore preference intensities. When H0i is empty, the interim
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preference ranking that agent i can have is at most two, and hence conditional on the other
agents’ reports h−i, agent i’s marginal influence on the choice probability is binary: high
(leading to qi(h−i)) or low (leading to qi(h−i)). It is then easy to see that the mechanism can
be simulated by a much simpler mechanism, which we call a binary voting mechanism.
In a binary voting mechanism, every agent is given two messages: R and S. The R message
is interpreted as a vote supporting the alternative R, whereas the S message is a vote
supporting the alternative S. A unilateral switch from sending message S to sending R
raises the chance that alternative R is chosen. Binary voting is clearly the most common
and important voting format used for bi-candidate public choice.
Condition 2 shows, despite that an IDSIC reduced direct mechanism does not elicit an
agent’s interim preference intensity, that intensity still constrains the mechanism. To see
this, observe that when the other agents report h−i, agent i’s marginal voting power can
be represented by qi(h−i) − qi(h−i), which is the marginal increase in the probability of R
being chosen if i unilaterally switches from reporting to be a type in H−i to reporting to be
a type in H+i . Condition 2 says that this marginal voting power cannot fluctuate too widely
with h−i, i.e, the ratio of agent i’s maximal marginal voting power maxh−i(qi(h−i)− qi(h−i))
to her minimal marginal voting power minh−i qi(h−i) − qi(h−i) cannot be higher than the
parameter ρi which depends on the agent’s interim preference intensities.
There is a special class of mechanisms such that every agent’s marginal voting power is
constant, and hence Condition 2 is immediately satisfied. This class of mechanism, which
we will formally define as “additive mechanisms” in Definition I.18 and discuss with more
details, will turn out to be IDSIC with respect to any type space based on any payoff state
space. In other words, additive mechanisms are not only robust, but also versatile.
On the other hand, majority voting mechanisms, where R is chosen if and only if there
are more than k votes for R, are not IDSIC exactly because an agent’s marginal voting power
fluctuates too much. Indeed, when the agent is pivotal, her marginal voting power is the
maximal 1, whereas when he is not pivotal, her marginal power is the minimal 0.
Now we drop the assumption that H0i is empty for every i and present the characteri-
zation for IDSIC reduced direct mechanisms in this general case.
Proposition I.8. A reduced direct mechanism q is IDSIC if and only if for any agent i and
h−i ∈ H−i there are two numbers, qi(h−i) and qi(h−i) where qi(h−i) ≥ qi(h−i), such that:
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1.
q(hi, h−i)

= qi(h−i) if hi ∈ H+i
∈ [q
i
(h−i), qi(h−i)] if hi ∈ H0i
= q
i
(h−i) if hi ∈ H−i
2. If H0i = ∅, then
max
h−i∈H−i
(
qi(h−i)− qi(h−i)
)
≤ ρi min
h−i∈H−i
(
qi(h−i)− qi(h−i)
)
.
If H0i 6= ∅, then q(hi, h−i)− q(h′i, h−i) is independent of h−i.
The biggest difference between Proposition I.7 and Proposition I.8 is that the existence
of an reduced type that is interim indifferent between S and R immediately pushes the
parameter ρi to the lower bound 1, which implies that agent i’s marginal voting power has
to be constant.
I.5.3 Example
Here we come back to the partnership example again. Recall that we assume there is a
unique belief type associated with each payoff type and the beliefs all come from a common
prior such that every state has a probability of 1/4. The payoff matrix is
ui(θ) H L
H 4 −2
L −2 1
In order to find all IDSIC mechanisms in this example, we first calculate agents’ interim
preferences. For example, α1(H) =
1
4
4 + 1
4
(−2) = 1/2. Then we have α2(H) = 1/2 > 0 and
α1(L) = α2(L) = −1/4 < 0. Monotonicity conditions require q(H,H) ≥ q(L,H), q(H,L) ≥
q(L,L), q(H,H) ≥ q(H,L), q(L,H) ≥ q(L,L).
Second, we compute each agent’s intensity ratio. When agent 1 is the H type, α1(H) =
1
4
4 = 1 and α1(H) =
1
4
(−2) = −1/2. Then ρ1(H) = α1(H)/|α1(H)| = 2. Similarly, we
have ρ1(H) = ρ2(H) = ρ2(L) = 2 which leads ρ1 = ρ2 = 2. Smoothness conditions are the
following,
1
2
≤ q(H,H)− q(L,H)
q(H,L)− q(L,L) ≤ 2,
1
2
≤ q(H,H)− q(H,L)
q(L,L)− q(L,H) ≤ 2.
Now suppose q(H,H) = 1, q(H,L) = 1/2, and q(L,L) = 0. Then q is IDSIC if and only
if 1/4 ≤ q(L,H) ≤ 3/4.
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I.5.4 Universal Existence of Non-Constant IDSIC Mechanisms
In this section, we show that non-constant IDSIC mechanisms universally exist over all type
spaces. In fact, they are closely related to additive mechanisms that we already informally
mentioned in Section I.5.2. Here we formally define them:
Definition I.18. An indirect mechanism 〈M1, ...,MN , q〉 where |Mi| ≥ 2 for all i is an
additive mechanism if there exist functions piqi : Mi → [0, 1] such that q(m1, ...,mN) =∑
i∈I pi
q
i (mi).
In an additive mechanism, every message mi has a “score” pi
q
i (mi) attached to it, and
the eventual probability that R is chosen is the sum of the scores of the chosen messages.
Proposition I.9. Fix a payoff environment. A mechanism (M1, ...,MN , q) is IDSIC in all
type spaces if and only if it is additive.14
The Proposition establishes the universal existence of non-constant IDSIC mechanisms,
because additive mechanisms are always IDSIC, and because most additive mechanisms are
non-constant. Moreover, it also shows that additive mechanisms are versatile, in the sense
that they are IDSIC with respect too many (in this case, all) type spaces, and hence are
expected to function well even if the underlying type space is uncertain. We will discuss this
versatility aspect in the next subsection.
Additive mechanisms also have a close relation with a class of well-known social choice
rules: random dictatorships.
Definition I.19. A social choice rule q : T → [0, 1] is a random dictatorship if there
exist numbers (λqi )i∈I , where λ
q
i ∈ [0, 1] and
∑
i∈I λi ≤ 1, and functions µqi : Ti → [0, 1] where
µqi (ti) = 1 if αi(ti) > 0 and µ
q
i (ti) = 0 if αi(ti) < 0, and a constant λ˜
q ∈ [0, 1 −∑i∈I λi],
such that
q(t) =
∑
i∈I
λqiµ
q
i (ti) + λ˜
q.
Under a random dictatorship rule, agent i has chance (with a probability of λqi ) to be
the “dictator” in the event of which her interim preferred alternative is chosen by the rule.
There is also a chance (with a probability of λ˜1) that no agent is chosen to be the random
dictator and R is in this case chosen with certainty.
14We rule out mechanisms with trivial message sets |Mi| = 1 for some i in the proposition.
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The following two result establish the close connection between additive mechanisms
and random dictatorship rules.
Proposition I.10. Suppose mechanism (M1, ...,MN , q) is an additive mechanism, and σ
∗ is
an interim dominant strategy equilibrium of it. Then the social choice function q ◦ σ∗ : T →
[0, 1] is a random dictatorship.
Proposition I.11. If q is a random dictatorship, then the direct mechanism (T, q) is an
additive voting mechanisms.
How should we interpret the results? Do they mean that IDSIC mechanisms in general
are not ideal, because they are “dictatorial” by nature? We recommend that “dictatorship”
not be taken at the face value, because random dictatorships are social choice rules, not
mechanisms. In other words, the actual mechanism that induces a random dictatorship need
not entail the seemingly undemocratic element of someone dictating a decision, possibly
against the prevailing public opinion. Proposition I.10 shows that additive mechanisms,
which can be perfectly democratic and fair formally and actually if every agent has the same
marginal voting power piqi , induces a random dictatorship rule nonetheless. We observe that
the random “dictator” under a random dictatorship is as dictatorial as the median voter in
the Median Voter Theorem who de facto decides the voting outcome, which is to say not
very much dictatorial at all.
I.5.5 Versatile IDSIC Mechanisms
In this sub-section we show that there are IDSIC mechanisms that have a nice property:
versatility. A mechanism is versatile if it is able to handle a wide variety of situations and
is and less reliant on the configuration of the environment. “Aye-Nay” voting used in many
legislative procedures, for instance, is versatile, as it handles a budgeting bill as well as an
impeachment motion, despite the great difference between these two issues. It is no wonder
why such a mechanism has been consistently used over history and across the globe.
Now we set the stage to formally discuss versatility. We identify three building blocks of
any collective choice environment: The underlying payoff state space Θ, the payoff functions
{ui}i∈I defined with respect to Θ, and the type space T . We jointly call these three elements
the environment concerning the collective choice problem, and denote it as E. Let E
denote the set of all environments, where, specifically, the underlying payoff state space may
vary.
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Definition I.20. A mechanism is versatile with respect to a given incentive compatibility
if the mechanism satisfies that incentive compatibility given any E ∈ E .
Our discussion on DSIC and EPIC shows that no non-constant mechanisms are ver-
satile with respect to those two incentive compatibility conditions. However, non-constant
mechanisms that are versatile with respect to IDSIC do exist. In fact, as the following result
shows, they have a very simple characterization.
Proposition I.12. Any binary additive voting rule is versatile with respect to IDSIC.
Proposition I.12 shows that even if the designer is agnostic not only to the belief envi-
ronment (type spaces) but also to the payoff environment, she is able to find a mechanism
that is IDSIC.
Moreover, when we know more about the environment, we can find more mechanisms
other than binary additive voting mechanisms that are IDSIC.
Fix any type space, and an agent i and her type ti. Let vi(ti) :=
αi(θˆi(ti), bˆi(ti))
|αi(θˆi(ti), bˆi(ti))|
be called this type’s virtual type. For any environment E let V := V1 × ...VN where
Vi = {vi(ti) : ti ∈ Ti} denotes the virtual type space induced by E. Note that the
virtual type space of any original type space is a subspace of (R ∪ {−∞,∞})N . Given any
environment, an agent can compute her virtual value (which is a real number) by considering
her payoff type and first-order belief.
Proposition I.13. Given a binary voting mechanism q. If an environment E induces a
virtual type space V such that vi /∈ (1/ηi, ηi) for all vi ∈ Vi and i ∈ I, then q is IDSIC on E,
where
ηi =
maxm−i q(1,m−i)− q(0,m−i)
minm−i q(1,m−i)− q(0,m−i)
for all i ∈ I.
If the designer knows more about the environment, the mechanism may deviate more
from binary additive voting without violating IDSIC.
I.5.6 DSIC = EPIC ∩ IDSIC
In this subsection, we show that the joint of the two “qualified” robustness conditions —
IDSIC and EPIC — is exactly DSIC.
Proposition I.14. A mechanism is DSIC if and only if it is EPIC and IDSIC.
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The “only if” direction is immediate. For better exposition, we assume the type space
is the payoff type space. In order to understand the intuition behind the “if” direction,
we shall first recall the defining property of DSIC is that it can not be responsive to any
not privately informed agents. Consider a not privately informed agent i. Suppose agent
i’s interim preferences is R, αi(θi) > 0, upon observing her own signal θi, IDSIC requires
θi ∈ argmaxθ′iq(θ′i, θ−i) for all θ−i. Since agent i doesn’t have quasi private value, there
exists θ−i such that ui(θi, θ−i) < 0 in which her ex post preferences is L. EPIC demands
θi ∈ argminθ′iq(θ′i, θ−i) for that θ−i. As a result, q(θi, θ−i) is a constant function over θi.
In other words, EPIC respects agents’ ex post preferences while IDSIC follows agents’
interim preferences. Disagreements between these two arise whenever the agent does not
have quasi private values. The tension is so severe that complying with one leads to a
violation of the other. Consequently, any EPIC and IDSIC mechanism cannot be responsive
to any agent who does not have quasi private value.
I.6 Conclusion
We study robust mechanisms without transfers in a setting where there are two alternatives,
the agents’ preferences are interdependent, and the underlying type space is rich. Three
notions of robustness (incentive compatibilities) are examined. The first two are widely
used: dominant strategy incentive compatibility and ex post incentive compatibility. The
former permits nothing but constant mechanisms and the latter is more lenient, but only
so in finite type spaces — when the type space is continuous, non-constant mechanisms are
again ruled out under weak conditions.
The interdependent values setting enables us to study another natural notion of robustness—
interim dominant strategy incentive compatibility. It requires that each agent has a weakly
interim dominant strategy— that is, conditional on each agent’s own private information, her
strategy must maximize her expected payoff for all possible strategies the other agents could
use. We establish a revelation principle that allows the mechanisms to simply ask the agents
to reveal their payoff type and first-order beliefs. The characterization suggests a simple
binary voting rule: Each agent reports Yes/No to the mechanism. Moreover, if the binary
voting rule is also additive (each agent’s influence is independent with other agents reports),
then the indirect mechanism is versatile: It admits interim dominant strategy equilibrium
on all payoff environments and all corresponding type spaces.
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I.7 Additional Results on EPIC Mechanisms
I.7.1 Monotonicity and Efficiency
It turns out Monotonicity plays a major role on the efficiency property of EPIC mechanisms.
We define Θ+ := {θ ∈ Θ|ui(θ) > 0 for all i ∈ I} and Θ− := {θ ∈ Θ|ui(θ) < 0 for all i ∈ I}.
Θ+ is the set of states in which all agents strictly prefer R over S, and Θ− is the set of states
in which all agents strictly prefer S over R.
Definition I.21. A mechanism q is ex post Pareto efficient if q(θ) = 1 for all θ ∈ Θ+ and
q(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ Θ− .
A mechanism q is ex post efficient if it respects unanimity of strict preference on the
part of the agents.
Definition I.22. A mechanism q is ex post efficient in the range if minθ∈Θ+ q(θ) ≥ maxθ∈Θ− q(θ).
A mechanism q is ex post efficient in the range if the smallest probability of choosing R
when all agents prefer R is higher than the greatest probability of choosing R when when
all agents prefer S.
Definition I.23. A mechanism q is grossly Pareto inefficient if maxθ∈Θ+ q(θ) < minθ∈Θ− q(θ).
A mechanism q is grossly efficient in the range if the largest probability of choosing R
when all agents prefer R is lower than the smallest probability of choosing R when when all
agents prefer S.
In any state θ, agent i may be of the following three types in terms of her preference over
R vs. S: she may prefer R to S (sgn(ui(θ)) > 0), she may be indifferent (sgn(ui(θ)) = 0), or
she may prefer S to R (sgn(ui(θ)) < 0).
Definition I.24. ui(θ) is monotone with respect to θj if there is a linear order (i)j on Θj
such that θj (i)j θ′j implies
sgn(ui((θj, θ−j)) ≥ sgn(ui((θ′j, θ−j))
for all θ−j.
Monotonicity means that agent i has a clear interpretation of agent j’s private signal:
higher ranked θj implies higher payoff of choosing R, regardless of θ−j. In the case that ui
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is not monotone w.r.t. θj, agent i’s interpretation of θj depends on the realization of other
private signals.
Also observe that, according to our definition, every private value utility function is
monotone.
We say that the environment or {ui}i∈I is monotone if every agent has monotone pref-
erence. Formally,
Definition I.25. {ui}i∈I is monotone if for each agent i there is a collection of linear orders
{(i)j }j∈I on {Θj}j∈I such that if θj (i)j θ′j, then
sgn(ui((θj, θ−j)) ≥ sgn(ui((θ′j, θ−j))
for all θ−j and all i.
Though monotonicity seems to be strong, it is not strong enough to insure every EPIC
mechanism is Pareto efficient. Figure I.3 shows an extreme counterexample. Similar to
Figure I.1, each agent has two possible signals {0, 1}, each vertex of the cube represents a
state, and the green vector under each state is the corresponding payoff vector. For example,
vertex (0, 1, 1) represents the state agent 1 gets signal 0 and both agent 2 and 3 get signal 1.
The payoff vector (−2, 2, 2) means the ex post payoff of choosing R in state (0, 1, 1) is −2 for
agent 1, and 2 for agent 2 and agent 3. It can be verified that {ui}i∈I is monotone, but no
EPIC mechanism is Pareto efficient. Furthermore, since Θ− = {(1, 1, 1)}, Θ+ = {(0, 0, 0)}
and (1, 1, 1) (0, 0, 0), any non-constant EPIC mechanism is grossly Pareto inefficient, i.e.
maxs∈Θ+ q(s) ≤ mins∈Θ− q(s).
Hence, in this extreme example, any EPIC mechanism ”cannot” response to any private
information in the sense that responding to private information leads to efficiency loss.
A key feature of the environment is that though each agent i has an interpretation of
each signal θj which is captured by the linear order (i)j , agents disagree with each other
regarding the interpretations of signals, for example, agent 1 thinks θ1 = 1 is a “good” signal
for R, while agents 2 and 3 think θ1 = 1 is a “bad” signal for R. This observation leads to
the following strengthening of monotonicity.
Definition I.26. {ui}i∈I is uniformly monotone if it is monotone and the linear order {(i)j
}j∈I is independent of i. That is, there is a collection of linear orders {j}j∈I on {Θj}j∈I
such that such that if θj i θ′j, then
sgn(ui((θi, θ−i)) ≥ sgn(ui((θ′i, θ−i))
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Figure I.3. An Example
for all θ−j and all i.
Monotonicity requires that each agent i has clear (and her own) interpretation of θj.
On top of that, uniform monotonicity makes sure every agent’s interpretation is the same
which is much stronger than what monotonicity asks for. However, both cases are common
in reality. For example, most college admission officers would agree higher SAT scores could
be the signal of competitive applicants; while different voters may have different tastes over
political candidates’ ideologies and policies.
Proposition I.15. Suppose {ui(s)}i∈I is uniformly monotone, then any EPIC mechanism
is Pareto efficient in the range.
I.7.2 Uniqueness
We focus on the existence of non-constant EPIC mechanisms in the main text. Here we
provide a uniqueness result.
Definition I.27. A mechanism q is a monotone transformation of q′ if there is a weakly
increasing function f : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] such that
q(θ) = f(q′(θ))
for all θ ∈ Θ.
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Proposition I.16. Suppose agents have common interests and {ui}i∈I is uniformly mono-
tone, then any non-constant EPIC mechanism q is a monotone transformation of q∗.
Proposition I.16 states that, under uniform monotonicity and common interests, there
is a unique class of non-constant EPIC mechanisms, and the Pareto efficient mechanism is
one of them.
I.7.3 Optimal Design
Suppose there is a mechanism designer whose preference over mechanisms is represented by
the utility function d(q) that is linear in q:
d(q) =
∑
s∈S
δ(θ)q(θ).
Note that δ(θ) can reflect the designer’s own preference over R vs S in θ, or it can reflect
the designer’s concern for the agents’ welfare. For instance, if δ(θ) =
∑N
i=1 ui(θ) then d is
utilitarian.
Fix a payoff environment, we denote EP the set of all EPIC mechanisms.
Definition I.28. A mechanism q¯ is optimal among all EPIC mechanisms if
d(q¯) = sup
q∈EP
d(q)
Lemma I.7. There is an optimal EPIC mechanism that is deterministic.
Lemma I.7 and Proposition I.2 jointly imply that optimal design is simplified to assigning
qc ∈ {0, 1} to every c ∈ C∗ respecting that qc ≥ qc′ if c c′.
Below we explicitly describe a procedure that returns an optimal mechanism.
Step 1. Construct the set CB of all acyclic bipartitions of C∗.15 Thus, any γ ∈ C∗ takes the
form of γ = {C1(γ), C2(γ)} where c′ 6→ c for any c ∈ C1(γ) and c′ ∈ C2(γ).
Step 2. For every γ ∈ CB:
– If there exist c ∈ C1(γ) and c′ ∈ C2(γ) such that c → c′, then define cˆ(γ) =
∪c∈C1(γ)c.
15Lemma I.11 implies that (C∗, ) corresponds to a directed acyclic graph (DAG). The construction of
CB is equivalent to finding all acyclic bipartitions of the DAG induced by (C∗,→).
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– Otherwise, define cˆ(γ) = argmaxC∈{C1(γ),C2(γ)}
∑
c∈C
∑
s∈c δ(θ).
Let v(γ) :=
∑
s∈cˆ(γ) δ(θ).
Step 3. Pick any γ∗ ∈ argmaxγ∈CBv(γ).
Step 4. Compare v(γ∗) and max{0,∑θ∈Θ δ(θ)}:
– If v(γ∗) > max{0,∑θ∈Θ δ(θ)}, then return q¯ where q¯(θ) = 1 if θ ∈ cˆ(γ∗) and
q¯(θ) = 0 if θ 6∈ cˆ(γ∗).
– If v(γ∗) ≤ max{0,∑θ∈Θ δ(θ)} and max{0,∑θ∈Θ δ(θ)} ≥ 0, then return q¯ where
q¯(θ) = 1 for every θ ∈ Θ.
– If v(γ∗) ≤ max{0,∑θ∈Θ δ(θ)} and max{0,∑θ∈Θ δ(θ)} < 0, then return q¯ where
q¯(θ) = 0 for every θ ∈ Θ.
Proposition I.17. q¯ is an optimal EPIC mechanism.
I.8 Proof
This section collects proofs. We omit some proofs which are similar to others or straightfor-
ward.
I.8.1 DSIC
Proof of lemma I.1
Proof. “If”: Suppose conditions 1 and 2 hold. Pick any s ∈ Θp and i. If ui(s) > 0, then
φi(θi) 3 1, and hence for any θ′−i and θ′i:
ui(s)q(θi, θ
′
−i) = ui(s) max
θ′′i ∈Θi
q(θ′′i , θ
′
−i) ≥ ui(s)q(θ′i, θ′−i).
The same equality for ui(s) ≤ 0 holds analogously. Therefore q is DSIC.
“Only if”: Assume q is DSIC. Pick any i and θi ∈ Θi where φi(θi) 3 1. There is some
θ−i ∈ Θ−i where (θi, θ−i) ∈ Θ. Therefore ei(θi, θ−i)q(θi, θ′−i) ≥ ei(θi, θ−i)q(θ′i, θ′−i) for any θ′i
and θ′−i, which implies that q(θi, θ
′
−i) ≥ q(θ′i, θ′−i) for any θ′i and θ′−i. Observe that condition
1 is satisfied in this case. Similarly, if φi(θi) 3 −1, then we have condition 2.
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Proof of Lemma I.2
Proof. Suppose q is DSIC and agent i is not privately informed. There exists θi such that
{1,−1} ⊂ φi(θi). From Lemma I.1 we have maxθ′i∈Θi q(θ′i, θ−i) = q(θi, θ−i) = minθ′i∈Θi q(θ′i, θ−i)
for any θ−i, which implies that q(·, θ−i) is constant over Θi.
Proof of Proposition I.1
Proof. Let ΘPI := ×i∈PIΘi. Therefore q is DSIC only if there is some qˆ : ΘPI → [0, 1] such
that q(θ) = qˆ(k(θ)) where k : Θ→ ΘPI orthogonally projects θ from Θ to ΘPI .
We can then derive binary relation ⇒ on SPI : θ ⇒ θ′ if θi ⇒i θ′i for every i ∈ PI. Note
that ⇒ is a partial weak order.
“If”: Suppose q(θ) = qˆ(k(θ)) for some qˆ : ΘPI → [0, 1] where qˆ(θ) ≥ qˆ(θ′) if θ ⇒ θ′. Pick
any θ ∈ Θ, agent i, and θ′i ∈ Θi and θ′−i ∈ Θ−i. If i /∈ PI then q(θi, θ′−i) = qˆ(k(θi, θ′−i)) =
qˆ(k(θ′i, θ
′
−i)) = q(θ
′
i, θ
′
−i), implying that i has no incentive to misreport θ
′
i. Now consider
i ∈ PI. If φi(θi) = {0} then i is indifferent between S and R and hence has no incentive
to misreport θ′i. If φi(θi) 3 1 then ui(θ) ≥ 0 and also k(θi, θ′−i) ⇒ k(θ′i, θ′−i). Therefore
ui(θ)q(θi, θ
′
−i) = ui(θ)qˆ(k(θi, θ
′
−i)) ≥ ui(θ)qˆ(k(θ′i, θ′−i)) = ui(θ)q(θ′i, θ′−i), that is, there is no
incentive to misreport θ′i. The same can be established analogously if φi(θi) 3 −1. Hence q
is DSIC.
“Only if”: Suppose q is DSIC. Lemma I.2 implies there is some qˆ : ΘPI → [0, 1] such
that q(θ) = qˆ(k(θ)). Fix any θPI , θ
′
PI ∈ ΘPI such that θPI ⇒ θ′PI . We want to show that
qˆ(θPI) ≥ qˆ(θ′PI), which is equivalent to showing that q(θ) ≥ q(θ′) for any θ ∈ k−1(θPI) and
θ′ ∈ k−1(θ′PI). For such θ, θ′ consider the sequence (θ0, ..., θN) where θk agrees with θ′ in the
first k entries and with θ in the last N−k entries. Therefore θ0 = θ, θN = θ′, and θk and θk−1
differ only in the k th entry. If k /∈ PI then q(θk) = q(θk−1) by Lemma I.2. If k ∈ PI then
we have θk ⇒k θ′k, which implies that either φk(θk−1k ) = φk(θk) 3 1 or φk(θkk) = φk(θ′k) 3 −1.
In both cases we have q(θk−1) = q(θk−1k , θ
k
−k) ≥ q(θkk , θk−k) = q(θk) by Lemma I.1. It follows
that q(θ) = q(θ0) ≥ q(θ1) ≥ ... ≥ q(θN) = q(θ′).
I.8.2 EPIC
Some Useful Lemmas
Lemma I.8. q is EPIC if and only if q(θ) ≥ q(θ′) for any θ, θ′ where θ → θ′.
Proof of Lemma I.8
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Proof. “If”: Suppose θ → θ′ implies q(θ) ≥ q(θ′). Pick any state θ where p(θ) > 0 and any
agent i. If ui(θ) = 0, then i is indifferent between R and L, and hence she has no incentive to
misreport in θ under any mechanism. If ui(θ) > 0, then we have θ → (θ′i, θ−i) for any θ′i 6= θi.
It follows that q(θ) ≥ q(θ′i, θ−i) for any θ′i ∈ Θi, which implies that it is not profitable for i to
misreport in θ, because i seeks to maximize the probability R being chosen in θ. Similarly
it is not profitable for i to misreport if ui(θ) < 0. Therefore q is EPIC.
“Only if”: Suppose q is EPIC. Pick any θ, θ′ where θ → θ′. By definition, there exists
i ∈ {1, ..., N} such that: (1) θ−i = θ′−i and (2) ui(θ) > 0 or ui(θ′) < 0. If ui(θ) > 0,
then i prefers a higher probability of R being chosen in θ, and hence EPIC implies θi ∈
argmaxθˆi∈Θiq(θˆi, θ−i), which in turn implies that q(θ) = q(θi, θ−i) ≥ q(θ′i, θ−i) = q(θ′). The
case where ui(θ
′) < 0 is analogous.
Lemma I.9 is a corollary of Lemma I.8.
Lemma I.9. If q is EPIC if and only if q(θ) ≥ q(θ′) for any θ, θ′ where θ  θ′.
The following lemma will be useful.
Lemma I.10. For any partition C of S, c, c′ ∈ C, θ ∈ c and θ′ ∈ c′, c  c′ if θ  θ′.
Moreover, if C = C∗ then c c′ only if θ  θ′
Proof. Suppose θ  θ′, then there exists a list (θ0, ..., θJ) such that θ0 = θ → θ1...→ θJ = θ′.
Let cj denote the cell in C that contains θj, and hence c = c0 → c1... → cJ = c′, which
implies that c c′.
Suppose C = C∗ and c → c′. By definition there exist θˆ ∈ c and θˆ′ ∈ c′ such that
θˆ → θˆ′, which implies that θˆ  θˆ′. By construction of C∗, θ  θˆ and θˆ′  θ′, hence θ  θ′
because  is transitive. With a straightforward inductive argument it is easy to generalize
this observation as long as c c′.
We say that a partition C of S is acyclic if there does not exist distinct c, c′ ∈ S such
that c! c′.
Lemma I.11. C∗ is the finest acyclic partition of Θ.
Proof. For any c, c′ ∈ C∗, if c ! c′ then θ ! θ′ for any θ ∈ c and θ′ ∈ c′ by Lemma
I.10, which implies that c = c′ by the construction of C∗. Thus there does not exist distinct
c, c′ ∈ Θ such that c! c′, implying that C∗ is acyclic.
Now we show that C∗ is the finest acyclic partition of Θ. Consider another acyclic
partition C of Θ. Pick any c ∈ C∗. Suppose, in order to lead to a contradiction, that there
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are distinct c, c′ ∈ C both of which intersect with c. Pick θ ∈ c∩ c and θ′ ∈ c∩ c′. It follows
that θ! θ′ by construction of C∗, and hence c! c′ by Lemma I.10, a contradiction as
C is assumed to be acyclic. Therefore c ⊂ c for some c ∈ C, implying that C∗ is finer than
C.
Proof of Proposition I.2
Proof. “If”: If there are such probabilities then θ  θ′ implies C∗(θ) C∗(θ′) (where C∗(θ)
denotes the cell in C∗ that contains θ) and hence q(θ) = qC∗(θ) ≥ qC∗(θ′) = q(θ′), which by
Lemma I.9 implies q is EPIC.
“Only if”: If q is EPIC then Lemma I.9 implies that q(θ) = q(θ′) if C∗(θ) = C∗(θ′),
because θ  θ′  θ. Therefore q is constant on any c ∈ C∗, and we can denote this value as
qc. Moreover if c c′ for c, c′ ∈ C∗ then Lemma I.10 implies that θ  θ′ for any θ ∈ c and
θ′ ∈ c′ and hence q(θ) ≥ q(θ′) by Lemma I.9, implying qc ≥ qc′ .
Proof of Proposition I.3
Proof. That part 1 and part 2 are equivalent follows immediately from Lemma I.2.
Suppose part 2 is true. That C∗ is acyclic implies that there exists c ∈ C∗ such that
c′ 6 c for every c′ ∈ C∗. Let cˆ denote the set in C∗ containing c. Construct cA = {c′ : c′ ∈
C and c′  cˆ} and cB := Θ\cA. By construction cB 6 cA, proving part 3.
That part 3 implies part 4 is obvious.
Suppose part 4 is true. There exists θ ∈ Θ such that θ′ 6 θ for some θ′ ∈ Θp. Construct
cA := {θ′ : θ′ ∈ Θ and θ′  θ}, and cB := Θ\cA. Note that by construction cB 6 cA, hence
C = {cA, cB} is an acyclic partition of S where both elements intersect with Θp. Since C∗ is
a refinement of C by Lemma I.11, part 2 follows.
Proof of Proposition I.15
Definition I.29. A vertex θ is called a source if there is a walk from θ to θ′ for any θ′ ∈ Θ;
A vertex θ is called a sink if there is a walk from θ′ to θ for any θ′ ∈ Θ.
When {ui}i∈I is weakly monotone, we can find θ¯ = (θ¯1, θ¯2, . . . , θ¯N) such that θ¯i (i)i θi
for all θi 6= θ¯i and
¯
θ = (
¯
θ1, . . . ,
¯
θN) such that θi (i)i ¯θi for all θi 6= θ¯i. Alternatively, we can
rearrange Θi by (i)i such that θ(1)i (i)i θ(2)i (i)i · · · , then θ¯ = (θ(1)1 , θ(1)2 , . . . , θ(1)N ).
Lemma I.12. Suppose {ui(θ)}i∈I is monotone, then θ¯ is a source and
¯
θ is a sink.
38
Lemma I.13. Suppose {ui(θ)}i∈I is uniformly monotone, then
1. if there is θ such that ui(θ) > 0 for all i ∈ I then there is a θ¯ − θ walk;
2. if there is θ such that ui(θ) < 0 for all i ∈ I then there is a θ −
¯
θ walk;
Proof of Proposition I.4
Proof. We want to show that for any θ ∈ Θ, i ∈ I and θ′i ∈ Θi,
u(θ)q(θi, θ−i) ≥ u(θ)q(θ′i, θ−i).
Suppose u(θ) > 0, then above equation becomes q(θ) = 1 ≥ q(θ′i, θ−i). Suppose u(θ) < 0,
then above equation becomes q(θ) = 0 ≤ q(θ′i, θ−i). Suppose u(θ) = 0, then above equation
becomes 0 ≥ 0.
Proof of Lemma I.7
Proof. Given Lemma I.8, it is straightforward to verify that the set of EPIC mechanisms
is a polytope in R|S| with extreme points consisting of either 0s or 1s. Since the objective
function d is linear in q, there is a maximizer that coincides with an extreme point, which is
then a deterministic mechanism.
Proof of Proposition I.17
Proof. For any γ ∈ CB, define qγ : Θ→ {0, 1} such that qγ(θ) = 1 if θ ∈ cˆ(γ) and qγ(θ) = 0
if θ /∈ cˆ(γ).
Lemma I.2 imply that any non-constant deterministic EPIC mechanism must be mea-
surable with respect to some γ ∈ CB, i.e. q−1(x) ⊂ γ for x = 0, 1. Moreover, if there
exist c ∈ C1(γ) and c′ ∈ C2(γ) such that c → c′, then Lemma I.2 implies that qγ is the
only non-constant deterministic EPIC mechanism measurable with respect to γ. Otherwise,
there are two non-constant deterministic EPIC mechanisms measurable with respect to γ:
q1γ that assigns 1 to states in every c ∈ C1(γ) and 0 to states in every c ∈ C2(γ), and q2γ that
assigns 0 to states in every c ∈ C1(γ) and 1 to states in every c ∈ C2(γ). Observe that, in
this case qγ is set to be the mechanism that the designer prefers between q
1
γ or q
2
γ.
It follows that every optimal non-constant deterministic EPIC mechanism is in argmaxγ∈CBd(qγ).
It is straightforward to verify that v(γ) = d(qγ). Thus γ
∗ is an optimal non-constant deter-
ministic EPIC mechanism.
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Step 4 simply compares an optimal non-constant deterministic EPIC mechanism to a
constant deterministic mechanism (which must be EPIC), and yields the optimal determin-
istic EPIC mechanism as q¯. It then follows from Lemma I.7 that q¯ is an optimal EPIC
mechanism.
Proof of Proposition I.5
Proof. Suppose a fully reduced mechanism q is EPIC. We want to show q is constant over
Θ¯ := Θ \ (IC1 ∪ IC2) where Θ¯ is the set of payoff states in which both agents have strict ex
post preferences.
We prove the Proposition in four steps.
Step 1: We introduce a binary relation ∼ on Θ¯.
Definition I.30. We Two payoff states θ ∼ θ′ if
1. ui(θ)ui(θ
′) > 0 for i = 1, 2;
2. There exists a path, (θ = θ(0), θ(1), · · · , θ(n) = θ′), such that θ(k) and θ(k+1) differ in
one entry, and θ′′ ∈ {θ|θ = tθ(k) + (1 − t)(θ(k+1)), ∀k = 1, 2, ..., n, ∀t ∈ [0, 1]} implies
ui(θ
′′)ui(θ′′) > 0 for i = 1, 2.
Condition 1 means each agent has the same ex post preferences on θ and θ′. Condition
2 means thee exist a continuous “manhattan path” links θ and θ′ and all the payoff states
along the path give each agent the same ex post preferences as θ and θ′ give. It is easy to
verify that ∼ is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive. Hence, ∼ is an equivalence relation
which induces in partition P := {Pk} on Θ¯. If P is a singleton, then Proposition I.5 holds
trivially. From now on, we assume P contains at least two elements/blocks.
Step 2: We show that q is constant in each Pi.
For any θ, θ′ ∈ Pi, there exists a path (θ = θ(0), θ(1), · · · , θ(n) = θ′) links θ and θ′. Ex
post incentive compatibility requires q(θ(k)) = q(θ(k+1)). Hence, q(θ) = q(θ′).
Step 3: We prove that q is constant between adjacent Pi and Pj.
We first give the definition of adjacency. Note that u1 and u2 are continuous, each Pi is
an open set in Θ. We denote the closure of Pi by P¯i.
Definition I.31. Two blocks of the partition P , Pi, Pj, are adjacent if m(P¯i∩ P¯j) > 0 where
m is the Lebesgue measure of R.
That is, Pi, Pj ∈ P are adjacent if their closures intersect with each other in a non-
degenerated fashion. Hence, we can find θ ∈ P¯i ∩ P¯j and δ > 0 such that Bδ(θ) ⊂ P¯i ∪ P¯j
where Bδ(θ) is the δ−neighborhood of θ under the Euclidean norm. We discuss three cases.
40
Case 1: Pi and Pj share the same signs of (u1, u2).
Since m(P¯i ∩ P¯j) > 0, there exist θ′ ∈ Pi and θ′′ ∈ Pj such that sgnu1(θ′) = sgnu1(θ′′),
sgnu2(θ
′) = sgnu2(θ′′), and θ′ and θ′′ differ in one entry. Without loss of generality, we
assume θ′1 = θ
′′
1 . Then, by agent 1’s incentive compatibilities, q(θ
′) = q(θ′′).
Case 2: Pi and Pj differ in one sign of (u1, u2).
Without loss of generality, we assume they differ in u1. Then P¯i ∩ P¯j is a subset of
BD1\BD2. For the θ we found right after the Definition I.31, we know θ ∈ P¯i∩P¯j ⊂ BD1, we
have
∂u1(θ)
∂θ2
6= 0 by generic interdependence. Therefore, u1(θ1, θ2 + δ/2)u1(θ1, θ2− δ/2) < 0.
Then we know u2(θ1, θ2 +δ/2)u2(θ1, θ2−δ/2) > 0. Agent 2’s incentive compatibilities require
that q(θ1, θ2 +δ/2) = q(θ1, θ2−δ/2). Since (θ1, θ2 +δ/2) and (θ1, θ2−δ/2) belongs to different
blocks, q is constant between Pi and Pj follows immediately.
Case 3: Pi and Pj differ in both signs of (u1, u2).
Suppose u1(θ
′) > 0, u2(θ′) > 0 for all θ′ ∈ Pi. Then u1(θ′′) < 0, u2(θ′′) < 0 for all
θ′′ ∈ Pj. Thus θ ∈ (P¯i ∩ P¯j) ⊂ (BD1 ∩ BD2). It is easy to show that all for all θ′ ∈ Bδ(θ),
we have u1(θ
′)u2(θ′) > 0. Generic heterogeneity condition is violated. Similarly, the subcase
u1(θ
′) < 0, u2(θ′) < 0 violates generic heterogeneity condition.
Now suppose u1(θ
′) < 0, u2(θ′) > 0 for all θ′ ∈ Pi. Then u1(θ′′) > 0, u2(θ′′) < 0 for
all θ′′ ∈ Pj. Then (P¯i ∩ P¯j) ⊂ (BD1 ∩ BD2). We can pick two payoff states within the δ-
neighborhood of θ: (θ1− , θ2), (θ1 + , θ2). We know u1(θ1− , θ2)u1(θ1 + , θ2) < 0. Without
loss of generality, we assume u1(θ1− , θ2) < 0 and u1(θ1 + , θ2) > 0. Then, (θ1− , θ2) ∈ Pi,
(θ1 + , θ2) ∈ Pj, and q(θ1 − , θ2) ≤ q(θ1 + , θ2).
We can also pick another two payoff states within the δ-neighborhood of (θ1, θ2 − ′),
(θ1, θ2 + 
′). Similarly, we know u2(θ1, θ2 − ′)u2(θ1, θ2 − ′) < 0. Without loss of generality,
we assume u2(θ1, θ2− ′) > 0 and u(θ1, θ2 + ′) < 0. Then, (θ1, θ2− ′) ∈ Pi, (θ1, θ2 + ′) ∈ Pj,
and q(θ1, θ2−′) ≥ q(θ1, θ2+′). By step 2, we know q(θ1−, θ2) = q(θ1, θ2−′), q(θ1+, θ2) =
q(θ1, θ2 + 
′). Therefore, q(θ1 − , θ2) = q(θ1, θ2 − ′) = q(θ1 + , θ2) = q(θ1, θ2 + ′).
The case u1(θ
′) > 0, u2(θ′) < 0 for all θ′ ∈ Pi can be proved in the same way.
Step 4: Since every block Pi has at least one adjacent block, any two blocks Pi and Pj
are linked by a sequence of adjacent blocks. Hence, q is constant over Θ¯.
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I.8.3 IDSIC
Proof of Lemma I.4
Proof. For player i of type ti, given message profile m−i ∈M−i, payoff-type profile θ−i ∈ Θ−i
and joint strategy σ−i : T−i → ∆(M−i) of the other players, define
qi(m−i|σ−i, θ−i, ti) : =
∑
{t−i∈T−i:θˆ−i(t−i)=θ−i}
Pr
[
t−i
∣∣∣θ−i, ti]σ−i(t−i)[m−i]
where Pr
[
t−i
∣∣∣θˆ−i(t−i) = θ−i, ti] = βˆi(ti)[t−i]
bˆi(ti)[θ−i]
is agent i’s belief over t−i conditional on her
own signal is ti and other agents’ payoff types are θ−i.
Thus qi(m−i|σ−i, θ−i, ti) is what player i of type ti evaluates as the probability that the
message profile from the other players will be m−i conditional on their payoff-type profile
being θ−i and them following σ−i.
For player i of type ti, her expected payoff from message mi conditional on other players
following joint strategy σ−i can be written as:
Ui(mi|σ−i, ti)
:=
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
bˆi(ti)[θ−i]
∑
m−i∈M−i
qi(m−i|σ−i, θ−i, ti)
∑
a∈A
ui(a, θˆi(ti), θ−i)q(mi,m−i)[a].
Suppose mi is an interim dominant action for player i of type ti. Pick any t
′
i ∈ Ti where
θˆi(t
′
i) = θˆi(ti) and bˆi(ti) = bˆi(t
′
i). For any σ−i : T−i → ∆(M−i) there always exists χσ−i :
T−i → ∆(M−i) such that qi(m−i|σ−i, θ−i, t′i) = qi(m−i|χσ−i , θ−i, ti) for any m−i ∈ M−i and
θ−i ∈ Θ−i.16
It is straightforward to verify that Ui(·|σ−i, t′i) = Ui(·|χσ−i , ti). It follows that for any
σ−i and m′i,
Ui(mi|σ−i, t′i) = Ui(mi|χσ−i , ti) ≥ Ui(m′i|χσ−i , ti) = Ui(m′i|σ−i, t′i).
Thus mi is also an interim dominant action for player i when her type is t
′
i.
Proof of Proposition I.6
Proof. “Only if’.’ Suppose σ is an interim dominant-strategy equilibrium of the mechanism.
For each i ∈ I, θi ∈ Θi and bi ∈ ∆(Θ−i) pick some τi(θi, bi) ∈ Ti where θˆi(τi(θi, bi)) = θi and
16For instance, set χσ−i(m−i|t−i) = qi(m−i|σ−i, θ−i, t′i) for every t−i where θˆ−i(t−i) = θ−i.
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bˆi(τi(θi, bi)) = bi whenever possible. Consider strategy profile σ
′ where σ′i(ti) = σ
′
i(τi(θi, bi))
for any ti where θˆi(ti) = θi and bˆi(ti) = bi. Observe that σ
′ is higher-order belief-independent.
Moreover Lemma I.4 implies that σ′ is also an interim dominant strategy equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma I.6
Proof. “If”: Fix agent i. Suppose the other agents report σ−i(θ−i) ∈ H−i when their
true payoff types is θ−i. The difference in payoff to i between truthfully reporting hi and
misreporting as h′i is
D : =
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
bi(θ−i)ui(θi, θ−i)
(
q(hi, σ−i(θ−i))− q(h′i, σ−i(θ−i))
)
=
[ ∑
{θ−i|ui(θ)>0}
bi(θ−i)ui(θi, θ−i)
(
q(hi, σ−i(θ−i))− q(h′i, σ−i(θ−i))
)
+
∑
{θ−i|ui(θ)<0}
bi(θ−i)ui(θi, θ−i)
(
q(hi, σ−i(θ−i))− q(h′i, σ−i(θ−i))
)]
.
Define d := maxh−i∈H−i
(
q(hi, h−i)−q(h′i, h−i)
)
and d := minh−i∈H−i
(
q(hi, h−i)−q(h′i, h−i)
)
.
It is straightforward to verify that
D ≥ d
∑
{θ−i|ui<0}
bi(θ−i)ui(θi, θ−i) + d
∑
{θ−i|ui>0}
bi(θ−i)ui(θi, θ−i)
= αi(hi)d+ αi(hi)d
≥ 0,
where the last inequality is due to the assumption that for any h−i, h′−i ∈ H−i:
αi(hi)
(
q(hi, h−i)− q(h′i, h−i)
)
+ αi(hi)
(
q(hi, h
′
−i)− q(h′i, h′−i)
)
≥ 0.
Therefore misreporting is not profitable, and q is IDSIC.
“Only if”: Suppose q is IDSIC. Fix agent i, hi, h
′
i ∈ Hi and h−i, h′−i ∈ H−i. Suppose
agents other than i jointly report h−i whenever their true payoff types θˆ−i satisfy ui(θi, θˆ−i) <
0, and they jointly report h′−i otherwise. Thus IDSIC requires that∑
{θˆ−i|u(θi,θˆ−i)<0}
bi(θ−i)ui(θi, θˆ−i)
(
q(hi, h−i)− q(h′i, h−i)
)
+
∑
{θˆ−i|ui(θi,θˆ−i)>0}
bi(θ−i)ui(θi, θˆ−i)
(
q(hi, h
′
−i)− q(h′i, h′−i)
) ≥ 0,
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implying that αi(hi)
(
q(hi, h−i)− q(h′i, h−i)
)
+ αi(hi)
(
q(hi, h
′
−i)− q(h′i, h′−i)
) ≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition I.8
Proof. “Only if”: Suppose q is IDSIC. Then by Lemma I.6, Equation I.2 holds for all
hi, h
′
i, h−i, h
′
−i. Let h−i = h
′
−i, we have
αi(hi)
(
q(hi, h−i)− q(h′i, h−i)
) ≥− αi(hi)(q(hi, h−i)− q(h′i, h−i))
⇔ αi(hi)q(hi, h−i) ≥αi(hi)q(h′i, h−i)
(I.3)
for all hi, h
′
i ∈ Hi and all h−i ∈ H−i.
If αi(hi) > 0, then q(hi, h−i) ≥ q(h′i, h−i) for all h′i ∈ Hi; if αi(hi) < 0, then q(hi, h−i) ≤
q(h′i, h−i) for all h
′
i ∈ Hi; if αi(hi) = 0, then q(h′i, h−i) ≤ q(hi, h−i) ≤ q(h′′i , h−i) for all
h′i ∈ H−i , h′i ∈ H+i . Hence, the monotonicity condition is proved.
For each agent i, we have two cases for the variation condition (condition 2).
1. H0i = ∅. First, let hi ∈ H+i , h′i ∈ H−i , h−i ∈ argmax [q(hi, h−i) − q(h′i, h−i)], h′−i ∈
argmin [q(hi, h−i)− q(h′i, h−i)]. Equation I.2 gives
−αi(hi) max
h−i∈H−i
(
qi(h−i)− qi(h−i)
)
≤ αi(hi) min
h−i∈H−i
(
qi(h−i)− qi(h−i)
)
,
for all hi ∈ H+i . Therefore,
max
h−i∈H−i
(
qi(h−i)− qi(h−i)
)
≤ ρi(hi) min
h−i∈H−i
(
qi(h−i)− qi(h−i)
)
,
for all hi ∈ H+i .
Second, let hi ∈ H−i , h′i ∈ H+i , h−i ∈ argmin [q(hi, h−i)−q(h′i, h−i)], h′−i ∈ argmax [q(hi, h−i)−
q(h′i, h−i)]. Equation I.2 gives
−αi(hi) min
h−i∈H−i
(
qi(h−i)− qi(h−i)
)
≥ αi(hi) max
h−i∈H−i
(
qi(h−i)− qi(h−i)
)
Therefore,
max
h−i∈H−i
(
qi(h−i)− qi(h−i)
)
≤ ρi(hi) min
h−i∈H−i
(
qi(h−i)− qi(h−i)
)
,
for all hi ∈ H−i . Recall that ρi = minhi ρi(hi). Hence,
max
h−i∈H−i
(
qi(h−i)− qi(h−i)
)
≤ ρi min
h−i∈H−i
(
qi(h−i)− qi(h−i)
)
.
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2. H0i 6= ∅. Now consider h∗i ∈ H0i . Since −αi(h∗i ) = αi(h∗i ), Equation I.2 gives
q(h∗i , h−i)− q(h′i, h−i) ≤ q(h∗i , h′−i)− q(h′i, h−i′)
for all h′i ∈ Hi, and all h−i, h′−i ∈ H−i. Then q(h∗i , h−i) − q(h′i, h−i) = q(h∗i , h′−i) −
q(h′i, h
′
−i) for all h
′
i ∈ Hi and all h−i, h′−i ∈ H−i, which mean q(h∗i , h−i) − q(h′i, h−i) is
constant over h−i, for all h′i ∈ Hi. We then have q(hi, h−i)− q(h′i, h−i) = [q(hi, h−i)−
q(h∗i , h−i)] + [q(h
∗
i , h−i) − q(h′i, h−i)] is a constant function with respect to h−i, for all
hi, h
′
i ∈ Hi.
“If”: We want to show that if both monotonicity condition and variation condition are
satisfied, then Equation I.2 holds for all i ∈ I, hi, h′i ∈ Hi, and h−i, h′−i ∈ H−i. For each
i ∈ I, we discuss two situations.
1. H0i = ∅. If both hi, h′i ∈ H+i or both hi, h′i ∈ H−i , then it is obvious that Equation I.2
holds. If hi ∈ H+i , h′i ∈ H−i , then
αi(hi)
(
q(hi, h−i)− q(h′i, h−i)
)
+ αi(hi)
(
q(hi, h
′
−i)− q(h′i, h′−i)
)
=αi(hi)
(
q(h−i)− q(h−i)
)
+ αi(hi)
(
q(h′−i)− q(h′−i)
)
≥αi(hi) max
h−i
(
q(h−i)− q(h−i)
)
+ αi(hi) min
h′−i
(
q(h′−i)− q(h′−i)
)
≥ 0
for all h−i, h′−i ∈ H−i. The first equality follows the monotonicity condition, the second
equality is due to the fact αi(hi) ≤ 0 and αi(hi) > 0, the last inequality follows the
variation condition. The case in which hi ∈ H−i , h′i ∈ H+i can be prove in a similar
way.
2. H0i 6= ∅. Then variation condition says q(hi, h−i) − q(h′i, h−i) is a constant function
with respect to h−i, for all hi, h′i ∈ Hi. Equation I.2 becomes
αi(hi)[q(hi, h−i)− q(h′i, h−i)] ≥ 0
which is true for all hi, h
′
i ∈ Hi and h−i ∈ H−i by the monotonicity condition.
Proof of Proposition I.9
Proof. “If”: Fix any type space T and additive mechanism (M1, ...,MN , q). It suffices to
show that every agent has an interim dominant strategy. For agent i, consider the strategy
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σi that prescribes her to send a message mi that maximizes pi
q
i (·) if her type ti satisfies
αi(θˆi(ti), bˆi(ti)) ≥ 0, or to send a message mi that minimizes piqi (·) if her type satisfies
αi(θˆi(ti), bˆi(ti)) < 0. For any strategy profile σ−i from the other agents, if αi(θˆi(ti), bˆi(ti)) ≥ 0,
then we have
Ui(mi|σ−i, ti) ≥ Ui(mi|σ−i, ti)
⇔
∑
t−i∈Ti
βˆi(ti)[t−i]q(mi, σ−i(t−i))ui(θˆ(ti, t−i)) ≥
∑
t−i∈Ti
βˆi(ti)[t−i]q(mi, σ−i(t−i))ui(θˆ(ti, t−i))
⇔
∑
t−i∈Ti
βˆi(ti)[t−i]pi
q
i (mi)ui(θˆ(ti, t−i)) ≥
∑
t−i∈Ti
βˆi(ti)[t−i]pi
q
i (mi)ui(θˆ(ti, t−i))
⇔ piqi (mi)αi(θˆi(ti), bˆi(ti)) ≥ piqi (mi)αi(θˆi(ti), bˆi(ti))
⇐ piqi (mi) ≥ piqi (mi),
from which we conclude that mi is a best response against σ−i. That mi is a best response
against σ−i when αi(θˆi(ti), bˆi(ti)) < 0 is established analogously. Therefore σi is indeed an
interim dominant strategy for agent i.
“Only if”: Suppose (M1, ...,MN , q) is IDSIC in all type spaces. We want to show that
there exist functions piqi : Mi → [0, 1] such that q(m1, ...,mN) =
∑
i∈I pi
q
i (mi).
Fix a type space where for every i ∈ I there is a type t˜i such that αi(θˆi(t˜i), bˆi(t˜i)) =
−αi(θˆi(t˜i), bˆi(t˜i)) > 0. Let m∗i denote the message that agent i of type t˜i sends in a given in-
terim dominant strategy equilibrium. It follows from an argument analogous to how Lemma
I.6 is proved that
αi(θˆi(t˜i), bˆi(t˜i))
(
q(m∗i ,m−i)− q(mi,m−i)
)
+ αi(θˆi(ti), bˆi(ti))
(
q(m∗i ,m
′
−i)− q(mi,m′−i)
) ≥ 0
for any mi ∈ Mi,m−i,m′−i ∈ M−i. That αi(θˆi(ti), bˆi(ti)) + αi(θˆi(t˜i), bˆi(t˜i)) = 0 implies
q(m∗i ,m−i)− q(mi,m−i) in invariant to m−i. Thus the expression
q(mi,m−i)− q(m∗i ,m−i) +
1
N
q(m∗1, ...,m
∗
N).
does not depend on m−i, and hence we can denote this expression as pi
q
i (mi). Observe that
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for any m1, ...,mN ,
q(m1, ...,mN) = q(m1,m2, ...,mN)− q(m∗1,m2, ...,mN) +
1
N
q(m∗1, ...,m
∗
N)
+q(m∗1,m2, ...,mN)− q(m∗1,m∗2, ...,mN) +
1
N
q(m∗1, ...,m
∗
N)
· · ·
+q(m∗1, ...,m
∗
N1
,mN)− q(m∗1, ...,m∗N−1,m∗N) +
1
N
q(m∗1, ...,m
∗
N)
=
∑
i∈I
piqi (mi).
Therefore (M1, ...,MN , q) is an additive mechanism.
Proof of Proposition I.10
Proof. Let σ∗ be any interim dominant strategy equilibrium of the mechanism. It follows
that for player i, any type ti where αi(θˆi(ti), bˆi(ti)) > 0 only sends messages that maximize
pigi (·) with positive probability (and denote that maximized value as pii), and any type ti
where αi(θˆi(ti), bˆi(ti)) < 0 only sends messages that minimize pi
g
i (·) with positive probability
(and denote that minimized value as pii). For any ti where αi(θˆi(ti), bˆi(ti)) = 0 let pˆii(ti)
denote the expected value of pii(·) conditional on ti’s (mixed) strategy under σ. Define
λi := pii − pii and
µi(ti) =

1 if αi(θˆi(ti), bˆi(ti)) > 0
1 if αi(θˆi(ti), bˆi(ti)) = 0 and λi = 0
(pˆii(ti)− pii)/λi if αi(θˆi(ti), bˆi(ti)) = 0 and λi 6= 0
0 if αi(θˆi(ti), bˆi(ti)) < 0.
It is straightforward to verify that the induced social choice function qσ satisfies qσ(t) =∑
i∈I λiµi(ti) +
∑
i∈I pii. Thus qσ is a random dictatorship.
Proof of Proposition I.13
Proof. Without loss, we assume q(1,m−i) ≥ q(0,m−i). It is easy to check that the following
strategy profile σ∗ is an interim dominant strategy equilibrium,
σ∗i (ti) =
1 if αi(θˆi(ti), bˆi(ti)) ≥ 00 if αi(θˆi(ti), bˆi(ti)) < 0.
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Proof of Proposition I.14
Proof. The “only if” direction is obvious. For the “if” direction we prove its contrapositive:
If a mechanism is not DSIC, then it cannot be both EPIC and IDSIC. Suppose, in order to
lead to a contradiction, that there exists q that is not DSIC, yet it is EPIC and IDSIC. That
q is not DSIC implies that
ui(θ)q(θi, θ
′
−i) < ui(θ)q(θ
′
i, θ
′
−i)
for some agent i, θi, θ
′
i ∈ Θi and θ′−i ∈ Θ−i. Suppose ui(θ) > 0, then we have q(θi, θ′−i) <
q(θ′i, θ
′
−i), which implies that αi(θi) ≤ 0 and αi(θ′i) ≥ 0 by Corollary I.8.
Suppose αi(θi) < 0. It then follows from Proposition I.8 that q(θi, θ−i) ≤ q(θ′i, θ−i). If
q(θi, θ−i) < q(θ′i, θ−i) then ui(θ)q(θi, θ−i) < ui(θ)q(θ
′
i, θ−i), contradicting EPIC. If q(θi, θ−i) =
q(θ′i, θ−i) then q(θ
′
i, θi) − q(θi, θ−i) = 0, which implies, by condition 1 of Proposition I.8,
that minθˆ−i∈Θ−i
(
q(θi, θˆ−i) − q(θi, θˆ−i)
)
= q(θ′i, θ−i) − q(θi, θ−i) = 0. Also by condition 1
of Proposition I.8 we have maxθˆ−i∈Θ−i
(
q(θ′i, θˆ−i) − q(θi, θˆ−i)
)
≥ q(θ′i, θ′−i) − q(θi, θ′−i) > 0,
therefore
αi(θi) max
θˆ−i∈Θ−i
(
qi(θˆ−i)− qi(θˆ−i)
)
+ αi(θi) min
θˆ−i∈Θ−i
(
qi(θˆ−i)− qi(θˆ−i)
)
< 0
because αi(θi) < 0 implies αi < 0. This, however, contradicts condition 2 of Proposition I.8.
We can thus deduce that αi(θi) = 0. That ui(θ) > 0 implies αi(θi) > 0, and hence
αi(θi) = −αi(θi) < 0. Substituting this into inequality I.2, we have αi(θi)
(
(q(θi, θ
′
−i) −
q(θ′i, θ
′
−i))−(q(θi, θ−i)−q(θ′i, θ−i))
)
= 0, which implies that q(θi, θ−i)−q(θ′i, θ−i) = q(θi, θ′−i)−
q(θ′i, θ
′
−i) < 0, contradicting EPIC because ui(θ) > 0.
If ui(θ) < 0 then similar contradictions arise analogously.
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CHAPTER II
Social Discounting and Intergenerational Pareto
The most critical issue in evaluating policies and projects that affect generations of
individuals is the choice of social discount rate. This chapter shows that there exist social
discount rates such that the planner can simultaneously be (i) an exponential discounting
expected utility maximizer; (ii) intergenerationally Pareto—i.e., if all individuals from all
generations prefer one policy/project to another, the planner agrees; and (iii) strongly non-
dictatorial—i.e., no individual from any generation is ignored. Moreover, to satisfy (i)–(iii), if
the time horizon is long enough, it is generically sufficient and necessary for social discounting
to be more patient than the most patient individual’s long-run discounting, independent of
the social risk attitude.
II.1 Introduction
Many economic decisions are inherently dynamic and affect multiple generations, such as
corporate and household long-term investment decisions, intertemporal taxation, durable
public good provision, environmental policies, etc. These decisions crucially depend on one
parameter, the social discount rate, which encapsulates the trade-off between the current
benefit and future benefit from the society’s point of view. Unfortunately, there is no con-
sensus on which social discount rate should be used. This disagreement has sparked debate,
for example, about the cost-benefit analysis of environmental projects that affect many, if
not all, future generations. Moreover, the evaluation of those projects is sensitive to the
choice of social discount rate. The famous Stern review uses a near-zero social discount rate
(pure rate of time preference), and suggests that we should take strong and immediate action
on climate change (see Stern (2007)).1 Nordhaus (2007) argues that Stern’s conclusion does
This chapter is based on the paper “Social Discounting and Intergenerational Pareto ” (Feng and Ke,
2018).
1The consumption discount rate derived from the Ramsey formula used in the Stern review depends on
the pure rate of time preference, the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption, and the growth rate
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not hold if a market rate is used instead. Many economists, however, believe that using a
high discount rate (such as a market rate) is ethically indefensible.
In the social discounting literature, some economists have argued that social discount-
ing should be more patient than individual discounting (for example, see Caplin and Leahy
(2004) and Farhi and Werning (2007)). The idea is that if social discounting takes into
account how future generations will feel about their consumption, then because future gen-
erations will value future consumption relatively more than the current generation values
future consumption, social discounting will also value future consumption more than the cur-
rent generation does.2 However, these studies usually assume that only one (representative)
individual is in the society. How their insight carries over to a society with heterogeneous
individuals—and which individual’s discounting social discounting should be more patient
than—remains unanswered.
Let us explain what will go wrong with heterogeneous individuals. What is common
among these dynamic economic decisions is that there is a benevolent planner who must
make choices from risky alternatives for generations of individuals. In such a setting, first,
economists often assume that the planner’s objective is an exponential discounting (expected)
utility function. This assumption is widely used and normatively appealing, because it is
equivalent to assuming that the planner’s preference is time-consistent, time-invariant, and
stationary.3 Second, it is often assumed that a benevolent planner respects individuals’
preferences. In other words, some notion of the Pareto property should hold: If “all” indi-
viduals agree that one policy/project is better than another, the planner should agree that
the former is better.
Despite the fact that these two assumptions are fundamental to economics, they cannot
be satisfied simultaneously (see Gollier and Zeckhauser (2005), Zuber (2011), and Jackson
and Yariv (2015)). Even if every individual has an exponential discounting utility function,
a planner must be dictatorial to ensure that her exponential discounting utility function
satisfies some Pareto property. The negative result also challenges the conclusion that social
discounting should be more patient than individual discounting. In light of the negative
result, with heterogeneous individuals, perhaps we can only conclude that the planner is
more patient than the only individual (dictator) she cares about.
This paper addresses these issues using a classic approach. We introduce a new Pareto
of per capita consumption.
2Some economists have also argued that individuals’ altruistic discounting for future generations should
be excluded from the planner’s aggregation. See Hammond (1987) and Boadway (2012).
3A version of the definition of time consistency, time invariance, and stationarity can be found in Halevy
(2015). Under the assumption that the utility function is a time-additively separable expected utility func-
tion, Halevy’s version of the three properties is equivalent to assuming an exponential discounting expected
utility function.
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property, and characterize the range of (pure-time-preference) social discount rates that are
compatible with the new property. In models that generate the negative result, there is often
only one generation of individuals. The Pareto property they use, which we call current-
generation Pareto, is the key to the negative result. Current-generation Pareto requires that
whenever a consumption sequence p is preferred to another sequence q by every current-
generation individual, then the planner prefers p to q. In many problems we consider,
multiple generations of individuals are involved. As Pigou (1920) argues, the planner should
not only respect how the current generation discounts the future, but also care about the
actual well-being of future generations—that is, how future generations will feel about their
consumption and how they will discount the future. The Pareto property we introduce,
intergenerational Pareto, captures this. It requires that whenever a consumption sequence
p is preferred to q by every individual from every generation, then the planner prefers p to
q.
Specifically, each generation-t individual i lives for one period, and has a discount func-
tion δi(τ − t) to discount period-τ consumption.4 The planner is intergenerationally Pareto
and has an exponential discounting utility function. To contrast with the negative result,
we require that the planner be strongly non-dictatorial in the sense that she never ignores
the preference of any individual from any generation. Under these assumptions, we show
how the range of social discount factors depends on (a) individual relative discounting, av-
erage discounting, and long-run discounting, and (b) the linear dependency of individual
instantaneous utility functions.5
We first characterize the range of social discount factors assuming that individual dis-
count functions are exponential. This allows us to compare our results to the negative result
directly. We examine two cases. In the first case, individuals share the same instanta-
neous utility function. In this way, we focus on aggregating individual discount functions.
The negative result is avoided: We find that the planner is intergenerationally Pareto and
strongly non-dictatorial if and only if the social discount factor is higher than the least patient
individual’s discount factor.
Since the least patient individual’s discount factor could be quite low, a wide range
of social discount factors can be supported by the first result. The result will be rather
different in our second case in which individual instantaneous utility functions are linearly
independent. When there are many consumption goods, individual instantaneous utility
functions are generically linearly independent. Under this assumption, we find that the
planner is intergenerationally Pareto and strongly non-dictatorial if and only if the social
4Individuals altruistically care about future generations’ consumption.
5The discount rate is equal to one minus the discount factor.
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discount factor is higher than the most patient individual’s discount factor, independent of
the planner’s instantaneous utility function. This result thus provides a new justification for
the use of a near-zero social discount rate.
In general, individual discount functions are not exponential. One challenge that comes
with general individual discount functions is that when we say that social discounting is
more patient than individual discounting, it is not even clear what individual discounting
refers to. We show that when individuals share the same instantaneous utility function,
there exist two cutoffs for the social discount factor. One is related to the least patient
individual’s maximal relative discount factor, and the other to the least patient individual’s
asymptotic average discount factor. If the social discount factor is above the first cutoff, the
planner is intergenerationally Pareto and strongly non-dictatorial. Conversely, if the social
discount factor is below the second cutoff, the planner must violate intergenerational Pareto
as long as the time horizon is long enough; that is, there exist two consumption sequences
such that every individual from every generation thinks that one is better than the other,
but the planner disagrees. The two cutoffs are tight.
The two cutoffs merge into one cutoff when individuals exhibit present bias. The unique
cutoff is equal to the least patient individual’s long-run discount factor. Each individual’s
long-run discount factor is defined as the asymptotic relative discount factor and the asymp-
totic average discount factor.
Lastly, if individual instantaneous utility functions are linearly independent, the cutoff
for the social discount factor jumps from the least patient individual’s long-run discount
factor to the most patient one’s, again independent of the planner’s instantaneous utility
function. We also characterize how the cutoff for the social discount factor changes gradually
from the least patient individual’s long-run discount factor to the most patient one’s, as the
number of types of individual instantaneous utility functions increases.
Related Literature
This paper is not the first to aggregate the preferences of multiple generations of individuals.
Indeed, there is a long-running debate on whether future generations should be aggregated.
Among others, Pigou (1920), Ramsey (1928), Sen (1961), Feldstein (1964), Solow (1974),
Arrow (1999), Caplin and Leahy (2004), and Farhi and Werning (2007) are in favor, and
Eckstein (1957), Bain (1960), and Marglin (1963) believe that the government’s or the policy
maker’s decision should only reflect the preferences of the current generation. Our approach
is closer to Caplin and Leahy and Farhi and Werning, who show that assuming there is only
one individual in each generation, social discounting should be more patient than the sole
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individual’s discounting. Our results show that having multiple heterogeneous individuals
in each generation makes an important difference.
Many papers have analyzed the aggregation of one generation of heterogeneous indi-
viduals. Weitzman (2001) conducts a survey of economists’ discount rates to motivate a
gamma discounting model. Gollier and Zeckhauser (2005) study a dynamic efficient allo-
cation problem with heterogeneous individuals and show that even when individuals have
constant discount rates, the representative agent has a decreasing discount rate. Zuber (2011)
establishes that a planner cannot have an exponential discounting utility function and be
(current-generation) Pareto when individuals have private consumption. Jackson and Yariv
(2015) present a similar negative result, in which consumption is public. Millner and Heal
(2018) show that the negative result goes away if we only require that the planner’s objective
be time-consistent. A key difference between these papers and ours is that they aggregate
only one generation of individuals, whereas we aggregate multiple generations. This distinc-
tion is important in economic decisions that have long-term impact, such as environmental
policies and intertemporal taxation.
There are other approaches to the study of social discounting. Our paper emphasizes
the relation between social discounting and individual discounting implied by intergenera-
tional Pareto. Chambers and Echenique (2018) study three models of discount rates. One
aggregates exponential individual discount functions in a utilitarian way, which is similar
to Weitzman (2001), Zuber (2011), and Jackson and Yariv (2014, 2015). The other two
aggregate exponential individual discount functions by selecting the most pessimistic utili-
tarian weight and discount function, respectively. Millner (2020) shows that if heterogeneous
individuals are not fully paternalistic, they will agree on parameters for the long-run social
discount rate. Zuber and Asheim (2012), Asheim and Zuber (2014), Fleurbaey and Zuber
(2015), and Piacquadio (2017) study models in which social discounting is due to intergen-
erational inequality aversion. Jonsson and Voorneveld (2018) study a welfare criterion for
multiple generations. Each generation has one individual, and in the limit of the criterion,
different generations are treated equally.
In the first part of Drugeon and Wigniolle (2017), they characterize what exponential
discounting utility functions can be written as weighted sums of individuals’ current selves’
and future selves’ quasi-hyperbolic discounting utility functions; their result is related to our
Propositions II.4 and II.5, and Proposition 5 of Galperti and Strulovici (2017). Drugeon
and Wigniolle (2016) and the second part of Drugeon and Wigniolle (2017) study time-
consistent solutions for consumption-saving problems with heterogeneous exponential and
quasi-hyperbolic discounting individuals, respectively. The planner in period t maximizes
the weighted sum of period-t individuals’ utility, and the solution is the subgame perfect
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Nash equilibrium of the game between the planner’s multiple selves.
Our paper is also related to Mongin (1998), who establishes that under a standard form
of Pareto, as long as individuals’ subjective probabilities are linearly independent or their
instantaneous utility functions are affinely independent, the planner must be dictatorial.
Related results can be found in Mongin (1995) and Chambers and Hayashi (2006). In
our model, if we view periods as states and discount factors as subjective probabilities,
Mongin’s result seems to apply. Nonetheless, our planner is not dictatorial. The technical
reason why our Theorem 6 can bypass Mongin’s negative result is the assumption that
all individuals share the same instantaneous utility function. As for Theorem 9, we first
aggregate individual utility functions with identical instantaneous utility functions into an
EDU function whose discount factor is equal to the social discount factor. Then, we aggregate
utility functions with identical discount factors (subjective probabilities). Both steps bypass
Mongin’s negative result.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe individuals’ and the planner’s
preferences. Section 3 introduces a variant of the negative result and two key assumptions of
the paper, intergenerational Pareto and strong non-dictatorship. We characterize the range
of social discount factors under the assumption that individuals have exponential discount
functions in Section 4, and under the assumption that individuals have general discount
functions in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
II.2 Preferences
There are 2 < T < +∞ generations/periods. In each generation, 1 < N < +∞ individuals
live for one period. With an abuse of notation, let N := {1, . . . , N} and T := {1, . . . , T}.
The generation-t individual i is the parent of the generation-(t + 1) individual i, in which
t, t + 1 ∈ T and i ∈ N . In each period, there is a public risky consumption good denoted
by ∆(X), in which ∆(X) is the set of probability measures on a compact set X ⊂ Rm.6 A
typical consumption sequence is denoted by p = (p1, . . . , pT ) ∈ ∆(X)T .7
Although individuals live for one period, they altruistically care about future genera-
tions’ consumption. We assume throughout the paper that the generation-t individual i has
6All results we derive apply to the case in which each individual has his own consumption. We only need
to view public consumption as an N -tuple of individual consumption, and let each individual care only about
his own component.
7We discuss what may change if we allow uncertainty to resolve over time in Section II.8.4 in the Sup-
plemental Material.
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the following discounting utility function:
Ui,t(p) =
T∑
τ=t
δi(τ − t)ui(pτ ), (II.1)
in which δi : {0, . . . , T − 1} → R++ with δi(0) = 1 is called the discount function, and the
instantaneous utility function ui : ∆(X)→ R is a continuous expected utility function. The
generation-t individual i’s discounting utility function induces a preference, denoted by %i,t,
over consumption sequences ∆(X)T .
We have assumed that the generation-(t + 1) individual i inherits the generation-t in-
dividual i’s discount function and instantaneous utility function. This assumption does not
imply that a parent and his offspring have the same preference, because the generation-(t+1)
individuals’ discount functions are shifted one period forward. This assumption simplifies
our analysis and can be relaxed (see Section II.8.1 in the Supplemental Material).
In each period t ∈ T , the planner’s objective is an exponential discounting utility (EDU)
function:
Ut(p) =
T∑
τ=t
δτ−tu(pτ ), (II.2)
in which δ > 0 is the social discount factor, and u, a continuous expected utility function on
∆(X), is the planner’s instantaneous utility function. In each period t ∈ T , Ut induces the
planner’s preference, denoted by %t, over consumption sequences ∆(X)T .
It is well known that if the planner’s objective is a discounting utility function, the
planner is time-consistent if and only if the planner’s discount function is exponential.8
More generally, (II.2) holds if and only if the planner’s preference is time-consistent, time-
invariant, and stationary (see footnote 3). Also note that (II.2) holds for every t ∈ T ; that
is, the social discount factor and the planner’s instantaneous utility function never change.
Lastly, to rule out uninteresting cases and simplify the statement of our results, we
assume that there are some fixed consequences x∗, x∗ ∈ X such that for any i ∈ N , ui(x∗) =
u(x∗) = 0 and ui(x∗) = u(x∗) = 1 throughout the paper. A similar assumption, called the
minimum agreement condition, also appears in De Meyer and Mongin (1995). Our main
findings do not rely on this assumption, and we provide a more detailed discussion following
Lemma 3. More generally, for any continuous expected utility function v defined on ∆(X),
we say that it is normalized if v(x∗) = 1 and v(x∗) = 0. One may think of x∗ as one dollar
and x∗ as zero dollars, or x∗ as the best consumption good and x∗ as the worst.
8Since individuals only live for one period, time consistency may have a nonstandard interpretation for
them. In contrast, the planner is a long-lived entity who tries to stick to an objective function that exhibits
nice properties. The interpretation of time consistency for the planner is similar to the standard one.
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II.3 Intergenerational Pareto and Dictatorship
We want to assume that the planner’s preference (%t)t∈T satisfies some Pareto property. In
a dynamic setting, however, there are multiple ways to define the Pareto property. Different
notions of Pareto have different implications. For example, Zuber (2011) and Jackson and
Yariv (2015) show that if a planner has an EDU function and follows their Pareto property,
the planner must be dictatorial. To motivate our new Pareto property, it is useful to first
understand the negative result. Below, we introduce a version of the negative result.
II.3.1 A Variant of the Negative Result
Below is a variant of the Pareto property used by Zuber (2011) and Jackson and Yariv (2015)
that fits our setting.
Definition 1. The planner’s preference (%t)t∈T is current-generation Pareto if for any con-
sumption sequences p,q ∈ ∆(X)T , in each period t ∈ T , p %i,t q for all i ∈ N implies
p %t q, and p i,t q for all i ∈ N implies p t q.
This notion of Pareto says that in any period t, if all current-generation individuals
agree that a consumption sequence p is preferred to another sequence q, the planner should
agree that p %tq. The same applies when the preferences are all strict.
Consider a situation in which every generation-t individual i has an EDU function; that
is, for some discount factor δi > 0,
Ui,t(p) =
T∑
τ=t
δτ−ti ui(pτ ).
Let us present below a variant of the negative result.
Proposition II.1. Suppose each generation-t individual i has an EDU function with discount
factor δi and instantaneous utility function ui such that δi’s are distinct. The planner is
current-generation Pareto if and only if there exists some i ∈ N such that for any t ∈ T ,
Ut = Ui,t.
The result says that if we require that the planner be current-generation Pareto and have
an EDU function, the planner’s preference must be identical to some individual’s preference
in every period. Since consumption is public, our setting is closer to Jackson and Yariv
(2015). However, Jackson and Yariv’s result is different from the above proposition. For
example, they require that instantaneous utility functions be defined on a one-dimensional
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space and twice continuously differentiable, and we require that instantaneous utility func-
tions be expected utility functions.
The intuition is as follows. First, the planner is current-generation Pareto if and only
if her EDU function is equal to a weighted sum of the individuals’ EDU functions; because
we consider expected utility functions, this is an implication of Harsanyi (1955). Next,
for simplicity, suppose there are only two individuals with identical instantaneous utility
functions u1 = u2. The planner attaches a weight ω ∈ [0, 1] to the first individual and 1− ω
to the second individual. Now, for the planner to not be dictatorial, there must be some
ω ∈ (0, 1) and δ > 0 such that
ωδ1 + (1− ω)δ2 = δ,
and
ωδ21 + (1− ω)δ22 = δ2.
However, one cannot find such a δ, unless ω = 0 or 1.
II.3.2 Intergenerational Pareto
A key feature of environmental policies and many other economic policies is that such de-
cisions affect multiple generations. Current-generation Pareto only takes into account the
preferences of the current generation. Although current-generation individuals altruistically
care about future consumption and the planner should respect how they discount the future,
how they think about the future may well differ from how future generations will think.
Since future generations will be affected by the planner’s decision, the planner should take
into account their actual well-being (including how they will discount their own future). The
following Pareto property captures this idea.
Definition 2. The planner’s preference (%t)t∈T is intergenerationally Pareto if for any con-
sumption sequences p,q ∈ ∆(X)T , in each period t ∈ T , p %i,s q for all i ∈ N and all s ≥ t
implies p %t q, and p i,s q for all i ∈ N and all s ≥ t implies p t q.
Intergenerational Pareto says that in any period t, if all current- and future-generation
individuals agree that a consumption sequence is preferred to another sequence, the planner
should agree. For example, suppose all current-generation individuals are extremely selfish:
They are willing to sacrifice the environment to increase their own consumption. If the
planner is current-generation Pareto, the planner must agree with them, and let them destroy
the environment. However, if the planner is intergenerationally Pareto, the planner is allowed
to disagree with them, because what they prefer hurts future generations. Note that if
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the planner is current-generation Pareto, she is also intergenerationally Pareto. Therefore,
intergenerational Pareto is weaker than current-generation Pareto.
Our model considers expected utility functions. This enables us to apply the classic
result from Harsanyi (1955) and Fishburn (1984) to characterize the consequence of inter-
generational Pareto.
Lemma 3. (Harsanyi (1955)) The planner’s preference (%t)t∈T is intergenerationally Pareto
if and only if in each period t ∈ T , there exists a finite sequence of nonnegative numbers
(ωt(i, s))i∈N,s≥t such that
Ut =
N∑
i=1
T∑
s=t
ωt(i, s)Ui,s.
The lemma above follows from Harsanyi (1955) and Fishburn (1984), and shows that
intergenerational Pareto is equivalent to intergenerational utilitarianism in our setting; that
is, the planner is intergenerationally Pareto if and only if in each period, her utility func-
tion is equal to a weighted sum of all the current- and future-generation individuals’ utility
functions. In contrast, current-generation Pareto is equivalent to current-generation utilitar-
ianism. We omit the proof of this lemma.
Instantaneous utility functions are normalized. In general, it is possible that there do
not exist two consumption sequences such that all individuals strictly prefer one to the other;
in that case, if the planner is indifferent to all consumption sequences, the planner will be
intergenerational Pareto trivially. If the planner is always indifferent, her instantaneous
utility function is constant and her discount function can be arbitrary. The normalization
assumption rules out this uninteresting case.
II.3.3 Dictatorship
In the negative result, a planner can have an EDU function and be current-generation Pareto
as long as she is dictatorial. To rule out dictatorship, we introduce a strong notion of non-
dictatorship such that not only is the planner not dictatorial, but also every individual from
every generation has a say.9
Definition 4. We say that the planner is strongly non-dictatorial if for each t ∈ T ,
Ut(p) = ft (U1,t(p), . . . , U1,T (p), U2,t(p), . . . , U2,T (p), . . . , UN,T (p))
for some (strictly) increasing function ft.
9When the planner is not dictatorial, we only know that at least two individuals’ preferences are taken
into account by the planner.
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In light of Lemma 3, under intergenerational Pareto, this means that the planner’s
utility function can be written as a weighted sum of individual utility functions with positive
weights.
Intergenerational Pareto is weaker than current-generation Pareto. According to Lemma
3, the planner has more utilitarian weights to assign under intergenerational Pareto, which
makes it easier for the planner to aggregate individuals’ utility functions into an EDU func-
tion. The strongly non-dictatorial property, on the other hand, makes the aggregation prob-
lem harder, because it requires that all weights be positive.
II.4 Individuals with Exponential Discount Functions
We address two aspects of social discounting. First, can we bypass the negative result?
If so, which social discount factors are reasonable? In particular, which social discount
factors, under our assumptions, are compatible with intergenerational Pareto? Second, recall
that in the social discounting literature, economists have argued that the social discount
factor should be higher than the individual discount factor. Accordingly, with heterogeneous
individuals, which individual’s discount factor should the social discount factor be higher
than?
To contrast with the negative result, we first examine a special case of our model in
which individual discount functions are exponential.
II.4.1 Aggregating Individual Discount Functions
To focus on discounting, suppose that all individual instantaneous utility functions are iden-
tical; that is, there is some continuous expected utility function u : ∆(X) → R such that
each generation-t individual i’s utility function is
Ui,t(p) =
T∑
τ=t
δτ−ti u(pτ ).
This assumption will be relaxed soon, and we will use the result established under this
assumption to highlight how the range of reasonable social discount factors is affected by
individual instantaneous utility functions. An alternative interpretation of this assumption
is that the planner only wants to aggregate individual discount functions. Therefore, it is
without loss of generality to replace the (possibly heterogeneous) individual instantaneous
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utility functions with the planner’s instantaneous utility function u.10
Proposition II.2. Suppose each generation-t individual i has an EDU function with discount
factor δi and instantaneous utility function u. Let the planner’s instantaneous utility function
be u. The planner is intergenerationally Pareto and strongly non-dictatorial if and only if
δ > mini δi.
When individuals share the same instantaneous utility function, according to Lemma 3,
the planner must use the same instantaneous utility function in order to satisfy the Pareto
property.
Proposition II.2 shows that under intergenerational Pareto rather than current-generation
Pareto, a positive result can be established. Moreover, under the current set of assumptions,
it is the least patient individual’s discount factor that the social discount factor should be
higher than.
Because discount functions are exponential and consumption is public, Proposition II.2
can be directly compared to Jackson and Yariv (2014, 2015). In Jackson and Yariv, adding
more current-generation exponential discounting individuals to the aggregation cannot help
eliminate the negative result. In contrast, we add future-generation exponential discounting
individuals to the aggregation, and this helps.
To see why, first recall that when ui = u, Jackson and Yariv (2014) show that utilitarian
aggregation of the current generation leads to a social discount function that exhibits present
bias. The fact that future generations will not care about past consumption as much as past
generations did helps us remove the present bias. In our model, past consumption does not
enter future generations’ utility functions; that is, δi(τ) = 0 for any τ < 0. This implies
that, for example, generation-t individual i’s relative discount factor applied to period-t
consumption (relative to period-(t − 1) consumption) is equal to “δi(0)/δi(−1) = +∞.”
Thus, generation-t is “infinitely patient” between period t − 1 and period t. The infinite
patience can be used in the aggregation to offset the present bias generated by aggregating
the current generation alone. In fact, the same result continues to hold even if individuals
backward discount past consumption exponentially (see Section II.8.3 in the Supplemental
Material).11
To understand how the proposition is proved, consider the planner in the first period.
According to Lemma 3, the planner is intergenerationally Pareto if and only if her objective
10In this interpretation, however, each individual i’s preference in the definition of Pareto properties must
be replaced with another preference induced by a discounting utility function with a discount function δi
and an instantaneous utility function u chosen by the planner.
11See Caplin and Leahy (2004) and Ray, Vellodi and Wang (2017) for models that allow backward dis-
counting for past consumption.
60
function U1 satisfies
U1(p) =
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
ω(i, t)Ui,t(p), (II.3)
for any consumption sequence p, in which ω(i, t) ≥ 0 is the weight the planner assigns to the
generation-t individual i. Consider how the planner discounts period-τ consumption. Since
the planner and individuals have EDU functions, and their instantaneous utility functions
are identical, equation (II.3) becomes
δτ−1 =
τ∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
ω(i, t)δτ−ti . (II.4)
To prove the “if” part of the proposition, we let all individuals’ weights be equal to some
small numbers, except for the least patient individuals. We show that if those weights are
sufficiently small, there exist positive weights for the least patient individuals such that the
weighted sum of all individuals’ utility functions is an EDU function with the social discount
factor δ > mini δi. For example, suppose N = T = 2 and δ1 < δ2.
12 Let ω(i, t) = ε whenever
i = 2. Equation (II.4) implies that
ω(1, 1) = 1− ω(2, 1) = 1− ε
and
ω(1, 2) = δ − ω(1, 1)δ1 − ω(2, 1)δ2 − ω(2, 2) = δ − δ1 + ε(δ1 − δ2 − 1).
Since δ > δ1, ω(1, 1) and ω(1, 2) are positive when ε = 0. Therefore, when ε > 0 is sufficiently
small, ω(i, t)’s can all be positive.
To understand the “only-if” part, suppose individual 1’s discount factor is the lowest.
By letting τ = 1, equation (II.4) implies that
∑N
i=1 ω(i, 1) = 1. Since the planner is strongly
non-dictatorial, we can assume that ω(i, t)’s are positive, and hence
∑τ
t=1
∑N
i=1 ω(i, t) > 1.
Then, equation (II.4) implies that
δτ−1 =
τ∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
ω(i, t)δτ−ti ≥ δτ−11
τ∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
ω(i, t) > δτ−11 , (II.5)
which means δ > δ1.
Note that Proposition II.2 is not very helpful in pinning down social discount factors,
because the least patient individual’s discount factor can be quite low. Thus, many social
12We have assumed T > 2 because when T ≤ 2, there will be no negative result (such as Proposition II.1)
trivially. However, to illustrate the idea of the proof here, we only need an example with T = 2.
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discount factors can satisfy our requirements. However, as will be shown below, this is no
longer the case once we relax the unrealistic assumption that individuals share the same
instantaneous utility function.
II.4.2 Social Discounting and Individual Instantaneous Utility Func-
tions
The assumption that individuals share the same instantaneous utility function is clearly
unrealistic. As long as |X| ≥ N (i.e., the number of deterministic consumption goods is
higher than the number of individuals in each generation), generically, the instantaneous
utility functions should not only be different, but also linearly independent.13
Definition 5. An N -tuple of continuous expected utility functions (ui)i∈N is linearly inde-
pendent if there are no constants α1, . . . , αN that are not all zero, and
∑
i∈N αiui(p) = 0 for
all p ∈ ∆(X).
It turns out that when individual instantaneous utility functions are linearly indepen-
dent, the cutoff for the social discount factor jumps from mini δi to maxi δi; that is, generi-
cally, the social discount factor should be higher than the most patient individual’s discount
factor.
Proposition II.3. Suppose each generation-t individual i has an EDU function with discount
factor δi and instantaneous utility function ui such that (ui)i∈N is linearly independent. Let
the planner’s instantaneous utility function u be an arbitrary strict convex combination of
(ui)i∈N .14 The planner is intergenerationally Pareto and strongly non-dictatorial if and only
if δ > maxi δi.
To understand why we assume that the planner’s instantaneous utility function is a
strict convex combination of individual instantaneous utility functions, note that Lemma
3 implies that the intergenerationally Pareto and strongly non-dictatorial planner’s utility
function is equal to a weighted sum of individual discounting utility functions with positive
weights. Thus, the planner’s instantaneous utility function must also be a positively weighted
sum of individual instantaneous utility functions. Since instantaneous utility functions are
normalized, the weights sum up to 1.
13However, for example, if individual instantaneous utility functions are drawn from some fixed small set
of continuous expected utility functions rather than the set of all continuous expected utility functions, or
the number of consumption goods is lower than N , individual instantaneous utility functions need not be
linearly independent. See Theorem 10 for results without assuming linear independence.
14By a strict convex combination of (ui)i∈N , we mean that u is in the interior of the convex hull of
u1, . . . , uN .
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Notice that the planner’s instantaneous utility function—in other words, her risk attitude—
is independent of the cutoff for the social discount factor. This is somewhat surprising.
Suppose there are two individuals, 1 and 2, and individual 2 is more patient. The above
result says that even if the social discount factor is close to individual 2’s discount factor, it
is not necessarily the case that the planner’s risk attitude is also close to individual 2’s risk
attitude. We can have a planner whose risk attitude is close to individual 1’s, but the social
discount factor is close to individual 2’s.
If there are many individuals with a wide range of discount factors, this result may imply
that the planner must be very patient in order to be intergenerationally Pareto and strongly
non-dictatorial. This provides a new justification for the use of the near-zero social discount
rate by Stern (2007). If one thinks that a market rate is higher than the lowest individual
discount rate, this result also rules out the use of a market rate as the social discount rate.
This result shows that the cutoff for the social discount factor in Proposition II.2 is
not robust. When ui = uj for any i, j ∈ N , the cutoff is mini δi. If we introduce a small
perturbation to ui’s, generically, the cutoff jumps discontinuously to maxi δi.
One may wonder whether there is any intermediate case that yields a cutoff for the
social discount factor between mini δi and maxi δi. In Section II.5.4, under a more general
assumption about individual instantaneous utility functions, we explain the intermediate
cases.
To understand how this proposition is proved, consider again the planner in the first
period. To prove the “if” part of Proposition II.3, we want to find positive weights ω(i, t)’s
such that the weighted sum of all individuals’ EDU functions is equal to the planner’s
EDU function. Focus on one arbitrary j ∈ N . We show that we can find positive weights
ω˜(j, 1), . . . , ω˜(j, T ) such that
∑
t∈T ω˜(j, t)Uj,t is equal to an EDU function with any discount
factor that is higher than δj. In particular, we can find positive weights ω˜(i, 1), . . . , ω˜(i, T )
for each i ∈ N such that
T∑
t=1
ω˜(i, t)Ui,t(p) =
T∑
τ=1
δτ−1ui(pτ ),
for any consumption sequence p, because δ > maxi δi. Now, since the planner’s instantaneous
utility function u =
∑
i∈N λiui for some positive numbers λi’s, we only need to let ω(i, t) =
λiω˜(i, t).
The “only-if” part of Proposition II.3 may be surprising. Note that when (ui)i∈N is
linearly independent and u is in the interior of co({ui}i∈N), there is a unique way to write
u as a strict convex combination of (ui)i∈N .15 Suppose
∑
i∈N λiui = u and
∑
i∈N λi = 1 for
15We use co(·) to denote the convex hull of a set.
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some positive numbers λi’s. The planner’s period-1 EDU function satisfies
U1(p) =
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
ω(i, t)Ui,t(p) =
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
ω(i, t)
T∑
τ=t
δτ−ti ui(pτ ), (II.6)
in which ω(i, t) > 0 is the weight the planner assigns to the generation-t individual i. This
implies that the planner’s instantaneous utility function for period-1 consumption satisfies
u(p1) =
N∑
i=1
ω(i, 1)ui(p1)
for any p1. Because u =
∑
i∈N λiui and (ui)i∈N is linearly independent,
ω(i, 1) = λi (II.7)
must hold for any i ∈ N . Similarly, for period-2 consumption, equation (II.6) implies that
δu(p2) =
N∑
i=1
[ω(i, 1)δi + ω(i, 2)]ui(p2)
for any p2. Since instantaneous utility functions do not change over time, the unique way
to write u as a strict convex combination of (ui)i∈N does not change; that is, δu(p2) =
δ
∑
i∈N λiui(p2) for any p2. Then, for any i ∈ N ,
λiδ = ω(i, 1)δi + ω(i, 2). (II.8)
Equations (II.7) and (II.8), together with the strongly non-dictatorial property, imply that
δ > δi for any i ∈ N . Hence, δ > maxi δi.
II.5 Individuals with General Discount Functions
Individual discount functions are often not exponential (see Strotz (1955), Laibson (1997),
and Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2002)).16 Allowing individuals to have general
discount functions, as in (II.1), raises a challenge to our previous findings: When we say
that the social discount factor should be higher than some individual’s discount factor, it is
not clear how individual discount factors should be defined. Our analysis below shows how
16In contrast, for normative reasons, we may prefer to require that the planner have an EDU function.
Such a requirement also makes our positive results sharper.
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the range of reasonable social discount factors depends on some asymptotic characteristic
of general individual discount functions, and how our positive results in Section 4 can be
generalized.
II.5.1 Aggregating Individual Discount Functions
Again, we begin with the case in which individual instantaneous utility functions are identi-
cal; that is, there is some continuous expected utility function u : ∆(X)→ R such that each
generation-t individual i’s utility function is
Ui,t(p) =
T∑
τ=t
δi(τ − t)u(pτ ).
Because we will need to vary T in part of the results below, we assume that individual
discount functions are well defined for natural numbers. Starting from a set of individual
discount functions δi’s defined over natural numbers N, whenever a finite T is chosen, we
restrict the domain of δi’s to {0, . . . , T − 1}. For instance, suppose individuals have quasi-
hyperbolic discount functions. We first define δi(τ) = βiδ
τ−1
i for any τ > 0. Then, we choose
T and focus on δi(0), . . . , δi(T − 1).
For each individual discount function δi, we call
τ
√
δi(τ) the average discount func-
tion, and δi(τ+1)
δi(τ)
the relative discount function. The average discount function measures the
equivalent exponential discount factor for τ -period-ahead consumption. The relative dis-
count function captures the instantaneous discounting for consumption that is τ + 1 periods
ahead relative to consumption that is τ periods ahead.
We make two assumptions about the individual discount functions. The first assumption
says that average discounting has a limit; that is,
lim
τ→∞
τ
√
δi(τ) exists. (A1)
The second assumption says that the relative discount function is bounded; that is,
there exists some α > 0 such that
δi(τ + 1)
δi(τ)
< α for all τ ≥ 0. (A2)
The following theorem characterizes the set of social discount factors that are compatible
with intergenerational Pareto under these assumptions.
Theorem 6. Suppose each generation-t individual i’s discounting utility function has an
instantaneous utility function u and a discount function δi such that (A1) and (A2) hold.
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Let the planner’s instantaneous utility function be u. Then,
1. for each δ > mini maxτ∈{0,...,T−2}
δi(τ+1)
δi(τ)
, the planner is intergenerationally Pareto and
strongly non-dictatorial;
2. for each δ < mini limτ→∞ τ
√
δi(τ), there exists some T
∗ > 0 such that if T ≥ T ∗, the
planner is not intergenerationally Pareto.
The theorem shows how social discounting depends on individual discounting when indi-
viduals have heterogeneous general discount functions. We can find two cutoffs for the social
discount factor. If the social discount factor is above the least patient individual’s max-
imal relative discount factor, the planner’s preference must be intergenerationally Pareto
and strongly non-dictatorial. If the social discount factor is below the least patient individ-
ual’s asymptotic average discount factor, the planner’s preference must have violated the
intergenerationally Pareto property as long as T is large enough.
The first part of the theorem confirms that positive results can still be established when
individuals have arbitrary discount functions. Given a social discount factor, we can also
apply this result to check whether intergenerational Pareto holds. The second part of the
theorem says that if the social discount factor is too low, there must be two consumption
sequences such that all individuals from all generations prefer one over the other, but the
planner disagrees. A reasonable social discount factor should not allow this to happen.
Note that for any fixed T , max
τ∈{0,...,T−2}
δi(τ+1)
δi(τ)
≥ T−1√δi(T − 1), because
T−1
√
δi(T − 1) = T−1
√
δi(T − 1)
δi(T − 2) · · · · ·
δi(1)
δi(0)
; (II.9)
that is, T−1
√
δi(T − 1) is the geometric mean of δi(τ+1)δi(τ) ’s. Therefore, maxτ∈{0,...,T−2}
δi(τ+1)
δi(τ)
will
not be lower than limτ→∞ τ
√
δi(τ) when T is large enough, and hence the first cutoff for the
social discount factor will eventually be higher than the second cutoff.
Although the first cutoff may be strictly higher than the second, the two cutoffs in the
theorem are “tight” in the following sense. For the first cutoff, there exist some individual dis-
count functions δi’s and T such that if the social discount factor δ ≤ mini maxτ∈{0,...,T−2} δi(τ+1)δi(τ) ,
the planner cannot be both intergenerationally Pareto and strongly non-dictatorial. This
happens, for example, when δi’s are exponential. Similarly, for the second cutoff, we can
find individual discount functions δi’s such that for any finite T , if the social discount fac-
tor δ ≥ mini limτ→∞ τ
√
δi(τ), the planner is intergenerationally Pareto. This happens, for
example, when δi’s are quasi-hyperbolic (see Section II.8.2 in the Supplemental Material).
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To prove the first part of this theorem, we first focus on one arbitrary i ∈ N . The key
step is to show that for each t ∈ T , we can find positive weights (ω˜(i, t, s))Ts=t such that∑T
s=t ω˜(i, t, s)Ui,s is equal to an EDU function with any discount factor that is higher than
maxτ∈{0,...,T−2}
δi(τ+1)
δi(τ)
. Therefore, the planner can use utilitarian aggregation to transform
each generation-t individual i’s discounting utility function into an EDU function with a
discount factor that is higher than maxτ∈{0,...,T−2}
δi(τ+1)
δi(τ)
. Then, we only need to let the
planner use utilitarian weights to aggregate these EDU functions, as in Proposition II.2.
The proof of the second part is similar to that of Proposition II.2. Suppose individual
1’s asymptotic average discount factor is the lowest strictly. When τ is large enough (and
hence T must be large enough), we know that δi(τ − s) ≥ δ1(τ − s). Hence, (II.5) becomes
δτ−1 =
τ∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
ω(i, t)δi(τ − t) ≥ δ1(τ − 1)
τ∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
ω(i, t) ≥ δ1(τ − 1).
Therefore, δ ≥ limτ→∞ τ
√
δ1(τ) when τ is large enough.
II.5.2 Individual Long-Run Discounting
It turns out that for many widely used classes of individual discount functions, the two
cutoffs in Theorem 6 merge into one. This is not a coincidence, and will help us identify an
important characteristic of the individual discount function that determines the cutoff for
the social discount factor. Let us introduce the following assumption:
the relative discount function
δi(τ + 1)
δi(τ)
is nondecreasing in τ. (A3)
In the literature of time inconsistency, when an individual has a nondecreasing relative
discount function, the individual has (weak) present bias. A discount function δi is hyperbolic
if for some αi, βi > 0, δi(τ) = (1 +αiτ)
−βi , and is quasi-hyperbolic if for some βi ∈ (0, 1] and
δi > 0, δi(τ) = βiδ
τ
i for any τ > 0. Exponential, hyperbolic, and quasi-hyperbolic discount
functions all satisfy (A3).
Under (A2) and (A3), δi(τ+1)
δi(τ)
is nondecreasing and bounded. Hence, limτ→∞
δi(τ+1)
δi(τ)
exists. Whenever limτ→∞
δi(τ+1)
δi(τ)
exists, because the average discount factor is the geometric
mean of relative discount factors (see equation (II.9)), the average discount factor also has
a limit. Therefore, assumptions (A2) and (A3) imply (A1).
More importantly, when limτ→∞
δi(τ+1)
δi(τ)
exists, the asymptotic relative discount factor
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and the asymptotic average discount factor coincide:
lim
τ→∞
δi(τ + 1)
δi(τ)
= lim
τ→∞
τ
√
δi(τ).
Definition 7. When limτ→∞
δi(τ+1)
δi(τ)
exists, we call δ∗i := limτ→∞
δi(τ+1)
δi(τ)
= limτ→∞ τ
√
δi(τ)
individual i’s long-run discount factor.
The following corollary of Theorem 6 has only one cutoff for the social discount factor,
and shows how social discounting is related to individual long-run discounting.
Corollary 8. Suppose each generation-t individual i’s discounting utility function has an
instantaneous utility function u and a discount function δi such that (A2) and (A3) hold.
Let the planner’s instantaneous utility function be u. Then,
1. for each δ > mini δ
∗
i , the planner is intergenerationally Pareto and strongly non-
dictatorial;
2. for each δ < mini δ
∗
i , there exists some T
∗ > 0 such that if T ≥ T ∗, the planner is not
intergenerationally Pareto.
If individuals have hyperbolic discount functions, the cutoff for the social discount factor
is mini δ
∗
i = 1; if individuals have quasi-hyperbolic discount functions with δi(τ) = βiδ
τ
i , the
cutoff is mini δ
∗
i = mini δi.
In Section II.8.2 in the Supplemental Material, we reinterpret the generation-(t + s)
individual i (with s > 0) as a future self of the generation-t individual i, which offers a
new interpretation of intergenerational Pareto and allows us to discuss how our findings are
related to the time-inconsistency literature. In addition, we provide a stronger result similar
to Corollary 8 for the case in which individuals have quasi-hyperbolic discount functions.
From here on, to simplify the statement of our results, we focus on the case in which
long-run discount factors δ∗i ’s are well defined.
II.5.3 Social Discounting and Individual Instantaneous Utility Func-
tions
Corollary 8 shows that if all individuals share the same instantaneous utility function, the
social discount factor only has to be higher than the lowest individual long-run discount
factor. As one may expect, when individual instantaneous utility functions are linearly
independent, the cutoff for the social discount factor jumps from mini δ
∗
i to maxi δ
∗
i . Thus,
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generically, if social discounting is more patient than the most patient individual’s long-run
discounting, the planner is intergenerationally Pareto and strongly non-dictatorial; otherwise,
if the time horizon is long enough, intergenerational Pareto is violated.
Theorem 9. Suppose each generation-t individual i’s discounting utility function has an
instantaneous utility function ui and a discount function δi such that (A2) and (A3) hold
and (ui)i∈N is linearly independent. Let the planner’s instantaneous utility function u be an
arbitrary strict convex combination of (ui)i∈N . Then,
1. for each δ > maxi δ
∗
i , the planner is intergenerationally Pareto and strongly non-
dictatorial;
2. for each δ < maxi δ
∗
i , there exists some T
∗ > 0 such that if T ≥ T ∗, the planner is not
intergenerationally Pareto.
Again, the cutoff is independent of the planner’s risk attitude. Theorem 9 assumes (A2)
and (A3). If we replace (A3) with (A1), as in Theorem 6, the only change in the statement
of Theorem 9 will be that instead of one cutoff, we will have two cutoffs, as in Theorem 6.
The proof of this theorem is similar to Proposition II.3, with some new elements taken
from the proof of Theorem 6. Similar to Theorem 6, the second part of Theorem 9 requires
that the time horizon be long enough.
II.5.4 Transition of the Cutoff
Let us further illustrate how the cutoff changes from the least patient individual’s long-
run discount factor to the most patient individual’s. An individual’s instantaneous utility
function describes his risk attitude. Let Θ be some positive integer between 1 and N .
Suppose there is a linearly independent Θ-tuple of instantaneous utility functions (uθ)Θθ=1
representing Θ generic types of risk attitude. Assume that individual i’s instantaneous utility
function ui ∈ {uθ}Θθ=1, and there is no redundant type in {uθ}Θθ=1; that is, for each type uθ,
at least one individual’s instantaneous utility function is equal to uθ. If Θ = 1, we are in the
case of Theorem 6. If Θ = N , we are in the case of Theorem 9. Define δ∗θ := min
k∈{i∈N :ui=uθ}
δ∗k;
that is, for each θ, let δ∗θ be the least patient individual’s long-run discount factor whose
type is uθ. Define
δ∗maxmin := max
θ
δ∗θ .
Theorem 10. Suppose for some linearly independent Θ-tuple of instantaneous utility func-
tions (uθ)Θθ=1, each generation-t individual i’s discounting utility function has an instanta-
neous utility function ui ∈ {uθ}Θθ=1 and a discount function δi such that (A2) and (A3) hold
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and {ui}i∈N = {uθ}Θθ=1. Let the planner’s instantaneous utility function u be an arbitrary
strict convex combination of (ui)i∈N . Then,
1. for each δ >δ∗maxmin, the planner is intergenerationally Pareto and strongly non-dictatorial;
2. for each δ <δ∗maxmin, there exists some T
∗ > 0 such that if T ≥ T ∗, the planner is not
intergenerationally Pareto.
Note that as Θ increases from 1 to N , the cutoff may not increase monotonically. The
idea of the proof of the theorem is as follows. For each type of risk attitude uθ, we can apply
Theorem 6 to show that the cutoff for the social discount factor implied by aggregating
type-uθ individuals is δ∗θ . When aggregating across types, we apply Theorem 9 to show that
the maximal δ∗θ is the cutoff for the social discount factor.
II.6 Conclusion
The value of a policy or a public project that affects generations of individuals often cru-
cially depends on which social discount rate is used for the evaluation. However, there is
no consensus on which social discount rate is the right one to use. This paper considers
a few important and widely used assumptions in economics, and characterizes the set of
social discount rates that are compatible with those assumptions. The key assumptions are
(i) individuals discount future consumption heterogeneously, (ii) the planner has an expo-
nential discounting expected utility function, (iii) the planner is intergenerationally Pareto,
which means that if all individuals from the current and future generations agree that one
consumption sequence is better than another, the planner must agree, and (iv) the planner
never completely ignores any individual’s preference.
We show that for a generic set of individual instantaneous utility functions, social dis-
counting should be more patient than the most patient individual’s long-run discounting, as
long as the time horizon is long enough, independent of the planner’s instantaneous utility
function. Therefore, using a near-zero social discount rate is justifiable in our framework.
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II.7 Proof
II.7.1 Proof of Proposition II.1
Proof. If Part If there exists some i ∈ N such that Ut = Ui,t for any t ∈ T , the planner
only takes individual i into account in period t. The corresponding weights in period t are
ωi = 1 and ωj = 0 for all j 6= i. According to Lemma 3, the planner’s preference (%t)t∈T is
current-generation Pareto.
Only-If Part Suppose the planner is current-generation Pareto. We only prove the
only-if part for the first period. According to Lemma 3, there exists an N -tuple of nonneg-
ative weights (ωi)i∈N , such that
N∑
i=1
ωi
T∑
τ=1
δτ−1i ui(pτ ) =
T∑
τ=1
δτ−1u(pτ );
that is, for τ = 1, . . . , T − 1,
N∑
i=1
ωiδ
τ−1
i ui(pτ ) = δ
τ−1u(pτ ).
Let τ = 1, 2, and 3. We have
∑N
i=1 ωiui(p) = u(p),∑N
i=1 ωiδiui(p) = δu(p),∑N
i=1 ωiδ
2
i ui(p) = δ
2u(p),
for any p ∈ ∆(X). Let p = x∗. The first equation shows that ∑i∈N ωi = 1. Combining the
second and the third equations above,(
N∑
i=1
ωiδi
)2
=
N∑
i=1
ωiδ
2. (II.10)
Since
∑
i∈N ωi = 1 and δi’s are distinct, by Jensen’s inequality, equation (II.10) holds if
and only if there is some i ∈ N such that ωi = 1 (ωj = 0 for any j 6= i). Thus, U1 = Ui,1.
Since the planner’s instantaneous utility function and the social discount factor do not change
over time, Ut = Ui,t for any t ∈ T .
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II.7.2 Proof of Proposition II.2
Proof. The following lemma will be useful in proving Proposition II.2.
Lemma 11. Given a positive N-tuple (δi)i∈N , for any t ∈ T , there exists a finite sequence
of positive numbers (ωt(i, s))i∈N,s≥t such that
N∑
i=1
τ∑
s=t
ωt(i, s)δ
τ−s
i = δ
τ−t (II.11)
for any τ ≥ t if and only if δ > mini δi.
Proof. If Part Without loss of generality, we assume that δ1 = mini δi. First, we fix all the
weights other than individual 1’s. Let ωt(i, s) = t(s) > 0 for any i ≥ 2, t ≥ 1, and s ≥ t.
The remaining part is to find (ωt(1, s))t∈T,s≥t such that
1. equation (II.11) holds;
2. ωt(1, s) > 0, for any t ≥ 1 and s ≥ t.
Construct (ωt(1, s))t∈T,s≥t by the following recursive formula:
ωt(1, s) =

1−
N∑
i=2
ωt(i, s), if s = t,
δs−t −
N∑
i=1
ωt(i, t)δ
s−t
i − · · · −
N∑
i=1
ωt(i, s− 1)δi −
N∑
i=2
ωt(i, s), if s > t.
(II.12)
It can be verified that (II.12) ensures that equation (II.11) holds for any t ∈ T and τ ≥ t.
The remaining part is to show that (ω1,t(s))t∈T,s≥t derived from (II.12) are strictly greater
than zero, if (t(s))t∈T,s≥t are small enough. We prove it in two steps.
Step 1 Setting t(s) = 0, the recursive formula (II.12) becomes
ωt(1, s) =
{
1, if s = t,
δs−t−1(δ − δ1), if s > t,
for each t ∈ T . This can be proved by induction. Since δ > δ1, we have ωt(1, s) > 0.
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Step 2 Plugging t(s) into formula (II.12), we have,
ωt(1, t) = 1− (N − 1)t(t),
ωt(1, t+ 1) = δ − δ1 −
[
N∑
i=2
(δi − δ1)
]
t(t)− (N − 1)t(t+ 1),
ωt(1, t+ 2) = δ(δ − δ1)−
[
N∑
i=2
δi(δi − δ1)
]
t(t)−
[
N∑
i=2
(δi − δ1)
]
t(t+ 1)− (N − 1)t(t+ 2),
...
Then, we know that ωt(1, s) = F
(s)
t (t(t), . . . , t(s)|δ, δ1, . . . , δn), in which F (s)t is an affine
(and hence continuous) function of t(t), . . . , t(s). Since F
(s)
t is continuous, the weights
ωt(1, s)’s are strictly greater than zero, if t(s)’s are small enough.
Only-If Part For any t < T , let τ = t, t+ 1 in (II.11). We have{ ∑N
i=1 ωt(i, t) = 1,∑N
i=1 ωt(i, t)δi +
∑N
i=1 ωt(i, t+ 1) = δ.
Combining the above two equations,
N∑
i=1
ωt(i, t)δ =
N∑
i=1
ωt(i, t)δi +
N∑
i=1
ωt(i, t+ 1).
Rearranging the above equation, we have
δ =
N∑
i=1
ωt(i, t)δi +
N∑
i=1
ωt(i, t+ 1)
N∑
i=1
ωt(i, t)
>
N∑
i=1
ωt(i, t)δi
N∑
i=1
ωt(i, t)
>
N∑
i=1
ωt(i, t) mini δi
N∑
i=1
ωt(i, t)
= min
i∈N
δi.
Now we prove Proposition II.2.
If Part Taking the weights from the if part of Lemma 11, since the planner’s instan-
taneous utility function u is identical to individual instantaneous utility function u, we
immediately know that the planner has the desired EDU function, because
Ut(p) =
T∑
s=t
N∑
i=1
ωt(i, s)Ui,s(p) =
T∑
s=t
N∑
i=1
ωt(i, s)
T∑
τ=s
δτ−si u(pτ )
=
T∑
τ=t
τ∑
s=t
N∑
i=1
ωt(i, s)δ
τ−s
i u(pτ ) =
T∑
τ=t
δτ−tu(pτ ).
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Only-If Part Suppose the planner’s preference is intergenerationally Pareto and strongly
non-dictatorial. For each t ∈ T , there exists a finite sequence of positive numbers (ωt(i, s))i∈N,s≥t
such that
Ut(p) =
T∑
s=t
N∑
i=1
ωt(i, s)Ui,s(p) =
T∑
τ=t
τ∑
s=t
N∑
i=1
ωt(i, s)δ
τ−s
i u(pτ ).
Then, for any t ∈ T and τ ≥ t, the following equality holds:
τ∑
s=t
N∑
i=1
ωt(i, s)δ
τ−s
i u(pτ ) = δ
τ−tu(pτ ).
Let pτ = x
∗. Lemma 11 implies that δ > mini δi.
II.7.3 One-Individual Intergenerational Aggregation
We prove the following lemma for intergenerational aggregation when each generation only
has one individual.
Lemma 12. Assume that N = {i}. Suppose each generation-t individual i’s discounting
utility function has an instantaneous utility function u and a discount function δi such that
(A1) and (A2) hold. For any δ > δˆi := max
τ∈{0,...,T−2}
δi(τ+1)
δi(τ)
, the planner is intergenerationally
Pareto and strongly non-dictatorial.
Proof. We want to show that for any δ > δˆi and t ∈ T , there exists a finite sequence of
positive numbers (ωt(i, s))s≥t such that
Ut(p) =
T∑
τ=t
δτ−tu(pτ ) =
T∑
s=t
ωt(i, s)Ui,s(p).
Given any δ > δˆi, for each t ∈ T , we can construct (ωt(i, s))s≥t according to the following
formula:
ωt(i, s) =
 1, if s = t,δs−t−1 (δ − δˆi)+ s−1∑
τ=t
[
δˆiδi(s− 1− τ)− δi(s− τ)
]
ωt(i, τ), if s > t.
(II.13)
Note that by assuming δ > δˆi, for s > t, the first term of ωt(i, s) is strictly greater than
0. According to the definition of δˆi, the second term of ωt(i, s) is greater than 0. Hence,
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ωt(i, s) > 0 for any s ≥ t. Then,
Ut(p) =
T∑
s=t
ωt(i, s)Ui,s(p) =
T∑
s=t
ωt(i, s)
[
T∑
τ=s
δi(τ − s)u(pτ )
]
=
T∑
τ=t
[
τ∑
s=t
δi(τ − s)ωt(i, s)
]
u(pτ ).
We want to prove that Ut(p) =
∑T
τ=t δ
τ−tu(pτ ) by induction. Consider
∑τ
s=t δi(τ −
s)ωt(i, s). When τ = t,
∑τ
s=t δi(τ − s)ωt(i, s) = ωt(i, t) = 1 = δ0. Suppose for some τ ≥ t,
we have proven that
∑τ
s=t δi(τ − s)ωt(i, s) = δτ−t. We want to prove that for τ + 1,
τ+1∑
s=t
δi(τ + 1− s)ωt(i, s) = δτ−t+1. (II.14)
To prove (II.14), we only need to notice that according to (II.13),
τ+1∑
s=t
δi(τ + 1− s)ωt(i, s) = ωt(i, τ + 1) +
τ∑
s=t
δi(τ + 1− s)ωt(i, s)
= ωt(i, τ + 1) + δˆi
[
δτ−t +
τ∑
s=t
δi(τ + 1− s)
δˆi
ωt(i, s)− δτ−t
]
= ωt(i, τ + 1) + δˆi
[
δτ−t +
τ∑
s=t
δi(τ + 1− s)
δˆi
ωt(i, s)−
τ∑
s=t
δi(τ − s)ωt(i, s)
]
= ωt(i, τ + 1) + δˆiδ
τ−t +
τ∑
s=t
[
δi(τ + 1− s)− δˆiδi(τ − s)
]
ωt(i, s) = δ
τ−t+1.
By induction, we know that
∑τ
s=t δi(τ − s)ωt(i, s) = δτ−t for any τ ≥ t, and hence
Ut(p) =
∑T
τ=t δ
τ−tui(pτ ).
II.7.4 Proof of Proposition II.3
Proof. If Part Lemma 12 states that the planner can find a sequence of positive numbers
(ω˜t(i, s))t∈T,i∈N,s≥t such that
T∑
s=1
ω˜t(i, s)Ui,s(p) =
T∑
τ=1
δτ−1ui(pτ ),
for any i ∈ N and consumption sequence p, because δ > maxi δˆi = maxi δi. Now, since the
planner’s instantaneous utility function u =
∑
i∈N λiui, we only need to let ω(i, t) = λiω˜(i, t).
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Then,
N∑
i=1
T∑
s=1
ωt(i, s)Ui,s(p) =
N∑
i=1
T∑
s=1
λiω˜t(i, s)Ui,s(p) =
N∑
i=1
λi
[
T∑
τ=1
δτ−1ui(pτ )
]
=
T∑
τ=1
δτ−1u(pτ ).
Only-If Part Note that when (ui)i∈N is linearly independent and u is in the interior
of co({ui}i∈N), there is a unique way to write u as a strict convex combination of (ui)i∈N .
Suppose
∑
i∈N λiui = u, in which λi > 0 and
∑
i∈N λi = 1. We only need to consider the
period-1 planner. The planner’s discounting utility function satisfies
U1(p) =
T∑
s=1
N∑
i=1
ω1(i, s)Ui,s(p) =
T∑
s=1
N∑
i=1
ω1(i, s)
T∑
τ=s
δτ−si ui(pτ ), (II.15)
in which ω1(i, s) > 0 is the weight the period-1 planner assigns to the generation-s individual
i. Since p is arbitrary, this implies that the planner’s instantaneous utility function for
period-1 consumption satisfies
u(p1) =
N∑
i=1
ω1(i, 1)ui(p1)
for any p1. Because u =
∑
i∈N λiui and (ui)i∈N is linearly independent,
ω1(i, 1) = λi (II.16)
must hold for any i ∈ N . Similarly, equation (II.15) implies that for period-2 consumption,
δu(p2) =
N∑
i=1
[ω1(i, 1)δi + ω1(i, 2)]ui(p2)
for any p2. Since instantaneous utility functions do not depend on time, the unique way
to write u as a strict convex combination of (ui)i∈N does not change; that is, δu(p2) =
δ
∑
i∈N λiui(p2) for any p2. Then, for any i ∈ N ,
λiδ = ω1(i, 1)δi + ω1(i, 2). (II.17)
Combining equations (II.16) and (II.17) gives us
δ = δi +
ω1(i, 2)
ω1(i, 1)
> δi,
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for any i ∈ N . The last strict inequality follows from the fact that ω1(i, s) > 0. Therefore,
δ > maxi δi.
II.7.5 Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. Part I We prove the first part in three steps.
In the first step, the period-t planner does T−t+1 times aggregations for each individual
i. The σth aggregation aggregates individual i from generation σ to generation T (σ starts
from t and ends at T ), and it assigns weight ω˜t,σ(i, s) to generation-s individual i for s ≥ σ.
By Lemma 12, we know that for each t ∈ T , i ∈ N and σ ≥ t, the planner can find a
sequence of positive weights (ω˜t,σ(i, s))s≥σ such that
T∑
s=σ
ω˜t,σ(i, s)Ui,s(p) =
T∑
τ=σ
δτ−σu(pτ ),
for any δ > δˆi . The σ
th aggregation, as if, gives the planner an exponential discounting
generation-σ individual i with a discount factor slightly higher than δˆi.
In the second step, the period-t planner collects all of the weights assigned to generation-
s individual i for all T − t + 1 times step-one aggregations. Then the weight assigned to
generation-s individual i by the period-t planner is
ω˜t(i, s) =
T∑
σ=s
ω˜t,σ(i, s).
Essentially, in each period t, the step-two aggregation under weights (ω˜t(i, s))
i∈N
t∈T,s≥t gives the
planner N exponential discounting individuals from the tth generation to the T th generation,
and each individual has a discount factor slightly higher than δˆi.
Lastly, by Proposition II.2, the planner can aggregate N exponential discounting indi-
viduals one more time, and obtain an EDU function with any social discount factor greater
than mini δˆi.
Part II Define δ˜i := limτ→∞ τ
√
δi(τ). We assume that δ˜1 is the unique minimum of
δ˜1, . . . , δ˜N . The proof can easily be extended to the case with multiple minima. We prove
it by contradiction. Suppose the planner is intergenerationally Pareto. For each t ∈ T ,
there exists a finite sequence of nonnegative numbers (ωt(i, s))i∈N,s≥t such that the following
equality holds:
τ∑
s=t
N∑
i=1
ωt(i, s)δi(τ − s)u(pτ ) = δτ−tu(pτ ) (II.18)
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for any t ∈ T and τ ≥ t.
By letting τ = t, equation (II.18) shows that
∑
i∈N ωt(i, t) = 1 for any t ∈ T . Then,
δτ−t =
τ∑
s=t
N∑
i=1
ωt(i, s)δi(τ − s)
N∑
i=1
ωt(i, t)
≥
N∑
i=1
ωt(i, t)δi(τ − t)
N∑
i=1
ωt(i, t)
. (II.19)
Since δ˜1 = mini δ˜i, there exists T1 > 0 such that for each τ > T1, δ1(τ − t) = mini δi(τ − t).
Hence, (II.19) becomes
δτ−t ≥
N∑
i=1
ωi,t(t)δ1(τ − t)
N∑
i=1
ωi,t(t)
= δ1(τ − t). (II.20)
According to our assumptions, δ < δ˜1. Then, there exists T2 > 0 such that for each
τ > T2,
δτ−t < δ1(τ − t). (II.21)
Let T ∗ = max{T1, T2}. Then, (II.20) and (II.21) contradict each other.
II.7.6 Proof of Theorem 9
Proof. Part I We prove this theorem in two steps. First, we again consider the special
case in which there is only one individual i to be aggregated across generations. Since the
individual relative discount factor is nondecreasing, δ∗i ≥ δˆi := max
τ∈{0,...,T−2}
δi(τ+1)
δi(τ)
. By Lemma
12, because the social discount factor δ > maxi δ
∗
i ≥ δ∗i , for any i ∈ N and t ∈ T , we can
find some positive (ωt(i, s))s≥t such that
T∑
s=t
ωt(i, s)Ui,s(p) =
T∑
τ=t
δτ−tui(pτ );
that is, we can aggregate each individual’s utility functions across generations into an EDU
function with discount factor δ.
Consider any N -tuple of positive numbers (λi)i∈N such that
∑
i∈N λi = 1. Together
with the weights (ωt(i, s))t∈T,i∈N,s≥t we have found above, let the planner’s utility function
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satisfy
Ut(p) =
N∑
i=1
T∑
s=t
λiωt(i, s)Ui,s(p) =
N∑
i=1
T∑
τ=t
δτ−tλiui(pτ )
=
T∑
τ=t
δτ−t
N∑
i=1
λiui(pτ ) =
T∑
τ=t
δτ−tu(pτ ),
in which u =
∑
i∈N λiui is an arbitrary strict convex combination of (ui)i∈N .
Part II We prove it by contradiction. Suppose there exists an intergenerationally Pareto
planner with the social discount factor δ < maxi δ
∗
i . By intergenerational Pareto, for any
t ∈ T , there exists nonnegative numbers (ωt(i, s))i∈N,s≥t such that the following equality
holds for any t ∈ T :
T∑
τ=t
δτ−tu(pτ ) =
T∑
s=t
N∑
i=1
ωt(i, s)
T∑
τ=s
δi(τ − s)ui(pτ ) =
T∑
τ=t
N∑
i=1
τ∑
s=t
ωt(i, s)δi(τ − s)ui(pτ ).
Since p is arbitrary, the equation above implies that for any t ∈ T and τ ≥ t,
N∑
i=1
τ∑
s=t
ωt(i, s)δi(τ − s)ui(pτ ) = δτ−tu(pτ ). (II.22)
Recall that u is a strict convex combination of (ui)i∈N and (ui)i∈N is linearly independent.
There is a unique way to write u as a convex combination of (ui)i∈N . Moreover, when τ = t,
equation (II.22) becomes
N∑
i=1
ωt(i, t)ui(pt) = u(pt) (II.23)
for any t ∈ T . Thus, ωt(i, t) > 0 for any i ∈ N and t ∈ T . Combining equations (II.22) and
(II.23), we have
δτ−t
N∑
i=1
ωt(i, t)ui(pτ ) =
N∑
i=1
τ∑
s=t
ωt(i, s)δi(τ − s)ui(pτ ).
Since (ui)i∈N is linearly independent, for any i ∈ N , t ∈ T , and τ ≥ t, the above equation
implies
ωt(i, t)δ
τ−t =
τ∑
s=t
ωt(i, s)δi(τ − s),
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which in turn implies
δτ−t =
∑τ
s=t ωt(i, s)δi(τ − s)
ωt(i, t)
=
ωt(i, t)δi(τ − t) +
∑τ
s=t+1 ωt(i, s)δi(τ − s)
ωt(i, t)
≥ ωt(i, t)δi(τ − t)
ωt(i, t)
= δi(τ − t);
that is,
δ ≥ τˆ
√
δi(τˆ) (II.24)
for any 1 ≤ τˆ < T .
Without loss of generality, we assume δ∗N is a maximum of {δ∗i }i∈N . Since δ < δ∗N =
limτ→∞ τ
√
δN(τ), there exists T
∗ such that for any T ≥ T ∗, δ < T−1√δN(T − 1), which
contradicts (II.24).
II.7.7 Proof of Theorem 10
Proof. Part I We prove Part I in two steps. First, we aggregate individuals who share the
same uθ. For each θ ∈ Θ, Iθ := {i ∈ N : ui = uθ} is called a “family,” which is the set of i’s
whose instantaneous utility functions are uθ. By Corollary 8, we know that for each θ and
each δ > mini∈Iθ δ
∗
i , there exists a sequence of weights (ωt(i, s))t∈T,i∈Iθ,s≥t such that
U θt (p) =
T∑
τ=t
δτ−tuθ(pτ ) =
T∑
s=t
∑
i∈Iθ
ωt(i, s)Ui,s(p).
for each t ∈ T . Now, we have |Θ| exponential discounting expected utility functions U θt ’s
with linearly independent instantaneous utility functions uθ’s.
Next, we apply Proposition II.3 to aggregate U θt ’s. It follows immediately that if δ >
maxθ∈Θ mini∈Iθ δ
∗
i , the planner is intergenerationally Pareto and strongly non-dictatorial.
Part II We prove its contrapositive. Suppose the planner is intergenerationally Pareto.
Then, for each t ∈ T , there exists a finite sequence of positive numbers (ωt(i, s))i∈N,s≥t such
that
Ut(p) =
T∑
τ=t
δτ−tu(pτ ) =
T∑
s=t
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
i∈Iθ
ωt(i, s)
T∑
τ=s
δi(τ − s)ui(pτ ),
and hence
δτ−tu(pτ ) =
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
i∈Iθ
τ∑
s=t
ωt(i, s)δi(τ − s)uθ(pτ ) (II.25)
for any t ∈ T and τ ≥ t.
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By letting τ = t in equation (II.25), we have
u(pt) =
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
i∈Iθ
ωt(i, t)u
θ(pt). (II.26)
Recall that u is a strict convex combination of (ui)i∈N . Equation (II.26) shows that
∑
i∈Iθ ωt(i, t) >
0 for each θ. Combining equations (II.25) and (II.26), we have
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
i∈Iθ
δτ−tωt(i, t)uθ(pτ ) =
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
i∈Iθ
τ∑
s=t
ωt(i, s)δi(τ − s)uθ(pτ ).
Since (uθ)Θi=1 is linearly independent, the above equation is equivalent to
∑
i∈Iθ
δτ−tωt(i, t) =
∑
i∈Iθ
τ∑
s=t
ωt(i, s)δi(τ − s)
for any θ ∈ Θ. Rearranging the above equation, we obtain
δτ−t =
∑
i∈Iθ
∑τ
s=t ωt(i, s)δi(τ − s)∑
i∈Iθ ωt(i, t)
>
∑
i∈Iθ ωt(i, t)δi(τ − t)∑
i∈Iθ ωt(i, t)
. (II.27)
Letting τ go to infinity, it is easy to see that (II.27) becomes δ ≥ mini∈Iθ δ∗i for ∀θ ∈ Θ.
Hence, δ ≥ maxθ∈Θ mini∈Iθ δ∗i = δ∗maxmin.
II.7.8 Infinite Time Horizon
Our findings can be extended to the case with T = +∞. When T = +∞, we require
that individual discount factors (δi(τ))
∞
τ=0 be an absolutely summable sequence (in `
1) and
maxi δ
∗
i < 1, and that the social discount factor δ < 1. The result below will show that
even when individual instantaneous utility functions are identical, the cutoff for the social
discount factor will jump from mini δ
∗
i to maxi δ
∗
i when T becomes infinite. We first define
intergenerational utilitarianism.
Definition 13. The planner is intergenerationally utilitarian if in each period t ∈ T , there
exists a sequence of nonnegative numbers (ωt(i, s))i∈N,s≥t such that 0 <
∑N
i=1
∑T
s=t ωt(i, s) <
∞, and
Ut =
N∑
i=1
T∑
s=t
ωt(i, s)Ui,s.
Below, we will assume intergenerational utilitarianism rather than intergenerational
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Pareto, because the equivalence between intergenerational utilitarianism and intergenera-
tional Pareto for countably infinitely many individuals is not yet established.
Proposition II.4. Suppose T = +∞, and each generation-t individual i’s discounting utility
function has an instantaneous utility function ui and a discount function δi such that (A2)
and (A3) hold. Let the planner’s instantaneous utility function u be an arbitrary strict convex
combination of (ui)i∈N . Then,
1. for each maxi δ
∗
i < δ < 1, the planner is intergenerationally utilitarian and strongly
non-dictatorial;
2. for each δ < maxi δ
∗
i , the planner is not simultaneously intergenerationally utilitarian
and strongly non-dictatorial.
Proof. Part I Since u is a strict convex combination of (ui)i∈N , suppose u =
∑
i λiui for
some λ1, . . . , λN > 0 such that
∑
i λi = 1. For each i ∈ N and each t ∈ T , we want to
construct a sequence of positive and absolutely summable numbers (ωt(i, s))
∞
s=t such that
∞∑
s=t
ωt(i, s)Ui,s(p) =
∞∑
τ=t
δτ−tui(pτ ).
If this can be done, then in period t, let λiωt(i, s) be the planner’s utilitarian weight for the
generation-s individual i, in which case
N∑
i=1
∞∑
s=t
λiωt(i, s)Ui,s(p) =
∞∑
τ=t
δτ−tu(pτ ) = Ut(p),
which means that the planner is intergenerationally utilitarian and strongly non-dictatorial.
Next, we show that the following recursive definition of (ωt(i, s))
∞
s=t works: For each
s ≥ t,
ωt(i, s) =
{
1, if s = t,∑s−1
σ=t[δ · δi(s− σ)− δi(s− σ + 1)]ωt(i, σ), if s > t.
(II.28)
First, it can be verified that each ωt(i, s) is positive, because δ > maxi δ
∗
i and the individual
relative discount factor is nondecreasing. Second, it can be verified inductively that for any
finite τ ,
τ∑
s=t
N∑
i=1
ωt(i, s)δi(τ − s)ui(pτ ) = δτ−tu(pτ )
for any pτ ∈ ∆(X). These two steps are similar to the steps in the proof of Lemma 12. Thus,
we only have to show that (ωt(i, s))
∞
s=t is summable. Clearly,
∑n
s=t ωt(i, s) is nondecreasing
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in n. If we can show that
∑n
s=t ωt(i, s) is bounded above and the bound is a constant, this
part of the theorem is proven.
Sum up both sides of equation (II.28) from s = t to n. We obtain that
1 =
n−1∑
s=t
(
(1− δ)
n−1−s∑
τ=0
δi(τ) + δi(n− s)
)
ωt(i, s) + ωt(i, n).
Because
∑n−1−s
τ=0 δi(τ) > 1 and δi(n− s) > 0, (1− δ)
∑n−1−s
τ=0 δi(τ) + δi(n− s) > 1− δ, which
implies that
1 >
n−1∑
s=t
(1− δ)ωt(i, s) + ωt(i, n) > (1− δ)
n−1∑
s=t
ωt(i, s).
Therefore,
∑n−1
s=t ωt(i, s) is bounded above by 1/(1− δ) for any n.
Part II Assume that δ∗N is the unique maximum of {δ∗i }i∈N . The proof can easily
be extended to the case with multiple maxima. We prove the contrapositive of this part.
Suppose the planner is intergenerationally utilitarian and strongly non-dictatorial; that is,
for each t ∈ T , there exists a sequence of positive numbers (ωt(i, s))i∈N,s≥t such that Ut =∑
i,s ωt(i, s)Ui,s. Hence, for any t ∈ T and τ ≥ t,
τ∑
s=t
N∑
i=1
ωt(i, s)δi(τ − s)ui(pτ ) = δτ−tu(pτ ).
Consider a consumption sequence that yields x∗ in every period, (x∗, x∗, . . . ). Then, the
equation above becomes
τ∑
s=t
N∑
i=1
ωt(i, s)δi(τ − s) = δτ−t.
Since ui’s and u are normalized, we know that for each t,
∑
i∈N ωt(i, t) = 1. Due to the
strongly non-dictatorial property, in particular, ωt(N, t) ∈ (0, 1). Then,
δτ−t =
τ∑
s=t
N∑
i=1
ωt(i, s)δi(τ − s) > ωt(N, t)δN(τ − t).
Therefore, δ > τ−t
√
ωt(N, t)δN(τ − t) for every τ implies that δ ≥ δ∗N .
Proposition II.4 covers the case in which ui’s are identical. Thus, Proposition II.4 says
that if T = +∞, the cutoff for the social discount factor again jumps from mini δ∗i to maxi δ∗i ,
compared to Theorem 6/Corollary 8.
Note that the second part of Proposition II.4 is weaker than the second part of Theorem
83
6, Corollary 8, or Theorem 9. In Proposition II.4, if the social discount factor is lower than
the highest individual long-run discount factor, the conclusion is that either intergenerational
utilitarianism is violated or the planner has ignored some individual from some generation.
Nonetheless, there is still discontinuity between Proposition II.4 and Theorem 6/Corol-
lary 8. In Theorem 6/Corollary 8, if the social discount factor is lower than the lowest in-
dividual long-run discount factor, we know that intergenerational Pareto is violated, which
implies that at least one of the two properties, intergenerational utilitarianism or the strongly
non-dictatorial property, is violated, as in Proposition II.4.
The intuition for this discontinuity is the following. For simplicity, suppose ui’s are the
same. Fixing an arbitrarily large but finite T , the planner can always attach small enough
utilitarian weights to individuals with high δ∗i . In this way, the planner can keep her social
discount factor low. However, if T is infinite, fixing any positive weights, as τ increases to
infinity, δi(τ) of the individual with the highest δ
∗
i dominates all other individuals’ discount
factors regardless of his weight. Therefore, the social discount factor cannot be strictly less
than maxi δ
∗
i .
II.8 Supplemental Material
This supplement consists of four parts: (i) the robustness of findings in the main paper with
respect to several main assumptions, (ii) an alternative interpretation of intergenerational
Pareto and its implication on quasi-hyperbolic discounting, (iii) a result with forward and
backward individual exponential discounting, and (iv) a discussion of the choice domain of
the main chapter.
II.8.1 Discussion of the Main Assumptions
Our main findings are built upon three sets of assumptions: (i) the assumptions about
individual preferences, (ii) intergenerational Pareto and strong non-dictatorship, and (iii) the
assumptions about the planner’s preference. In the first, we have assumed that a parent’s
discount function and instantaenous utility function are inherited by his offspring. This
assumption may or may not be realistic. It is helpful to understand how our results depend on
it. In the second, intergenerational Pareto only has bite when all individuals from the current
and future generations agree. It is useful to understand to what extent intergenerational
Pareto can be strengthened. In the third, we have required that the planner have an EDU
function. This assumption imposes restrictions on how the planner can aggregate individual
preferences. We examine what results still hold if we drop this assumption.
84
We first state a more general version of Lemma 3, which also follows from Harsanyi
(1955) and Fishburn (1984) directly.
Lemma 14. (Harsanyi (1955)) Suppose each generation-t individual i’s utility function takes
the following form:
Ui,t(p) =
T∑
τ=t
δi,t(τ − t)ui(pτ , τ),
and the planner’s utility function in period t takes the following form:
Ut(p) =
T∑
τ=t
δt(τ − t)ut(pτ , τ),
in which δi,t(·) and δt(·) are discount functions, and ui(·, τ) and ut(·, τ) are normalized in-
stantaneous utility functions. The planner’s preference (%t)t∈T is intergenerationally Pareto
if and only if in each period t ∈ T , there exists a finite sequence of nonnegative numbers
(ωt(i, s))i∈N,s≥t such that
Ut =
N∑
i=1
T∑
s=t
ωt(i, s)Ui,s.
We stick to the assumptions about individuals’ and the planner’s utility functions in
the main paper, unless stated otherwise.
Inheriting Discount Functions and Instantaneous Utility Functions from Parents
One maintained assumption about individual preferences is that each generation-t individual
i’s discount function δi and instantaneous utilty function ui are independent of t. We show
in this subsection that this assumption can be removed without changing our main findings.
We analyze two cases below. In the first case, for any i ∈ N and finite t, suppose generation-t
individual i’s discount function is δi,t and instantaneous utility function is ui; that is, we still
assume that individual instantaneous utility functions do not depend on time. Fixing each
generation-t individual i’s discounting utility function for any i ∈ N and any natural number
t, our result may require us to vary the time horizon T . The result below shows that we can
establish a positive result that is similar to Theorem 9.
Theorem 15. Suppose each generation-t individual i’s discounting utility function has an
instantaneous utility function ui and a discount function δi,t such that (A2) and (A3) hold
and (ui)i∈N is linearly independent. Let the planner’s instantaneous utility function u be an
arbitrary strict convex combination of (ui)i∈N . Then,
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1. for each δ > maxi,t δ
∗
i,t, the planner is intergenerationally Pareto and strongly non-
dictatorial;
2. for each δ such that for some i, t, δ< δ∗i,t, there exists some T
∗ > 0 such that if T ≥ T ∗,
the planner is not intergenerationally Pareto.
We will prove this theorem as a special case of Theorem 17 below. Theorem 15 shows
that social discounting should still be more patient than the most patient individual’s long-
run discounting when individual discount functions may change across generations. Since
generation-t individual i’s discount function is now δi,t rather than δi, the cutoff for the social
discount factor becomes maxi,t δ
∗
i,t. The second part of the theorem can be understood as fol-
lows. Suppose the social discount factor δ is below some generation-t individual i’s long-run
discount factor. Then, as we increase T , this planner will eventually violate intergenerational
Pareto.
One may wonder why we still assume that generation-t individual i’s instantaneous
utility function does not depend on t. Let us assume that generation-t individual i’s instan-
taneous utility function is ui,t. The example below shows that this assumption will lead to
a trivial negative result that has nothing to do with discounting.
Example 16. Suppose N = 1. Let generation-1 individual’s instantaneous utility function
be u1, which is linearly independent of generation-2 individual’s instantaneous utility func-
tion u2. Since the planner has an EDU function, her instantaneous utility function should
never change. In the first period, the planner’s instantaneous utility function for period-1
consumption can only be u1, because only the generation-1 individual cares about period-1
consumption. The planner’s instantaneous utility function for period-2 consumption, how-
ever, must depend on both u1 and u2 due to strong non-dictatorship, which means that
the planner’s instantaneous utility function for period-2 consumption must differ from u1.
Therefore, it is impossible to require that the planner be intergenerationally Pareto and
strongly non-dictatorial.
As can be seen in the example above, it seems inevitable that the planner’s instantaneous
utility function should depend on time; that is, the planner’s instantaneous utility function
for period-τ consumption should depend on τ . Indeed, one way to restore the positive result
is to allow the planner’s instantaneous utility function to be u(·, τ).
However, there is another way to restore the positive result, which is the second case
we want to analyze. For any i ∈ N and finite t, suppose generation-t individual i’s discount
function is δi,t and instantaneous utility function for period-τ consumption is ui(·, τ); that is,
if the planner’s instantaneous utility function for period-τ consumption has to depend on τ ,
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let us make the same assumption for individuals. Note that individual instantaneous utility
functions now depend on time, but in a manner different from Example 16. The planner’s
discount function is again exponential.
These assumptions are particularly suitable in our setting. Recall that each individual
only lives for one period, and he cares about future consumption based on altruism. Imagine
that ui(·, τ) is generation-τ individual i’s actual consumption utility—that is, the utility that
generation-τ individual i derives by consuming rather than from altruism. Now, generation-t
individual i’s utility function is
Ui,t(p) =
T∑
τ=t
δi(τ − t)ui(pτ , τ),
which means that when the generation-t individual i altruistically cares about generation-
τ individual i’s consumption, he values the consumption in exactly the same way that
generation-τ individual i will value it for himself.
Theorem 17. Suppose each generation-t individual i’s discounting utility function has in-
stantaneous utility functions (ui(·, τ))τ≥t and a discount function δi,t such that (A2) and
(A3) hold and (ui(·, τ))i∈N is linearly independent for each τ ∈ T . Suppose for some positive
(λi)i∈N such that
∑
i∈N λi = 1, the planner’s u(·, τ) =
∑
i∈N λiui(·, τ) for any τ ∈ T . Then,
1. for each δ > maxi,t δ
∗
i,t, the planner is intergenerationally Pareto and strongly non-
dictatorial;
2. for each δ such that for some i, t, δ< δ∗i,t, there exists some T
∗ > 0 such that if T ≥ T ∗,
the planner is not intergenerationally Pareto.
Proof. Part I This part is similar to Part I of Theorem 15. First, we prove a lemma for
one-individual aggregation.
Lemma 18. Assume that N = {i}. Suppose each generation-t individual i’s discounting
utility function has instantaneous utility functions ui(·, τ) and a discount function δi,t such
that (A2) and (A3) hold. Let the planner’s instantaneous utility function be ui(·, τ) for
any τ ∈ T . For any δ > maxt δ∗i,t, the planner is intergenerationally Pareto and strongly
non-dictatorial.
Proof. We want to show that for any δ > maxi,t δ
∗
i,t , there exists a finite sequence of positive
numbers (ωt(i, s))t∈T,s≥t such that
Ut(p) =
T∑
τ=t
δτ−tu(pτ , τ) =
T∑
s=t
ωt(i, s)Ui,s(p).
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for each t ∈ T . Given any δ > maxt δ∗i,t, we can construct (ωt(i, s))t∈T,s≥t according to the
following formula recursively:
ωt(i, s) =
 1, if s = t,s−1∑
τ=t
[δ · δi,τ (s− 1− τ)− δi,τ (s− τ)]ωt(i, τ), if s > t.
(II.29)
Note that by assuming δ > maxt δ
∗
i,t, ωt(i, s) > 0 for any s ≥ t and t ∈ T . Then,
Ut(p) =
T∑
s=t
ωt(i, s)Ui,s(p) =
T∑
s=t
ωt(i, s)
T∑
τ=s
δi,s(τ − s)u(pτ , τ)
=
T∑
τ=t
(
τ∑
s=t
δi,s(τ − s)ωt(i, s)
)
u(pτ , τ).
We want to prove that Ut(p) =
∑T
τ=t δ
τ−tu(pτ , τ). Clearly for τ = t,
∑τ
s=t δi,s(τ−s)ωt(i, s) =
ωt(i, t) = 1 = δ
0. Suppose for some τ ≥ t, we have proven that∑τs=t δi,s(τ−s)ωt(i, s) = δτ−t.
We want to prove that for τ + 1,
τ+1∑
s=t
δi,s(τ + 1− s)ωt(i, s) = δτ−t+1. (II.30)
To prove (II.30), we only need to notice that according to (II.29),
τ+1∑
s=t
δi,s(τ + 1− s)ωt(i, s) = ωt(i, τ + 1) +
τ∑
s=t
δi,s(τ + 1− s)ωt(i, s)
=
τ∑
s=t
[δδi,s(τ − s)− δi,s(τ + 1− s)]ωt(i, s) +
τ∑
s=t
δi,s(τ + 1− s)ωt(i, s)
= δ ·
τ∑
s=t
δi,s(τ − s)ωt(i, s) = δτ−t+1.
By induction, we know that
∑τ
s=t δi,s(τ − s)ωt(i, s) = δτ−t for all τ ≥ t, and hence Ut(p) =∑T
τ=t δ
τ−tui(pτ , τ).
Next, for any social discount factor δ > maxi maxt δ
∗
i,t, we can find (ωi,t(s))t∈T,i∈N,s≥t
such that
T∑
s=t
ωi,t(s)Ui,s(p) =
T∑
τ=t
δτ−tui(pτ , τ)
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for each i ∈ N . Then, we know that
Ut(p) =
N∑
i=1
T∑
s=t
λiωt(i, s)Ui,s(p) =
N∑
i=1
T∑
τ=t
δτ−tλiui(pτ )
=
T∑
τ=t
δτ−t
N∑
i=1
λiui(pτ , τ) =
T∑
τ=t
δτ−tu(pτ , τ).
Part II We prove it by contradiction. Suppose there exists an intergenerationally Pareto
planner with social discount factor δ< δ∗i,t for some i = i
∗ and t = t∗. By intergenerational
Pareto, for each t ∈ T , there exists a finite sequence of nonnegative numbers (ωt(i, s))i∈N,s≥t
such that the following equality holds
δτ−tu(pτ , τ) =
N∑
i=1
τ∑
s=t
ωt(i, s)δi,s(τ − s)ui(pτ , τ) (II.31)
for any τ ≥ t. When τ = t, the above equation reduces to
u(pτ , τ) =
N∑
i=1
ωτ (i, τ)ui(pτ , τ) (II.32)
for any τ ∈ T .
Since u(·, τ) = ∑i∈N λiui(·, τ) for any τ ∈ T and (ui(·, τ))i∈N is linearly independent,
ωt(i, t) = λi > 0, for any i and t. Multiply δ
τ−t to both sides of equation (II.32) and combine
it with equation (II.31). We obtain
N∑
i=1
ωτ (i, τ)δ
τ−tui(pτ , τ) =
N∑
i=1
τ∑
s=t
ωt(i, s)δi,s(τ − s)ui(pτ , τ).
Since (ui(·, τ))Ni=1 is linearly independent, the above equation is equivalent to
ωτ (i, τ)δ
τ−tui(pτ , τ) =
τ∑
s=t
ωt(i, s)δi,s(τ − s)ui(pτ , τ)
for any i ∈ N , t ∈ T , and τ ≥ t.
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Let i = i∗ and t = t∗, and rearrange the above equations. We have
δτ−t
∗
=
∑τ
s=t∗ ωt∗(i
∗, s)δi∗,s(τ − s)
ωτ (i∗, τ)
=
ωt∗(i
∗, t∗)δi∗,t∗(τ − t∗) +
∑τ
s=t∗+1 ωt∗(i
∗, s)δi∗,s(τ − s)
ωτ (i∗, τ)
≥ λ
∗
i · δi∗,t∗(τ − t∗)
λ∗i
= δi∗,t∗(τ − t∗)
(II.33)
for any τ > t∗. However, we also know that δ < lim
τ→∞
τ
√
δi∗,t∗(τ), there exists T
∗ such that
for any τ ≥ T ∗, δ < τ√δi∗,t∗(τ), which contradicts (II.33).
When we assume u(·, τ) = ∑i∈N λiui(·, τ), we have assumed that λi’s do not depend on
τ . In the social choice literature, some economists have argued that with normalized individ-
ual utility functions, equal utilitarian weights should be used (see Karni (1998), Dhillon and
Mertens (1999), and Segal (2000)). To some extent, this is consistent with our assumption
that λi’s do not change over time, although in our case, λi’s may not be 1/N . In general,
one may want λi’s to depend on time. In that case, the fact that the planner’s discount
function is exponential will impose restrictions on how λi’s may change over time.
Strengthening Intergenerational Pareto
The premise of intergenerational Pareto requires that the current generation and future
generations reach a consensus. A natural way to strengthen intergenerational Pareto may
be to require that the planner prefer one consumption sequence over another if more than a
certain fraction of current- and future-generation individuals agree.17 However, in this case,
how the planner aggregates individual preferences may differ somewhat from utilitarian
aggregation.
Therefore, we strengthen intergenerational Pareto in the following simple way without
deviating from standard utilitarianism. Let I ⊂ N ×T be an arbitrary subset of individuals
across generations. Let us weaken the premise of intergenerational Pareto by requiring
that the planner prefer a consumption sequence p to q whenever individuals in I agree.
Intergenerational Pareto and the strongly non-dictatorial property are adapted as follows.
Definition 19. The planner’s preference (%t)t∈T is I-intergenerationally Pareto if for any
consumption sequences p,q ∈ ∆(X)T , in each period t ∈ T , p %i,s q for all (i, s) ∈ I with
s ≥ t implies p %t q, and p i,s q for all (i, s) ∈ I with s ≥ t implies p t q.
17This strengthening can certainly be applied to current-generation Pareto as well.
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Definition 20. We say that the planner is I-strongly non-dictatorial if for each t ∈ T ,
Ut(p) = ft (U1,t(p), . . . , U1,T (p), U2,t(p), . . . , U2,T (p), . . . , UN,T (p))
for some function ft that is (strictly) increasing in Ui,s for any (i, s) ∈ I.
It is straightforward to show that under I-intergenerational Pareto, the planner’s utility
function can be written as a weighted sum of the utility functions of individuals in I. Below,
we show that under some assumption about I, positive results can still be established after
strengthening intergenerational Pareto.
The following example shows why we need an additional assumption. Suppose N = 2
and individual instantaneous utility functions, u1 and u2, are linearly independent. As-
sume that I = {(2, 1), (1, 2)}; that is, the planner will give generation-1 individual 1 and
generation-2 individual 2 zero weights. Then, the somewhat trivial negative result, as in
Example 16, appears again. To see this, note that in period 1, the planner’s instantaneous
utility function for period-1 consumption must be equal to u2, because only generation-1 in-
dividuals care about period-1 consumption and generation-1 individual 1 has been ignored.
We have assumed that the planner has an EDU function, in which her instantaneous utility
function never changes. Now, first, in period 1, the planner’s instantaneous utility function
for period-2 consumption is a strict convex combination of u1 and u2, which must differ from
u1; second, in period 2, following the same logic, the planner’s instantaneous utility function
for period-2 consumption must be equal to u1, which is again different from u1. Therefore,
it is hopeless to derive any positive result.
The theorem below imposes a simple assumption to avoid the example above, which
turns out to be strong enough for us to establish a positive result. For each t ∈ T , let
It := {i ∈ N : (i, t) ∈ I} be the set of generation-t individuals who may not be ignored by
the planner, and let I := ⋃t∈T It.
Theorem 21. Suppose I ⊂ N × T , and each generation-t individual i’s discounting utility
function has an instantaneous utility function ui ∈ {uθ}Θθ=1 for some linearly independent
Θ-tuple of instantaneous utility functions (uθ)Θθ=1, and has a discount function δi such that
(A2) and (A3) hold. Assume that co({ui}i∈It) =co({uθ}Θθ=1) for any t ∈ T . Let the planner’s
instantaneous utility function u be a strict convex combination of (ui)i∈It. Then,
1. for each δ > maxI δ∗i , the planner is I-intergenerationally Pareto and I-strongly non-
dictatorial;
2. for each δ < minI δ∗i , there exists some T
∗ > 0 such that if T ≥ T ∗, the planner is not
I-intergenerationally Pareto.
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Proof. Part I With an abuse of notation, let Θ := {1, . . . ,Θ}. For each θ ∈ Θ, let Iθ :=
{i ∈ N : ui = uθ}, which is the set of i’s whose instantaneous utility function is uθ. For
each θ ∈ Θ and t ∈ T , let Iθt := {i ∈ Iθ : (i, t) ∈ I} be the set of generation-t individuals
who may not be ignored by the planner and whose instantaneous utility function is uθ. Let
Iθ := ⋃t∈T Iθt .
We prove this part in four steps. First, we aggregate individuals in each Iθt into a
new “family” θ. Each generation-t family θ has instantaneous utility function uθ(·) and the
following discount function:
δθt (τ) =
1
|Iθt |
∑
i∈Iθt
δi(τ);
that is, if a generation-t individual i may not be ignored by the planner, his discount function
δi(·) enters family θ’s generation-t discount function δθt (·) with a weight equal to that of
other generation-t individual(s) in Iθt . Note that generation-t families’ discount functions
may change as t changes.
Next, we prove a lemma on one-family aggregation that is similar to Lemma 18.
Lemma 22. Assume Θ = {θ}. Suppose each generation-t family θ’s discounting utility
function has an instantaneous utility function uθ(·) and a discount function δθt (·). Let the
planner’s instantaneous utility function be uθ(·). For any δ > maxi∈Iθ δ∗i , the planner is
intergenerationally Pareto and strongly non-dictatorial.
Proof. We want to show that for any δ > maxi∈Iθ δ∗i , there exists a finite sequence of positive
numbers (ωθt (s))t∈T,s≥t such that
Ut(p) =
T∑
τ=t
δτ−tuθ(pτ ) =
T∑
s=t
ωθt (s)U
θ
s (p)
for each t ∈ T . Given any δ > maxi∈Iθ δ∗i , we can construct (ωθt (s))t∈T,s≥t according to the
following formula recursively:
ωθt (s) =
 1, if s = t,s−1∑
τ=t
[δ · δθτ (s− 1− τ)− δθτ (s− τ)]ωθt (τ), if s > t.
(II.34)
Note that if δ > maxt maxτ
δθt (τ+1)
δθt (τ)
, then ωθt (s) > 0 for any s ≥ t and t ∈ T . We also
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know that
δθt (τ + 1)
δθt (τ)
=
∑
i∈Iθt δi(τ + 1)∑
i∈Iθt δi(τ)
=
∑
i∈Iθt δi(τ)
δi(τ+1)
δi(τ)∑
i∈Iθt δi(τ)
≤
∑
i∈Iθt δi(τ) maxi∈Iθt
δi(τ+1)
δi(τ)∑
i∈Iθt δi(τ)
≤ max
i∈Iθt
δi(τ + 1)
δi(τ)
≤ max
i∈Iθt
δ∗i ≤ max
i∈Iθ
δ∗i .
Therefore, maxt maxτ
δθt (τ+1)
δθt (τ)
≤ maxi∈Iθ δ∗i . Hence, by assuming δ > maxi∈Iθ δ∗i , ωθt (s) > 0
for any s ≥ t and t ∈ T . The rest of the proof is the same as in Lemma 18.
Thus, for any social discount factor δ > maxθ∈Θ maxi∈Iθ δ∗i , we can find (ω
θ
t (s))t∈T,θ∈Θ,s≥t
such that
T∑
s=t
ωθt (s)U
θ
s (p) =
T∑
τ=t
δτ−tuθ(pτ )
for each θ ∈ Θ. Consider any positive numbers (λθ)Θθ=1 such that
∑Θ
θ=1 λ
θ = 1. Together with
the weights (ωθt (s))t∈T,θ∈Θ,s≥t we have found above, the planner’s utility function becomes
Ut(p) =
∑
θ∈Θ
T∑
s=t
λθωθt (s)U
θ
s (p) =
∑
θ∈Θ
T∑
τ=t
λθδτ−tuθ(pτ )
=
T∑
τ=t
δτ−t
∑
θ∈Θ
λθuθ(pτ ) =
T∑
τ=t
δτ−tu(pτ ),
(II.35)
in which u(pτ ) =
∑
θ∈Θ λ
θuθ(pτ ) can be any strict convex combination of (u
θ)θ∈Θ.
Lastly, we back out the weights (ωt(i, s))t∈T,i∈N,s≥t and show that the planner has an
EDU function, is I-intergenerationally Pareto, and is I-strongly non-dictatorial under these
weights. We construct (ωt(i, s))t∈T,i∈N,s≥t according to the following formula:
ωt(i, s) =
{
0, if (i, s) /∈ I,
λθ 1|Iθs |ω
θ
t (s) > 0, if (i, s) ∈ I.
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Then,
T∑
s=t
N∑
i=1
ωt(i, s)Ui,s(p) =
T∑
s=t
N∑
i=1
ωt(i, s)
T∑
τ=s
δi(τ − s)ui(pτ )
=
T∑
s=t
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
i∈Iθs
λθ
1
|Iθs |
ωθt (s)
T∑
τ=s
δi(τ − s)ui(pτ )
=
T∑
s=t
∑
θ∈Θ
λθωθt (s)
T∑
τ=s
∑
i∈Iθs
1
|Iθs |
δi(τ − s)ui(pτ )
=
T∑
s=t
∑
θ∈Θ
λθωθt (s)
T∑
τ=s
δθs(τ − s)uθ(pτ )
=
T∑
s=t
∑
θ∈Θ
λθωθt (s)U
θ
s (p) = Ut(p) =
T∑
τ=t
δτ−tu(pτ ).
The first equality follows from the definition of Ui,s. The second equality follows the con-
struction of (ωt(i, s))t∈T,i∈N,s≥t. The fourth equality follows the construction of δθs(·). The
fifth equality follows from the definition of U θs . The last two equalities follow equation (II.35).
Part II We prove it by contradiction. Suppose there exists an I-intergenerationally
Pareto planner with social discount factor δ < mini∈I δ∗i . By I-intergenerationally Pareto,
there exists a finite sequence of nonnegative weights (ωt(i, s))t∈T,i∈N,s≥t such that the follow-
ing equality holds:
δτ−tu(pτ ) =
τ∑
s=t
∑
i∈Is
ωt(i, s)δi(τ − s)ui(pτ ) (II.36)
for each t ∈ T and τ ≥ t. Combining equation (II.36) with the normalization assumption,
δτ−t =
τ∑
s=t
∑
i∈Is
ωt(i, s)δi(τ − s) ≥
∑
i∈It
ωt(i, s)δi(τ − s) (II.37)
for each t ∈ T and τ ≥ t.
We assume that arg mini∈I δ∗ = {i∗}. The proof can be easily extended to the case with
multiple minima. The following two claims must hold:
1. i∗ ∈ I; that is, there exists t∗ ∈ T such that i∗ ∈ It∗ .
2. There exists T1 such that for any τ ≥ max{T1, t∗}, δi∗(τ− t∗) ≤ δi(τ− t∗) for any i ∈ I.
Consider the period-t∗ planner. Let t = t∗ in equation (II.37), and suppose τ ≥
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max{T1, t∗}. We have
δτ−t
∗
=
τ∑
s=t∗
∑
i∈Is
ωt∗(i, s)δi(τ − s) ≥
∑
i∈I∗t
ωt∗(i, t
∗)δi(τ − t∗)
≥
∑
i∈I∗t
ωt∗(i, t
∗)δi∗(τ − t∗) ≥ δi∗(τ − t∗)
However, we know that δ < δ∗i∗ . Then, there exists T2 such that for any τ ≥ T2, δ < τ
√
δ∗i∗ .
Therefore, if T ≥ max{T1, T2, t∗}, there must be a contradiction.
Note that we assume co({ui}i∈It) =co({uθ}Θθ=1) for any t ∈ T . This is because we
want co({ui}i∈It) to remain constant across t to rule out the example we discuss before the
theorem, and we want to assume that there is no redundant type.
The theorem seems different from our previous results that have only one cutoff for the
social discount factor, but in fact it has a one-cutoff version that is similar to our previous
positive results. However, the expression of the cutoff will become rather complicated.18
The current version is easier to understand, and clearly shows that if the social discount
factor is higher than the highest long-run discount factor among individuals who are not
ignored in some generation, then we know that the planner is intergenerationally Pareto and
strongly non-dictatorial. Again, this is not the only way to establish positive results. If the
planner’s instantaneous utility function is allowed to vary in a general way by taking the
form of ut(·, τ), then the additional assumption we need can be weaker.
Utilitarianism and Long-Run Social Discounting
The main question of this paper is, if a planner has an EDU function, under what conditions
is she intergenerationally Pareto/utilitarian and strongly non-dictatorial? The fact that
an intergenerationally Pareto/utilitarian planner has an EDU function certainly imposes
restrictions on how the planner may aggregate individual preferences. On the one hand,
economists often assume that a planner has an EDU function, and there are many reasons
to believe that this is normatively appealing. Therefore, understanding the answer to our
main question is important.
On the other hand, there are other ways to examine the planner’s aggregation problem.
For example, sometimes economists may believe that the planner’s utility function should be
equal to the simple average of individuals’ discounting utility functions. However, because
18The cutoff for the social discount factor in the one-cutoff version should take the maximum across types
and periods, and then for each type in each period, take the minimal individual long-run discount factor
across all individuals who have the desired type and are not ignored in that period.
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it is unlikely that the planner’s discount function is exponential in this case, a choice about
what to assume for the planner must be made.
A natural question arises: If we now want to allow the planner to aggregate individual
preferences in a flexible way—in other words, we only require that the planner be intergener-
ationally Pareto/utilitarian and strongly non-dictatorial and do not require that her utility
function be an EDU function—what insight from our main findings remains true? The fol-
lowing result shows that under this different requirement, the planner’s “discount factor”
should still be higher than the most patient individual’s long-run discount factor. The result
assumes that T = +∞. Some notations and defintions for the case with T = +∞ can be
found in Section II.7.8.
Theorem 23. Suppose T = +∞, each generation-t individual i’s discounting utility function
has an instantaneous utility function ui and a discount function δi such that (A2) and (A3)
hold, and the planner’s utility function in any period t ∈ T is Ut =
∑∞
τ=t δt(τ− t)ut(pτ , τ) for
some discount function δt and (normalized) instantaneous utility function (ut(·, τ))τ≥t such
that δ∗t = lim
τ→∞
δt(τ+1)
δt(τ)
= lim
τ→∞
τ
√
δt(τ) exists. If the planner is intergenerationally utilitarian
and strongly non-dictatorial, δ∗t ≥ maxi δ∗i .
Proof. Since Ut =
∑N
i=1
∑∞
s=t ωt(i, s)Ui,s, we know that
δt(τ − t)ut(pτ , τ) =
N∑
i=1
τ∑
s=t
ωt(i, s)δi(τ − s)ui(pτ ) (II.38)
for any t ∈ T and τ ≥ t. Let pτ = x∗ in equation (II.38). We have
δt(τ − t) =
N∑
i=1
τ∑
s=t
ωt(i, s)δi(τ − s) ≥
∑
ωt(i, t)δi(τ − t) ≥ ωt(i∗, t)δi∗(τ − t), (II.39)
in which i∗ := arg maxi δ
∗
i . Let τ in (II.39) go to infinity. We have δ
∗
t ≥ maxi δ∗i .
Thus, if the planner is intergenerationally Pareto and strongly non-dictatorial, her long-
run discount factor should again be higher than the most patient individual’s long-run dis-
count factor.
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II.8.2 An Alternative Interpretation of Intergenerational Pareto
and a Result with Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting
We say that the generation-t individual i has a quasi-hyperbolic discounting utility (QHDU)
function if his discount function satisfies
δi(τ) =
{
1, if τ = 0,
βiδ
τ
i , if τ ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1},
for some βi ∈ (0, 1] and δi > 0. In the literature of time inconsistency, economists sometimes
ignore the βi parameter and use an EDU function with a discount factor δi as the welfare
criterion of individual i who has a QHDU function. The intuition is that because βi is the
cause of time inconsistency, βi should not enter the welfare criterion. We show how our
analysis provides some foundation for this practice.19
Consider Corollary 8. If we interpret the generation-(t+ 1) individual i in our model as
the future self of the generation-t individual i, Corollary 8 provides some foundation for the
use of this welfare criterion. Assume that individual i is the only individual (N = 1) and
has a quasi-hyperbolic discount function. According to Corollary 8, we immediately know
that any EDU function with a discount factor that is (strictly) greater than δi is a welfare
criterion that is consistent with intergenerational Pareto; that is, if individual i in every
period t agrees that one consumption sequence is better than another, the welfare criterion
says that the utility of the former is greater than the latter.
The following result is stronger than Corollary 8. It shows that δi is indeed the smallest
discount factor such that the corresponding EDU function is consistent with intergenerational
Pareto.
Proposition II.5. Suppose each generation-t individual i has a QHDU function with an
instantaneous utility function u, βi ∈ (0, 1), and δi ∈ (0, 1). Then,
1. for each δ ≥ mini δi, the planner is intergenerationally Pareto and strongly non-
dictatorial;
2. for each δ < mini δi, there exists some T
∗ > 0 such that if T ≥ T ∗, the planner is not
intergenerationally Pareto.
Proof. The second part follows from Theorem 6. We only prove the first part.
19Recent papers by Drugeon and Wigniolle (2017) and Galperti and Strulovici (2017) introduce results
similar to the one we present below.
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Lemma 24. Assume that N = {i}. Suppose individual i has a QHDU function with param-
eters βi ∈ (0, 1), δi ∈ (0, 1), and u. Then, there exists a cutoff δ(T ) for each T such that the
planner is intergenerationally Pareto and strongly non-dictatorial if and only if δ > δ(T ). In
addition, δ(T ) is (strictly) increasing with a limit δi.
Proof. The planner is intergenerationally Pareto and strongly non-dictatorial if and only
if there exists a finite sequence of positive weights (ωt(i, s))t∈T,s≥t such that the following
equation holds:
ωt(i, τ)u(pτ ) +
τ−1∑
s=t
ωi,t(s)βiδ
τ−s
i u(pτ ) = δ
τ−tu(pτ ) (II.40)
for any t ∈ T and τ ≥ t. We can solve (ωt(i, s))t∈T,s≥t from (II.40) as follows:
ωt(i, t+m) =
 1, if m = 0,δm − βi
1− βi
m∑
h=1
(1− βi)hδhi δm−h. if 1 ≤ m ≤ T − t.
(II.41)
Note that ωt(i, t) = 1 > 0, and the planner is intergenerationally Pareto and strongly non-
dictatorial if and only if (ωt(i, t+m))t∈T,1≤m≤T−t is positive.
We can rewrite the second equation of (II.41) as ωt(i, t+m) = Fm(δ|βi, δi), in which F
is a degree-m polynomial of a single indeterminate δ with parameters βi, δi. Define
S(βi, δi, T ) := {δ ∈ R+ : Fm(δ|βi, δi) > 0 for any 1 ≤ m ≤ T − 1}.
Therefore, the planner’s preference is intergenerationally Pareto and strongly non-dictatorial
if and only if δ ∈ S(βi, δi, T ).
We want to show that S(βi, δi, T ) is an interval that (strictly) shrinks to [δi,+∞) as T
increases. First, we prove that there exists a unique root/cutoff xm ∈ (0, δi] for Fm(δ|βi, δi)
such that Fm(xm|βi, δi) = 0, Fm(δ|βi, δi) < 0 for δ < xm, and Fm(δ|βi, δi) > 0 for δ > xm.
We know that Fm(0|βi, δi) = −(1− βi)m−1δmi < 0, Fm(δi|βi, δi) = (1− βi)mδmi > 0, and Fm
is continuous. Therefore, the existence of xm is guaranteed by Bolzano’s theorem.
Also note that the functionGm(δ|βi, δi) := δ−mFm(δ|βi, δi) has the same root as Fm(δ|βi, δi),
and Gm(δ|βi, δi) is (strictly) increasing in δ because
dGm(δ)
dδ
=
βi
1− βi
m∑
k=1
k
(1− βiδi)k
δk+1
> 0.
By Rolle’s theorem, there cannot be more than one root. Hence, the uniqueness is proved.
Second, we prove that the cutoff sequence (xm)m is (strictly) increasing and converges
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to δi. Noting that
Gm+1(δ|βi, δi)−Gm(δ|βi, δi) = − βi
1− βi
[
(1− βi)δi
δ
]m+1
< 0,
we have Gm+1(xm|βi, δi) − Gm(xm|βi, δi) < 0. By the definition of (xm)m, Gm(xm|βi, δi) =
Gm+1(xm+1|βi, δi) = 0. Therefore, Gm+1(xm|βi, δi) < Gm(xm|βi, δi) = Gm+1(xm+1|βi, δi). We
also know that Gm(δ|βi, δi) is (strictly) increasing. Hence, xm+1 > xm. Now that (xm)m is
bounded and (strictly) increasing, the convergence follows from the monotone convergence
theorem.
The only remaining part is to prove that the limit of the cutoff sequence is δi. Suppose
limm→∞ xm = x. Then, xm < x for all m > 1. Since Gm(δ|βi, δi) is (strictly) increasing, we
have
Gm(xm|βi, δi) < Gm(x|βi, δi)
⇔ 0 < 1− βi
1− βi
m∑
h=1
(1− βi)hδhi x−h
⇔ βi
1− βi
m∑
h=1
(1− βi)hδhi x−h < 1
⇔
m∑
h=1
[
(1− βi)δi
x
]h
<
1− βi
βi
(II.42)
for any m > 1.
Given that (1−βi)δi
x
> 0, we must have (1−βi)δi
x
< 1; otherwise,
m∑
h=1
[
(1−βi)δi
x
]h
diverges as
m increases. Now, let m in (II.42) go to infinity. We have
+∞∑
h=1
[
(1− βi)δi
x
]h
≤ 1− βi
βi
⇔ (1− βi)δi
x
1
1− (1−βi)δi
x
≤ 1− βi
βi
⇔ δi ≤ x.
(II.43)
In addition, since xm < δi for all m, we have x ≤ δi. Therefore, x = δi.
Lemma 24 states that for any finite T , in each period t, the planner can aggregate
each individual i from the tth generation to the T th generation so that the aggregated utility
function is an EDU function with a discount factor that is slightly below δi. Then, we can
apply the if part of Proposition II.2 for N exponential discounting individuals, and obtain a
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social discount factor δ ≥ mini δi.
When T = +∞, we can assume in Proposition II.4 that individuals have QHDU func-
tions and obtain a similar result.
II.8.3 The Case with Backward Discounting
The result we introduce below shows that if individuals exponentially forward and back-
ward discount consumption, our main results continue to hold. Before proceeding, it should
be noted that backward discounting has no revealed-preference foundation. Whenever we
observe an individual choosing, the past is sunk; there are no choices (yet) that allow the
individual to alter the past. Therefore, we do not know how individuals think about the
past from actual choice data.
However, economists have considered the possibility that individuals backward discount
(see Strotz (1955), Caplin and Leahy (2004), and Ray, Vellodi and Wang (2017)). Below,
we analyze our aggregation problem with exponential discounting individuals who backward
discount. Instead of assuming that Ui,t(p) does not depend on past consumption, we assume
that the generation-t individual i discounts both past and future by the same discounting
factor δi.
Definition 25. The generation-t individual i has an exponential forward and backward
discounting utility function if his utility function has the following form:
Ui,t(p) =
T∑
τ=1
δ
|τ−t|
i ui(pτ ), (II.44)
in which the discount factor δi ∈ (0, 1), and ui is the individual i’s instantaneous utility
function.
Note that the negative result, obviously, would continue to hold if we had assumed that
each generation-t individual i’s utility function was
Ui,t(p) =
T∑
τ=1
δτ−ti ui(pτ ).
In that case, the individual i’s offspring has exactly the same preference as the indivdual
i. This is problematic, however, because the generation-2 individual i will value period-1
consumption even more than his own period-2 consumption.
The result below demonstrates that the assumption that the planner has an EDU func-
tion and intergenerational Pareto are compatible when individuals exponentially forward
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and backward discount consumption. The typical negative result in the literature only con-
siders the planner’s aggregation problem in period 1. The following result also focuses on
the period-1 aggregation problem to highlight the difference.
Proposition II.6. Suppose each generation-t individual i has an exponential forward and
backward discounting utility function with discount factor δi and instantaneous utility func-
tion ui such that δ¯ := maxi δi < 1. Let the planner’s instantaneous utility function u be an
arbitrary strict convex combination of (ui)i∈N . Then, for each δ ∈
(
δ¯, δ¯
−1)
, the planner in
period 1 is intergenerationally Pareto and strongly non-dictatorial.
Proof. To prove the proposition, we consider the one-individual case first.
Lemma 26. Assume that N = {i}. Suppose each generation-t individual i has an exponen-
tial forward and backward discounting utility function with discount factor δi ∈ (0, 1) and
instantaneous utility function u. Then, for each δ ∈ (δi, δi−1), the planner in period 1 is
intergenerationally Pareto and strongly non-dictatorial.
Proof. We want to show that for any δ ∈ (δi, δi−1), there exists a finite sequence of positive
weights ~ω = (ω(i, 1), ω(i, 2), · · · , ω(i, T )) such that the following equation holds:
U1(p) =
T∑
τ=1
δτ−1u(pτ ) =
T∑
s=1
ω(i, s)Ui,s(p). (II.45)
Plugging in U1(p) and Ui,s(p), equation (II.45) becomes
T∑
τ=1
δτ−1u(pτ ) =
T∑
s=1
ω(i, s)
T∑
τ=1
δ
|τ−s|
i u(pτ ) =
T∑
τ=1
T∑
s=1
ω(i, s)δ
|s−τ |
i u(pτ ); (II.46)
that is, for each τ ≥ 1,
δτ−1 =
T∑
s=1
ω(i, s)δ
|s−τ |
i . (II.47)
Next, we can rewrite equation (II.47) as follows:
A · ~ω = ~δ, (II.48)
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in which ~δ = (1, δ, δ2, · · · , δT−1) and
A =

1 δi δ
2
i . . . δ
T−1
i
δi 1 δi . . . δ
T−2
i
...
...
...
. . .
...
δT−1i δ
T−2
i δ
T−3
i . . . 1
 .
Note that A is invertible. In particular,
A−1 =
1
1− δi2

1 −δi 0 · · · · · · · · · · · · 0
−δi 1 + δ2i −δi 0
...
0 −δi 1 + δ2i −δi . . .
...
... 0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . . . . . 0
...
...
. . . −δi 1 + δ2i −δi 0
... 0 −δi 1 + δ2i −δi
0 · · · · · · · · · · · · 0 −δi 1

.
We have ~ω = A−1 ·~δ. If we can show that ~ω  0, the lemma is proved. Showing that ~ω  0
is equivalent to showing that ω(i, 1) = 1− δiδ > 0, ω(i, s) = δs−2[−δi + (1 + δ2i )δ − δiδ2] > 0
for 2 ≤ s ≤ T − 1, and ω(i, T ) = −δiδT−2 + δT−1 > 0, which can be verified because
δ ∈ (δi, δi−1).
Lemma 26 shows that we can aggregate each individual i from the tth generation to the
T th generation into an EDU function with any discount factor δ within (δi, δi
−1). Now we can
prove Proposition II.6. For any social discount factor δ ∈ (δ¯, δ¯−1), we can find (ω(i, s))i∈N,s≥1
such that
T∑
s=1
ω(i, s)Ui,s(p) =
T∑
τ=1
δτ−1ui(pτ )
for each i ∈ N . Consider any positive numbers (λi)i∈N such that
∑
i∈N λi = 1. Together
with the weights (ω(i, s))i∈N,s≥1 we have found above, the planner’s utility function becomes
U1(p) =
N∑
i=1
T∑
s=1
λiω1(i, s)Ui,s(p) =
N∑
i=1
T∑
τ=1
δτ−1λiui(pτ )
=
T∑
τ=t
δτ−1
N∑
i=1
λiui(pτ ) =
T∑
τ=t
δτ−1u(pτ ),
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in which u(pτ ) =
∑
i∈N λiui(pτ ) is an arbitrary strict convex combination of (ui)i∈N .
II.8.4 Risk Resolution
The main model’s choice domain is ∆(X)T ; that is, in each period, there is a lottery/probability
measure over X. In many dynamic economic models with uncertainty, uncertainty resolves
over time. Below, we discuss what may change if we let uncertainty resolve over time,
maintaining our assumptions about individuals’ and the planner’s utility functions.
For simplicity, assume that T = 2 and N = 1. In period 2, the choice object is again a
lottery over X. Sometimes, it will be called a period-2 lottery. To distinguish between choice
objects in the main paper and in this section, here we call X outcomes and period-1 choice
objects dynamic lotteries. A dynamic lottery is a lottery over X × ∆(X). For example,
with probability 1/2, a dynamic lottery p˜1 yields a period-1 outcome x ∈ X and a period-2
lottery q2 ∈ ∆(X); with probability 1/2, p˜1 yields a period-1 outcome x′ and a period-2
lottery r2 ∈ ∆(X).
Now, the set of dynamic lotteries is ∆(X × ∆(X)), rather than ∆(X)2.20 However,
∆(X)2 can be viewed as a subset of ∆(X × ∆(X)) that consists of all dynamic lotteries
whose period-2 lotteries are independent of (the realization of) period-1 outcomes.
The following simple example shows in what sense, in period 1, the planner’s aggregation
problem under ∆(X×∆(X)) is the same as under ∆(X)2. Continue our example of p˜1, q2, r2
above. Let q2 be a lottery that yields y, y
′ ∈ X with equal probability. Let r2 be a degenerate
lottery that yields z ∈ X. First, consider the generation-1 individual. A natural way to
extend our period-1 individual utility function on ∆(X)2 to the new domain ∆(X ×∆(X))
is as follows:
V1(p˜1) =
1
2
(v(x, 1) + δv(q2, 2)) +
1
2
(v(x′, 1) + δv(r2, 2))
=
1
2
(
v(x, 1) + δ
(
1
2
v(y, 2) +
1
2
v(y′, 2)
))
+
1
2
(v(x′, 1) + δv(z, 2)),
in which δ is the individual discount factor and v(·, τ) is the period-τ individual instantaneous
utility function. Note that the above equation can be rewritten as
V1(p˜1) =
(
1
2
v(x, 1) +
1
2
v(x′, 1)
)
+ δ
(
1
4
v(y, 2) +
1
4
v(y′, 2) +
1
2
v(z, 2)
)
;
that is, the utility of p˜1 ∈ ∆(X×∆(X)) is equal to the following dynamic lottery: In period
20For any metric space Y , let ∆(Y ) denote the set of Borel probability measures on Y . We endow ∆(X)
with the Prohorov metric and X ×∆(X) with product topology.
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1, the individual consumes a 50-50 lottery between x and x′, and in period 2, he consumes
a lottery that yields y with probability 1/4, y′ with probability 1/4, and z with probability
1/2.
It is not difficult to see the logic behind this observation. In general, given any p˜1 ∈
∆(X ×∆(X)), we compute the marginal probability distribution of period-1 outcomes and
call it p1 ∈ ∆(X), and compute the marginal probability distribution of period-2 outcomes
and call it p2 ∈ ∆(X). Then, (p1, p2) is a dynamic lottery whose period-2 lotteries are
independent of period-1 outcomes. It must be the case that V1(p˜1) = V1((p1, p2)), because
V1 is a time-additively separable expected utility function.
Second, consider the generation-2 individual. Because we are examining the period-1
planner’s problem, which means the dynamic lottery’s risk has not resolved, how does the
planner evaluate the second generation’s utility of p˜1? Arguably,
V2(p˜1) =
1
2
(
1
2
v(y, 2) +
1
2
v(y′, 2)
)
+
1
2
v(z, 2) (II.49)
seems to be a reasonable evaluation—with probability 1/2, the second generation’s utility
will be 1
2
v(y, 2) + 1
2
v(y′, 2), and with probability 1/2, the second generation’s utility will be
v(z, 2). Now, again,
V2(p˜1) = V2((p1, p2)) =
1
4
v(y, 2) +
1
4
v(y′, 2) +
1
2
v(z, 2).
Therefore, p˜1 and (p1, p2) are equivalent for the planner in period 1. The planner’s
period-1 aggregation problem under ∆(X ×∆(X)) is the same as under ∆(X)2—there is a
bijection between time-addtively separable expected utility functions defined on the domain
with and without correlation. As long as the period-1 planner uses the same utilitarian
weights to aggregate individual utility functions, the planner’s preference will be the same
in both cases.
Move on to period 2 and continue our previous example of p˜1 and (p1, p2). With either
∆(X×∆(X)) or ∆(X)2, the second generation’s utility function is defined on ∆(X), because
individuals do not care about past consumption. Therefore, there is again a (trivial) bijection
between generation-2 individual utility functions defined on the domain with and without
correlation. The planner’s period-2 preference will be identical in both cases as long as she
uses the same utilitarian weights for individuals.
The analysis above can be extended to the case with more periods and more individuals.
In this sense, focusing on consumption sequences ∆(X)T without modeling how uncertainty
resolves over time is without loss of generality.
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However, it should be noted that with p˜1, the period-2 lottery is either q2 or r2. With
(p1, p2), no matter what the first generation consumes, the period-2 lottery is p2. Therefore,
there will be some ex post difference between p˜1 and (p1, p2) about which generation consumes
what. However, this difference should not affect the period-2 planner’s aggregation problem.
Another issue to be noted is that in either the case with correlation or the case without,
we only study what the planner’s objective should be if she aggregates individuals’ prefer-
ences. This exercise does not require us to consider, for example, feasibility constraints. If
the planner’s problem is to maximize some objective under certain constraints, correlation
may be important in the feasibility constraints. For example, if there is a technological ad-
vancement in the first period, we can anticipate a larger feasible set of consumption in the
future. This requires correlation in the constraints.
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CHAPTER III
Getting Information from Your Enemies
A decision maker DM faces a binary choice. DM does not know which alternative is
better, but a group of experts do. However, the experts would like DM to make the wrong
choice. Given the opposing preferences, is it still possible for DM to extract useful informa-
tion from the experts using mechanism design? We answer “Yes”: There are mechanisms
where truth-telling is a Bayesian or even ex post equilibrium, even though the information
leak benefits DM and hurts the expert. On the other hand, if truth-telling is required to be
an interim or ex post dominant strategy, then no mechanism extracts information in favor
of DM. We also discuss two extensions. In the first extension, we show that DM can extract
information even if his commitment to a mechanism is limited. In the second extension,
we show that if DM can first Blackwell-garble the experts’ information, then information
extraction becomes much easier.
III.1 Introduction
Can someone, using neither force nor lure, and not even a trick, get his enemies to tell him
secrets that benefit him and harm them? Yes, he (sometimes) can.
Suppose he is a decision maker DM who faces a binary choice: S or R? S is the Safe
option — the value of it is always 0. R is Risky — its value depends on the state of the
world, s. DM does not know what the state is, but a group of experts do. In particular, each
expert has a piece of partial information about the state — s manifests once these pieces of
partial information are combined.
DM wishes to collect these information fragments from the experts so he can learn about
the state and make an informed choice. There is, however, a hurdle: The experts would like
him to make the wrong choice, because it happens that, in every state, the lower DM’s
payoff, the higher the experts’ payoffs. In the face of such hostility, can DM still extract
This chapter is based on the working paper “Getting Information from Your Enemies ”(Feng and Wu,
2019).
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information from the experts so that he makes a better choice than if he was to choose
without any information? This is the question we address in the chapter.
We suppose DM can commit to a mechanism.1 Moreover, to make the analysis inter-
esting, suppose DM cannot make any transfers. In other words, he cannot make monetary
rewards and punishments part of the mechanism, for it is clear that these tools would make
information extraction easier.2
The situation does not look promising: The experts are hostile, and DM cannot use
transfers to alleviate the severe conflict of interests in between. Rough intuition could suggest
that the experts would not willingly leak information, knowing that the leak would benefit
DM and harm themselves. However, surprisingly, we find that DM can extract information
from his enemies in many cases.
More specifically, we show that there are (direct revelation) mechanisms such that truth-
telling is Bayesian, or even ex post, equilibrium strategy for the experts, despite that the
leaked information help DM make a better choice that in turn harms the experts. On the
other hand, the possibility of such information extraction depends on the environment, which
technically is captured by the payoff structure and information structure. We characterize
all environments in which information extraction is possible via ex post incentive compatible
mechanisms. Furthermore, we show that the weaker Bayesian incentive compatibility allows
more information extraction through examples. In particular, for environments correspond-
ing to the classical common value voting or “Condorcet Jury” models, Bayesian-incentive
compatible information leak can be so serious that DM is able to almost achieve first-best
when there are many experts.
On a different note, we also observe that if truth-telling has to be an interim dominant
strategy3 for the experts, i.e. a best response given one’s private information against any
strategies from the other experts, then information extraction is impossible. This implies
that information extraction is also impossible under the conventional dominant strategy
incentive compatibility, which is a stronger condition.
We consider two extensions. First, we ask whether DM can extract information without
full commitment to a mechanism, and find that he indeed can, as long as he commits to a
game protocol but not necessarily to a choice rule. In particular, for any direct revelation
mechanism, there is a cheap talk game where the DM achieves the same equilibrium payoff
1It turns out, as we will show, that full commitment to a mechanism, that is, commitment to a game
form and a choice rule, is more than necessary. The answer to the research question remains the same as
long as there is commitment to the game form only.
2Obviously, either ex post transfers, or side bets a` la Cre´mer and McLean (1988), can easily be used in
DM’s favor.
3The concept of interim dominant strategy is proposed and elaborately analyzed in Feng and Wu (2020)
as a weakening of the dominant strategy in the interdependent value setting.
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as he does using the mechanism.
In the second extension, we give DM the ability to Blackwell-garble the experts’ infor-
mation source, though he observes neither the original nor the garbled information. We show
that, with this additional device, DM can translate an environment in which information
extraction is not possible into one in which it is, thus making information extraction easier.
In the chapter, we try to understand whether mechanism design helps at all if there is
a severe conflict of interests between the uninformed designer and the informed agents.
In most mechanism design and contract theoretic models, despite some misalignment
of interests between the designer and the agents, there typically is a common ground where
everyone benefits from some information sharing. This potential surplus can easily be
(mis)understood as a foundation for meaningful mechanism design, as facilitating infor-
mation sharing is what a mechanism does. Intuitively, if sharing information would hurt,
why would the agents willingly reveal information even if participation is compulsory?
In this chapter we challenge, and then subvert, this intuition, by showing that a mech-
anism helps even if the informed parties are enemies to the designer. This finding is a
significant contribution to the literature, as it establishes that a potential surplus is not
necessary for information sharing.
The chapter can also be viewed as investigating how dramatically may a collective choice
institution fail. Institutions like voting systems serve the purpose of aggregating information
distributed among the population to arrive at a collective choice. We show in this chapter
that incentive compatible actions from the participants may lead to a collective choice that
is unsatisfactory to everyone. Indeed, the collective choice based on aggregated information
can in expectation be worse than a naive coin toss. Given the finding, there are situations
in which, when designing a voting system, we have to caution against potential failure that
may generate outcomes opposite to the public interest.
Related Literature
The overarching theme of this papechapterr is an important question: When is information
sharing possible? There has been extensive research on this theme, and a common finding
is that information sharing tends to break down when the conflict of interests between the
participating parties becomes severe. For example, in the standard cheap talk model of
Crawford and Sobel (1982), information sharing is not possible when the preference of the
single informed expert is sufficiently different from that of the uninformed DM. On the other
hand, when there are more experts, then a high degree of correlation between the experts’
information can help DM extract information. A stream of papers, including Gilligan and
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Krehbiel (1989), Krishna and Morgan (2001), Battaglini (2002, 2004), Gerardi, McLean and
Postlewaite (2009), Ambrus and Lu (2014), are based on this idea.
Without assuming highly correlated private information, Wolinsky (2002) shows that
when DM faces a group of partially informed experts, information sharing is possible despite
the experts’ significantly biased preferences relative to DM’s. The setup of Wolinsky (2002),
particularly in that there are multiple partially informed experts who share similar prefer-
ences, is similar to ours, and moreover the results of his paper and ours are also in the same
spirit. However, the conflict of interests between DM and the experts is much more severe in
our model than in Wolinsky (2002) — their preferences are always diametrically opposed in
our model. Therefore our results showing the possibility of information sharing is stronger.
Organization
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 delivers the
analysis and the results. Section 4 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
III.2 Model
This section describes the model.
Environment
A decision maker DM needs to make a choice between two options, S and R, which affects
himself and a group of N experts (indexed as expert 1, ..., expert N) . If option S is chosen,
every player including DM receives a payoff of 0. If option R is chosen, the payoffs depend
on an N−dimensional state of the world (s1, ..., sN) ∈ S1 × ...× SN = S. In particular, the
payoff from choosing R to each expert is e(s) and the payoff to DM is −e(s). Observe that
the interests between DM and the experts are diametrically opposed at both the ex ante and
the ex post stage — this makes them enemies.
For simplicity assume S is finite. The probability that state s ∈ S obtains is p(s). And
p(s) is the common prior. Let Sp denote the set of all states s where p(s) > 0. Moreover
denote S+ (resp. S−) as the set of all states s in Sp where e(s) > 0 (resp. e(s) < 0). To
avoid the trivial case of DM achieving first-best without any information, assume S+ and
S− are nonempty.
Conditional on state s = (s1, ..., sn), expert n = 1, ..., N privately observes sn, which we
will call his signal. Hence information about the state is distributed — each expert observes
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only one dimension of it. DM observes nothing about s. For parsimony suppose for any i
and si ∈ Si there is some s−i ∈ S−i such that p(si, s−i) > 0.
The environment is denoted by the environment parameters (S, e, p).
Mechanism
If DM gets no help from the experts, the best he can do is choosing the option that generates a
higher ex ante payoff. DM’s expected payoff from choosing this ex ante better option without
using any information is
B := max{0,−
∑
s∈S
p(s)e(s)},
whereas an expert’s expected payoff from this choice is −B. We call B the (no-information)
benchmark. Can DM do better than the benchmark by trying to get information from
the experts? By the Revelation Principle, if he can in any way then he can by using a
direct revelation mechanism. Therefore we shall focus on direct revelation mechanisms. As
discussed in the Introduction, we consider only mechanisms without transfers, as transfers
would make information extraction much easier.
A direct revelation mechanism is given by a choice rule q : S → [0, 1], where q(s1, ..., sN)
is the probability that R is chosen given each expert i = 1, ..., N reporting si. We say that
mechanism q extracts information (for DM) if truth-telling is an equilibrium 4 under q,
and moreover DM’s expected payoff from the mechanism is greater than the benchmark B.
Solution concepts
In this chapter we analyze information extraction under the following four kinds of mecha-
nisms, each of which associated with a different set of incentive compatibility constraints:
• Dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms
• Ex post incentive compatible mechanisms
• Interim dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms
• Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms.
Dominant strategy incentive compatibility requires that for every expert, truth-telling
is a best response given any beliefs about the following:
(1) The distribution of the other experts’ signals
4We shall analyze implications of different equilibrium concepts including dominant strategy equilibrium,
ex post equilibrium, interim dominant strategy equilibrium, and Bayes Nash equilibrium.
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(2) The other experts’ strategies.
Ex post incentive compatibility requires truth-telling be a best response given any belief
about (1) and a correct belief about (2) (that the other experts are also truth-telling).
Interim dominant strategy incentive compatibility, which we discuss in more detail in
Feng and Wu (2020), requires truth-telling be a best response given any belief about (2) and
a correct belief about (1) (that signals are distributed according to p).
Bayesian incentive compatibility assumes correct beliefs about both (1) and (2).
It is immediate that Bayesian incentive compatibility is the weakest and dominant
strategy incentive compatibility is the strongest. Ex post incentive compatibility and interim
dominant strategy incentive compatibility, on the other hand, are not mutually comparable
in general.
Participation constraint
We do not impose a participation constraint. In other words, experts have to participate in
the mechanism. Given our setting, DM’s choice has a public good nature — it affects the
experts regardless of whether they participate in the collective choice process (the mecha-
nism) or not. Therefore, to come up with a reasonable participation constraint, we must
endogenously derive the value of not participating (the outside option).
If we suppose the experts can collectively opt out of the mechanism, then, should that
happen, DM will choose the option that gives him the benchmark payoff of B, and each
expert gets a payoff of −B. It is thus natural to use −B as the value of the outside option
in the participation constraint, but this immediately implies that information extraction is
impossible, since in any mechanism that extracts information an expert’s payoff is less than
−B. The problem thus becomes trivial.
Alternatively, if experts can only individually opt out of the mechanism, then, to derive
the value of the outside option, we need to explicitly model the pre-mechanism game in
which experts decide whether to participate or not. This is certainly a worthwhile exercise,
yet it is beyond the scope of this chapter to examine this more complicated procedure.
In our setting, compulsory participation is not as strong an assumption as it seems.
Indeed, an expert has the freedom to “remain silent” by babbling, or to tell a lie, which will
not cause additional punishment because of the absence of transfers.
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III.3 Analysis
III.3.1 Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible Mechanisms
We first formally define dominant strategy incentive compatibility.
Definition. Mechanism q is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) if
for any s ∈ Sp, i = 1, ..., N and s′i ∈ Si, s′−i ∈ S−i,
e(s)q(si, s
′
−i) ≥ e(s)q(s′i, s′−i).
Thus truth-telling is a dominant strategy for every expert under q. The following lemma
characterizes DSIC mechanisms.
Lemma III.1. q is DSIC if and only if for any i = 1, ..., N and si ∈ Si:
1. If (si, s−i) ∈ S+ for some s−i ∈ S−i , then q(si, s′−i) ≥ q(s′i, s′−i) for any s′i ∈ Si and
s′−i ∈ S−i.
2. If (si, s−i) ∈ S− for some s−i ∈ S−i, then q(si, s′−i) ≤ q(s′i, s′−i) for any s′i ∈ Si and
s′−i ∈ S−i.
The following lemma states that a DSIC mechanism must take a particular form that
assumes at most three values.
Lemma III.2. If q is DSIC then there exist q+, q− ∈ [0, 1] where q+ ≥ q−, such that q(s) = q+
for every s ∈ S+, q(s) = q− for every s ∈ S−, and q(s) ∈ [q−, q+] for every s /∈ Sp.
The following lemma states that if every expert i may get some signal si that is not
perfectly informative of whether R or S is the better option for the experts, then a DSIC
mechanism must be a constant mechanism.
Lemma III.3. If for every i = 1, ..., N there exist si ∈ Si and s−i, s′−i ∈ S−i such that
(si, s−i) ∈ S+ and (si, s−i) ∈ S−, then q is DSIC if and only if it is a constant mechanism.
What kind of environment does Lemma III.3 leave out? Not much. If the condition in
the lemma is not satisfied, then there must be an expert i such that given any si ∈ Si, either
e(si, s−i) > 0 for all s−i ∈ S−i where (si, s−i) ∈ Sp or e(si, s−i) < 0 for all s−i ∈ S−i where
(si, s−i) ∈ Sp. In other words, i’s signal alone is perfectly informative of whether R or S is
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the better option for the experts. We call i the informed expert5, and denote SRi (resp.
SLi ) as the set of signals that are perfectly informative of R (resp. S) being the better option
for the experts. Hence Lemma III.3 can be restated as the following: A DSIC mechanism
is a constant mechanism if there is no informed expert. On the other hand, the following
lemma characterizes all dominant strategy mechanisms when there exist informed experts.
Lemma III.4. If there exists an informed expert i then q is DSIC if and only if there are
q+, q− ∈ [0, 1] where q+ ≥ q−, such that q(s) = q+ if si ∈ SRi and q(s) = q− if si ∈ SLi .
The proof is skipped, as the lemma follows straightforwardly from Lemmas III.1 and
III.2.
It follows from Lemmas III.3 and III.4 that DM cannot extract information using a DSIC
mechanism, because either there is no informed expert so the mechanism is constant, which
is weakly worse than what DM can get without any information, or there is an informed
expert so the mechanism has to cater to his preference, which is in direct conflict to DM’s.
Proposition III.1. There is no DSIC mechanism that extracts information.
III.3.2 Ex Post Incentive Compatible Mechanisms
Ex post incentive compatibility is formally defined as follows:
Definition. Mechanism q is ex post incentive compatible (EPIC) if for any s ∈ Sp,
i = 1, ..., N and s′i ∈ Si,
e(s)q(s) ≥ e(s)q(s′i, s−i).
Therefore, under an EPIC mechanism, truth-telling is a best response for every expert
even if the state is common knowledge. It equivalently means that truth-telling is a best
response regardless of an expert’s belief about the distribution of the other experts’ signals.
In contrast with DSIC, EPIC assumes every expert to (correctly) believe that the other
experts are truthful.
We say that s and s′ are contiguous if they differ in only one entry, or they are close
if they differ in one or two entries.
The following lemma, which “almost” characterizes EPIC mechanisms, will be useful.
Lemma III.5. q is EPIC only if for any s, s′ ∈ S:
5Note that an informed expert is not perfectly informed of all payoff-relevant information, because he
may still need the other experts’ information to fully know the exact value of e(s).
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1. q(s) = q(s′) if s and s′ are contiguous, and s, s′ are both in S+ or both in S−.
2. q(s) ≥ q(s′) if s and s′ are close, and s ∈ S+ and s′ ∈ S−.
Moreover for any q satisfying Conditions 1 and 2 there exists an EPIC mechanism q˜
such that q˜(s) = q(s) for every s ∈ Sp.
To prepare for a characterization of all environments in which there is an EPIC mecha-
nism that extracts information, introduce some additional terminology. For any C ⊂ Sp let
v(C) denote −∑s∈C p(s)e(s). Define C ⊂ Sp as a cluster if:
C1: No s ∈ C is contiguous to any s′ ∈ Sp − C where sgn(e(s′)) = sgn(e(s)).
C2: One of the following is true:
(A) v(C) > 0 and no s ∈ C ∩ S− is close to any s′ ∈ (Sp − C) ∩ S+.
(B) v(C) < 0 and no s ∈ C ∩ S+ is close to any s′ ∈ (Sp − C) ∩ S−.
If C satisfies Conditions C1 and C2(A) (resp. C2(B)) then we call it a Type A (resp.
Type B) cluster.
Proposition III.2. There exists an EPIC mechanism that extracts information if and only
if the environment (S, e, p) satisfies one of the following is true:
1. v(Sp) ≤ 0 and there is a Type A cluster.
2. v(Sp) ≥ 0 and there is a Type B cluster.
The following proposition characterizes a special class of environments in which DM can
use an EPIC mechanism to achieve a payoff that is not only higher than the benchmark, but
actually reaches the first-best level, which is the payoff DM would get if he knew the state.
An environment (S, e, p) is said to be rich if there exist two states s and s′ satisfying:
• p(s) > 0 and p(s′) > 0
• sgn(e(s)) 6= sgn(e(s′))
• s and s′ differ in the signals of no more than two experts.
Proposition III.3. DM can achieve his first-best payoff using an EPIC mechanism if and
only if the environment is not rich.
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Remark 1: Proposition III.3 is probably better read as an impossibility result. The
condition stated in the proposition is difficult to satisfy. If viewing the state space as a lattice
in which states with common entries are connected, an environment satisfying the condition
must have enough zero-probability states that separate positive-probability state-clusters
where e(s) > 0 from negative-probability state-clusters where e(s) < 0. For example, if
N ≤ 2 then no environment satisfies the condition.
It is well known that if N > 2 and experts’ signals are perfectly correlated, then full
information extraction is straightforward. Proposition III.3 is a generalization of this result,
as such an information structure can be easily verified to satisfy the condition in Proposition
III.3.
Remark 2: The proof shows more than stated in the proposition. Indeed, by the proof,
it is impossible for DM to get the first-best payoff with a mechanism that is just Bayesian
incentive compatible but not EPIC. Hence, as long as Bayesian incentive compatibility needs
to be satisfied, any mechanism that gives DM the first-best payoff must be EPIC.
III.3.3 Interim Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible Mecha-
nisms
Interim dominant strategy incentive compatibility is a condition we analyze in depth, for a
much more general setting, in Feng and Wu (2020). The formal definition is given as follows:
Definition. Mechanism q is interim dominant strategy incentive compatible
(IDSIC) if for any i = 1, ..., N , si, s
′
i ∈ Si, and any function z : S−i → S−i,∑
s−i∈Si
Pr(s−i|si)e(si, s−i)q(si, z(s−i))
≥
∑
s−i∈Si
Pr(s−i|si)e(si, s−i)q(s′i, z(s−i)),
where Pr(s−i|si) is derived from the common prior p(s).
Under an IDSIC mechanism, truth-telling is a best response as long as an expert has
the correct belief about the distribution of the other experts’ signals, regardless of what he
believes about the other experts’ strategies.6
6Although the definition is given in terms of truth-telling as a best response to any possible pure strategy
profile from the other players, it immediately implies that truth-telling is a best response to any possible
mixed strategy profile from the other players as well.
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Denote h(s) := p(s)e(s). For any expert i and si ∈ Si define
αi(si) :=
h(si,s−i)<0∑
s−i∈S−i
h(si, s−i),
αi(si) :=
h(si,s−i)≥0∑
s−i∈S−i
h(si, s−i),
and
βi(si) :=
∑
s−i∈S−i
h(si, s−i).
Clearly we have αi(si) ≤ 0 ≤ αi(si) and αi(si) + αi(si) = βi(si).
The following lemma characterizes all IDSIC mechanisms.
Lemma III.6. q is IDSIC if and only if for any i = 1, ..., N , si, s
′
i ∈ Si, and s−i, s′−i ∈ S−i:
αi(si)
(
q(si, s−i)− q(s′i, s−i)
)
+ αi(si)
(
q(si, s
′
−i)− q(s′i, s′−i)
)
≥ 0.
Based on the lemma, we show that it is impossible to extract information with an IDSIC
mechanism.
Proposition III.4. There is no IDSIC mechanism that extracts information.
Remark: Since every DSIC mechanism is also an IDSIC mechanism, Proposition III.1
can also be derived immediately as a corollary of Proposition III.4.
III.3.4 Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms
Bayesian incentive compatibility is formally defined as follows:
Definition. Mechanism q is Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) if for any i =
1, ..., N and si, s
′
i ∈ Si, ∑
s−i∈S−i
Pr(s−i|si)e(si, s−i)q(si, s−i)
≥
∑
s−i∈S−i
Pr(s−i|si)e(si, s−i)q(s′i, s−i),
where Pr(s−i|si) is derived from the common prior p(s).
Clearly, BIC is implied by IDSIC, EPIC or DSIC.
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The following proposition shows that two environments (S, e, p) and (S, e′, p′) are equiv-
alent in terms of information extraction using BIC mechanism, if p(s)e(s) = p′(s)e′(s) for
any s ∈ S.
Proposition III.5. Fix two environments (S, e, p) and (S, e′, p′) where p(s)e(s) = p′(s)e′(s)
for every s ∈ S. If mechanism q is a BIC mechanism that extracts information in (S, e, p),
then it is a BIC mechanism that extracts information in (S, e′, p′).
Remark. An immediate implication of Proposition III.5 is that in a full-support en-
vironment, the possibility of information extraction does not crucially depend on how sig-
nals are correlated, because if there is a BIC mechanism q that extracts information where
p has full support, then for any full-support p′ we can find payoff function e′ such that
p(s)e(s) = p′(s)e′(s), which by Proposition III.5 implies q is also a BIC mechanism that
extracts information in (S, e′, p′). This result is in contrast with results from a number of
papers which rely on correlation between the experts’ signals for information sharing.7
Since EPIC implies BIC, from Proposition III.2 we immediately know that there exist
environments in which DM can extract information using a BIC mechanism. Can DM do
more as EPIC is weakened to BIC? Yes, indeed. Below we show two examples in which an
EPIC mechanism cannot extract information where a BIC mechanism can.
Example 1
There are two experts, who each can observe a signal of either 0 or 1. The payoffs and
probabilities are given as follows.
Consider the following mechanism:
7See the Introduction for a discussion on this literature.
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DM’s expected payoff from the mechanism is 1/3, which is higher than the benchmark
of 1/4.
Observe that this environment does not allow information extraction in EPIC mecha-
nism, because there are only two experts.
Example 2
There are N experts, who each can observe a signal of either 0 or 1. If at least n experts
observe signal 1 then the value of R is 1. Otherwise the value of R is −1 < 0. All states
(signal profiles) are equally likely.
This example can be interpreted as a variation of the Condorcet Jury problem: S
correspond to acquittal, and R correspond to conviction. If at least n experts observe 1
then the defendant is guilty (in which case the experts, who are the jurors, would like a
conviction). Otherwise the defendant is innocent.
For simplicity suppose n ≥ N/2 so that B = 0.
Consider the following mechanism:
• q(s) = 1 if ∑Ni=1 si ≤ n− 2.
• q(s) = 0 if ∑Ni=1 si ≥ n+ 1.
• q(s) = (
N−1
n−2)
(N−1n )+(
N−1
n−2)
if
∑N
i=1 si = n− 1 or n.
It is straightforward to verify that q is a BIC mechanism that extracts information as long
as N ≥ 3 and gives the designer an expected payoff arbitrarily close to the first-best payoff
when N goes to infinity.
The rest of this chapter focuses on Condorcet Jury votings.
Generalized Condorcet Jury
Example 2 corresponds to an important class of collective choice problems known as “Cor-
dorcet Jury Problems”. We define a generalized Condorcet Jury problem as the following.
N agents each gets a binary signal taking value of 0 or 1. e(s) is permutation invariant, so
the value of R depends on how many 1-signals obtain. p(s) is permutation invariant. Let
(s) :=
∑N
i=1 si, e(s) ≥ e(s′) if and only if (s) ≥ (s′), that is, R is more valuable if there
are more 1-signals. This situation generalizes the Condorcet Jury model with the interpre-
tation that the agents are jurors to determine whether to convict or acquit a defendant. A
1-signal is a partial evidence that the defendant is guilty, thus the more 1’s the more likely
the defendant is guilty. S represents the decision to acquit and R to convict. The jurors
prefer to acquit if there’s no enough guilty evidence or to convict otherwise.
DM’s optimization problem is the following:
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max
0≤q(s)≤1
−
∑
s∈S
p(s)e(s)q(s)
s.t.
∑
s−i∈S−i
p(si, s−i)e(si, s−i)q(si, s−i) ≥
∑
s−i∈S−i
p(si, s−i)e(si, s−i)q(s′i, s−i)
for all i = 1, ..., N , si ∈ Si and s′i ∈ Si.
For any given s = (s1, s2, · · · , sn), there all n! permutations of s in total. We sort all
permutations in lexicographic order, i.e.,
σ1(s) = (s1, s2, · · · , sn), σ2(s) = (s1, s2, · · · , sn, sn−1), · · · , σn!(s) = (sn, sn−1, · · · , s1).
Lemma III.7. Suppose p(s) and e(s) are permutation invariant. If q(s) is a solution to the
above problem, then
q∗(s) =
1
n!
n!∑
k=1
q(σk(s))
is a solution.
Given Lemma III.7 we can focus on symmetric mechanisms. A symmetric mechanism
can be expressed as qsym : {0, ..., N} → [0, 1] where qsym(k) is the probability that R is
chosen given a report that has k 1-signals. Define ek = e(s), pk = p(s) and hk = ekpk where
(s) = k.
We first take a detour and ask an unusual question whether there is a BIC mechanism
that has a decreasing rules, that is, the probability of conviction goes down as evidence for
guilty becomes strong. Here we do not consider the trivial cases of constant mechanisms.
Lemma III.8. There exists a decreasing BIC mechanism if and only if there are i, j ∈
{0, ..., N} where hi, hi+1 < 0, hj, hj+1 > 0, and hi+1hi ≥
hj+1
hj
.
Lemma III.8 characterizes all environments that admit a BIC decreasing mechanism.
Combined with Lemma III.8, the following Lemma provides a sufficient condition for DM to
beat the benchmark.
Lemma III.9. If the DM is indifferent between S and R ex ante, then any decreasing mech-
anism beats the benchmark.
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Lemma III.9 shows in any environment that the DM is indifferent between S and R
ex ante (
∑N
k=0
(
N
k
)
hk = 0), the existence of a BIC decreasing mechanism is a sufficient
condition for beating the benchmark. However, existence of a BIC decreasing mechanism
is not a necessary condition for beating the benchmark incentive compatibly. Consider the
environment where N = 3, h0 = −2, h1 = −1, h2 = 1, h3 = 2. Lemma III.8 implies that a
BIC decreasing mechanism does not exist. However, the mechanism where q0 = 1, q1 = 1/4,
q2 = 3/4, q3 = 0 is BIC and beats the benchmark.
Another question is whether, when
∑N
k=0
(
N
k
)
hk is not necessarily 0, the best decreasing
BIC mechanism would still beat the benchmark. This answer to this question is again
negative. Consider the environment where N = 3, h0 = h1 = −1, h2 = h3 = 10. Then all
decreasing mechanisms are in the form of q0 = x, q1 = y, q2 = y, q3 = z where
x−y
y−z = 10. The
expected utility for the agents from this mechanism is
−x− 3y + 30y + 10z = 16y + 20z ≥ 0,
Implying no decreasing BIC mechanism beats the benchmark.
Classical Condorcet Jury
This part considers the classical Condorcet Jury problem. The ex ante probability of the
defendant being guilty is pi. A juror’s utility from convicting a guilty defendant is x and
that from convicting an innocent defendant is −y, where x and y are positive. Conditional
on the defendant being guilty, every juror independently receives the guilty (1) signal with
probability α > 1/2. Conditional on the defendant being innocent, every juror independently
receives the guilty (1) signal with probability β < 1/2.
Proposition III.6. In the classical Condorcet model, there is no symmetric monotone BIC
mechanism that extracts information.
It is straightforward to verify that hk is increasing in k in the classical Condorcet model.
Hence, by Lemma III.8 there does not exist a decreasing BIC mechanism for the classical
Condorcet Jury model. And it is easy to see that no symmetric increasing BIC mechanism
that extracts information. Thus no symmetric monotone BIC mechanism that extracts
information. By Lemma III.7 we know there is no monotone BIC mechanism that extracts
information.
As mentioned in the introduction, this chapter can also be viewed as investigating how
dramatically may a collective choice institution fail. Institutions like voting systems serve the
120
purpose of aggregating information distributed among the population to arrive at a collective
choice.
As shown in example 2, incentive compatible actions from the participants may lead to
a collective choice that is unsatisfactory to everyone. Given the finding, there are situations
in which, when designing a voting system, we have to caution against potential failure
that may generate outcomes opposite to the public interest. The next proposition brings
a reassuring message that the voting rule being used everyday never harms voters in the
classical Condorcet model.
Proposition III.7. Suppose in the classical Condorcet model, the voting rule is:
1. symmetric with respect to jurors,
2. monotone in the number of guilty reports.
Then any equilibrium payoff of the jurors is weakly higher than benchmark payoff −B.
It is well known that given a voting rule, there may exist multiple equilibria. Proposition
III.7 tells us a symmetric and monotone voting rule gives a higher expected payoff to the
jurors under any equilibrium compared with the jurors’ no-voting benchmark, −B (see page
144). Hence, a symmetric and monotone voting rule never fails in the classical Condorcet
model.
To understand Proposition III.7, consider a voting rule where the verdict is conviction
if there are at least k reports of the guilty (1) signal, or acquittal otherwise. Suppose jurors
follow the same strategy of reporting 1 with probability a conditional on the guilty signal
or with probability b conditional on the innocent signal. Compare two states s and s′ that
differ only in juror i’s signal, where si = 0 and s
′
i = 1. Let Qs and Qs′ respectively denote
the probability of conviction in states s and s′. Let p˜k denote the probability that the non-i
jurors report k guilty signals in total conditional on s−i. Thus
Qs′ −Qs =
[N−1∑
k=k
p˜k + p˜k−1a
]
−
[N−1∑
k=k
p˜k + p˜k−1b
]
= p˜k−1(a− b).
By symmetry of the strategy profile, the implied probability of conviction conditional on any
state only depends on the number of actual guilty signals that obtain in the state. Let q˜k
denote this probability if the number of guilty signals that obtain is k. The above inequality
implies q˜k is monotone in k. By the Revelation Principle, a symmetric strategy profile (a, b)
is an equilibrium only if the implied (monotone) direct mechanism (q˜k) is BIC.
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Since no monotone BIC mechanism extracts information, we conclude that no symmetric
equilibrium of the voting game makes the jurors worse off than no voting. The proof shows
that for any (possibly non-symmetric) equilibrium the implied direct BIC mechanism is
monotone. Hence, any equilibrium payoff of the jurors is weakly higher than the no-voting
benchmark.
III.4 Extensions
III.4.1 Extension 1: without Commitment
There is a shortcoming to the direct revelation mechanism: It requires full commitment
from DM, which makes the mechanism impractical in some situations. Indeed, if DM and
the experts are enemies it would be difficult to convince the experts that DM would honor
the choice rule q. Thus it is worth asking whether information extraction is still possible if
some of the commitment requirement is relaxed.
By using a mechanism, DM commits to two things: 1. A game form, and 2. A choice rule
given the game outcome. Below we show that as long as DM can commit to a game form
(communication protocol), commitment to a choice rule is not necessary for information
extraction. In particular, as long as there is a BIC direct revelation mechanism q that
extracts information, the same payoff can be achieved by cheap-talk communication. More
specifically, given direct revelation mechanism q let Γ(q) be the associated cheap talk game
defined in the following sense:
Step 1 Experts send messages simultaneously, where the message set for expert i is Si.
Step 2 Given message profile s, a public randomization device generates message R with
probability q(s) and message S with probability 1− q(s).
Step 3 DM makes choice after observing the device’s recommendation. He does not observe
messages from the experts.
The following result shows that there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the cheap talk
game which implements the choice rule q.
Proposition III.8. Γ(q) has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium that is outcome-equivalent to
the truth-telling equilibrium under q if q is a BIC mechanism that extracts information.
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Conditional on DM follows the device’s recommendation, truthtelling is incentive com-
patible for experts under q immediately implies truthtelling is optimal under Γ(q). Condi-
tional on every expert sends the message that is the same as his signal, mechanism q extracts
information implies following recommendation is optimal.
III.4.2 Extension 2: Information Manipulation
In this extension we suppose DM can contaminates the experts’ information, and examine
whether that makes information extraction easier. Suppose that, although DM has no direct
access to the experts’ information, he can manipulate the information that the experts
receive, that is, he may add noise to the experts’ information source and distort what the
experts observe. Information manipulation takes the form of garbling a la` Blackwell: As DM
contaminates the information source, if state s obtains, instead of receiving signal si with
certainty, expert i receives some s′i ∈ S ′i with some probability, where S ′i is the set of signals
that i can receive after the contamination. DM still does not observe the experts’ signals,
before or after contamination.
Formally, an information manipulation is represented by distorted state space S ′ =
S ′1 × ...× S ′N and garbling probability functions z(·|s), s ∈ S on S ′ where z(s′|s) is the
probability that distorted state s′ obtains, in which case expert i observes signal s′i instead
of si.
The probability of distorted state s′ is p′(s′) :=
∑
s∈S p(s)z(s
′|s). Conditional on
distorted state s′ ∈ S ′, the (expected) value of option S remains 0 for DM and the ex-
perts, and the value of option R to the experts is equal to e′(s′) :=
∑
s∈S Pr(s|s′)e(s) =∑
s∈S
p(s)z(s′|s)
p′(s′) e(s), and similarly the value of option R to DM is equal to−
∑
s∈S
p(s)z(s′|s)
p′(s′) e(s).
Observe that∑
s′∈S′
p′(s′)e′(s′) =
∑
s′∈S′
∑
s∈S
p(s)z(s′|s)e(s) =
∑
s∈S
∑
s′∈S′
p(s)z(s′|s)e(s) =
∑
s∈S
p(s)e(s),
which implies that max{−∑s′∈S′ p′(s′)e′(s′), 0} = max{−∑s∈S p(s)e(s), 0}. In other words,
the maximum payoff that DM can get without consulting with the experts remains the
same regardless of information manipulation. Therefore, information manipulation might be
helpful only if DM can extract some information from the experts.
For better exposition of the coming results for any state space S we (arbitrarily) order
states as s(1), ..., s(|S|), and given environment (S, e, p) denote h := (p(s(j))e(s(j)))|S|j=1 and
g := (−p(s(j))e(s(j)))|S|j=1.
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Lemma III.10. DM can translate environment (S, e, p) into an environment equivalent (in
the sense of Proposition III.5) to (S ′, e′, p′) by information manipulation if and only if there
is a |S ′| × |S| matrix Z such that:
1. Z is non-negative.
2. Zh = h′ and Zg = g′.
3. ZT1|S′| = 1|S| where 1d denotes a vector of dimension d whose entries are 1’s.
Following the lemma, we can completely determine when one environment can be ma-
nipulated into another.
Proposition III.9. DM can translate environment (S, e, p) into an environment equivalent
to (S ′, e′, p′) (in the sense of Proposition III.5) by information manipulation if and only if
1. ∑
s∈S
h(s) =
∑
s′∈S′
h′(s′).
2.
h(s)>0∑
s∈S
h(s) ≥
h′(s)>0∑
s′∈S′
h′(s′).
The proposition implies that information manipulation is very powerful. Indeed, as
long as there are three experts, DM can always get his first-best payoff by translating the
original environment (S, e, p) into (S ′, e′, p′) that satisfies the condition in Proposition III.3
where S ′ = {0, 1}N , h′(0, ..., 0) = ∑s∈S− h(s), h′(1, ..., 1) = ∑s∈S+ h(S) and p′(s) = 0 for
any s /∈ {(0, ..., 0), (1, ..., 1)}.
III.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we ask when a decision maker can use a mechanism without transfers to
extract information from a group of experts whose preferences are diametrically opposed
to his. We separately characterize environments in which this can be done subject to (1)
dominant strategy incentive compatibility, (2) ex post incentive compatibility, (3) interim
dominant strategy incentive compatibility, (4) Bayesian incentive compatibility. In particu-
lar, we show that in cases (1) and (3) the decision maker cannot extract information at all,
whereas in cases (2) and (4) he can. We also explore the role of information manipulation
and commitment in information extraction.
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III.6 Proof
III.6.1 Proof of Lemma III.1
Proof. Suppose q satisfies conditions 1 and 2 in the statement. Fix s ∈ Sp where e(s) > 0.
It follows immediately from condition 1 that e(s)q(si, s
′
−i) ≥ e(s)q(s′i, s′−i) for any s′i ∈ Si
and s′−i ∈ S−i. The case where e(s) < 0 is symmetric.
Now prove the “only if” direction. Suppose there is some s ∈ Sp such that e(s) > 0 and
q(si, s
′
−i) < q(s
′
i, s
′
−i) for some s
′
i ∈ Si, s′−i ∈ S−i. Thus we have e(s)q(si, s′−i) < e(s)q(s′i, s′−i),
implying that q is not a dominant strategy mechanism. A violation of condition 2 leads to
the same conclusion.
III.6.2 Proof of Lemma III.2
Proof. Suppose q is a dominant strategy mechanism. Pick any s ∈ S+. Let sk denote a state
where its first k entries agree with the first k entries of s′ and its last N−k entries agree with
the last N − k entries of s. Clearly s0 = s and sN = s′. Fix any k = 1, ..., N . Observe that
q(sk−1) = q(sk, sk−1−k ) = q(sk, s
k
−k) ≥ q(s′k, sk−k) = q(sk) where the inequality is due to Lemma
III.1. Thus q(s) ≥ q(s′). If s′ ∈ S+ then likewise we have q(s′) ≥ q(s), implying q(s) = q(s′).
If s, s′ ∈ S− then a symmetric argument applies, leading to q(s) = q(s′) again.
III.6.3 Proof of Lemma III.3
Proof. Suppose for every i = 1, ..., N there exist si ∈ Si and s−i, s′−i ∈ S−i such that
(si, s−i) ∈ S+ and (si, s′−i) ∈ S−. Any constant mechanism is obviously a dominant strategy
mechanism. To show the “only if” direction, suppose q is a dominant strategy mechanism.
Fix any i = 1, ..., N . Since (si, s−i) ∈ S+, it follows from Lemma III.1 that q(si, sˆ−i) =
maxσi∈Si q(σi, sˆ−i) for any sˆ−i ∈ Si. Similarly, q(si, sˆ−i) = minσi∈Si q(σi, sˆ−i) since (si, s′−i) ∈
S−. It follows that q(si, sˆ−i) = q(s′i, sˆ−i) for any s
′
i ∈ Si, implying that q is constant with
respect to expert i’s report. Since this is true for every i, q is a constant mechanism.
III.6.4 Proof of Proposition III.1
Proof. If in the environment there is no informed expert, then by Lemmas III.3 any DSIC
mechanism is constant. Since obviously DM’s payoff from the optimal constant mechanism
is B, no constant mechanism extracts information. If instead there is an informed expert i,
then by Lemma III.4 there exist q+ ≥ q− such that q(s) = q+ if si ∈ SRi , and q(s) = q− if
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si ∈ SLi . Thus
−
∑
s∈S
p(s)e(s)q(s) = −q+
∑
s:si∈SRi
p(s)e(s)− q−
∑
s:si∈SLi
p(s)e(s)
= −q+
∑
s:e(s)>0
p(s)e(s)− q−
∑
s:e(s)<0
p(s)e(s)
≤ −q+
∑
s∈S
p(s)e(s) ≤ B.
Again, q does not extract information.
III.6.5 Proof of Lemma III.5
Proof. Pick any s ∈ S+. EPIC at s implies q(s) ≥ q(s′) for any s′ that is contiguous to . If
further s′ ∈ S+ then similarly q(s′) ≥ q(s), implying q(s) = q(s′). The same is established
with an analogous argument if s, s′ ∈ S−. Thus we have Condition 1.
Suppose s ∈ S+ and s′ ∈ S− are close. If they are also contiguous then Condition 2 is
the immediate consequence of ex post IC at s. If s and s′ differ in two entries then there is
s′′ that is contiguous to s and to s′. EPIC at s implies q(s) ≥ q(s′′), and EPIC at s′ implies
q(s′′) ≥ q(s′). It follows that q(s) ≥ q(s′). Thus we have Condition 2.
Now we show the second part of the lemma. Suppose there exists q satisfying Conditions
1 and 2. Define q˜ such that:
• For any s where p(s) > 0: q˜(s) = q(s).
• For any s where p(s) = 0:
– q˜(s) = 1, if there does not exist s′ ∈ S+ that is contiguous to s.
– q˜(s) = min
{
q(s′) : s′ ∈ S+ and s′ is contiguous to s
}
, if there exists some s′ ∈ S+
that is contiguous to s.
To show that q˜ is EPIC, pick any s ∈ Sp, and s′ that is contiguous to s. First suppose
s ∈ S+. If p(s′) > 0 then Condition 1 or 2 imply q˜(s) = q(s) ≥ q(s′) = q˜(s′). If p(s′) = 0
then by construction q˜(s′) ≤ q(s). Thus EPIC holds at s if s ∈ S+. Now suppose s ∈ S−.
If p(s′) > 0 then Condition 1 or 2 imply q˜(s) = q(s) ≤ q(s′) = q˜(s′). If p(s′) = 0 and there
does not exist s′′ ∈ S+ that is contiguous to s′, then by construction q˜(s′) = 1 ≥ q˜(s). If
p(s′) = 0 and there exists some s′′ ∈ S+ that is contiguous to s′, then any such s′′ is close
to s, and hence by Condition 2 we have q˜(s) ≤ q˜(s′′), implying q˜(s) ≤ q˜(s′) = min
{
q(s′′) :
s′′ ∈ S+ and s′′ is contiguous to s′
}
. Thus EPIC holds at s if s ∈ S−.
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III.6.6 Proof of Proposition III.2
Proof. “If” direction: Suppose v(Sp) ≤ 0 and there is a Type A cluster C. Clearly B = 0.
Construct q such that q(s) = 1 for every s ∈ C and q(s) = 0 for every s ∈ Sp − C. Pick
any two contiguous states s, s′ ∈ Sp where sgn(e(s)) = sgn(e(s′)). Condition C1 implies s
and s′ are both in C or both in Sp − C. In either case q(s) = q(s′) by construction of q.
Thus Condition 1 in Lemma III.5 is satisfied. Now pick any two close states s, s′ ∈ Sp where
s ∈ S− and s′ ∈ S+. If they are both in C or both in Sp−C then q(s) = q(s′). If s ∈ Sp−C
and s′ ∈ C then q(s′) = 1 > 0 = q(s). Condition C2(A) rules out the possibility that s ∈ C
and s′ ∈ Sp − C. Thus q(s′) ≥ q(s), and Condition 2 in Lemma III.5 is satisfied. It follows
from Lemma III.5 that there is an EPIC mechanism q˜ where q˜(s) = q(s) for every s ∈ Sp.
DM’s expected payoff from q˜ is the same as that from q, which is equal to v(C) > 0 = B.
Suppose v(Sp) ≥ 0 and there is a Type B cluster. In this case B = v(Sp). Construct q
such that q(s) = 0 for every s ∈ C and q(s) = 1 for every s ∈ Sp − C. Using an analogoius
argument as above we can show the existence of an EPIC mechanism q˜ where q˜(s) = q(s)
for any s ∈ Sp. DM’s payoff from q˜ is v(Sp)− v(C) > v(Sp) = B. This concludes the proof
of the “if” direction.
“Only if” direction: Suppose v(Sp) ≤ 0 and there does not exist a Type A cluster.
Let q be the optimal EPIC mechanism for DM.
Define a relation ∼ on Sp such that s ∼ s′ if there is a finite sequence (s0, ..., sn) of
elements in Sp where (1) s
0 = s and sn = s′, (2) sgn(e(s0)) = ... = sgn(e(sn)), (3) sk
is contiguous to sk−1 for every k = 1, ..., n. It is straightforward to verify that ∼ is an
equivalent relation, and hence it partitions Sp into a set K of equivalence classes. For any
K ∈ K and s, s′ ∈ K, Lemma III.5 implies that q(s) = q(s′) because q is EPIC; we use q(K)
to denote this probability. Also for any K ∈ K and s, s′ ∈ K we have sgn(e(s)) = sgn(e(s′));
we use sgn(K) to denote this sign.
For any K ∈ K define R(K) := {K ′ ∈ K : K ′ is close to K, sgn(K ′) 6= sgn(K)}. Pick
any K ∈ K where sgn(K) = +. Suppose R(K) is empty and q(K) > 0. Consider q˜ where q˜
differ from q only in that q˜(K) = 0. It is straightforward to verify that q being EPIC implies
q˜ is EPIC. Moreover DM’s payoff from q˜ is equal to his payoff from q plus −q(K)v(K), which
is strictly higher than his payoff from q because v(K) < 0 given sgn(K) = +, contradicting
the assumption that q is the optimal EPIC mechanism. Thus q(K) = 0 if R(K) is empty.
Now supposeR(K) is nonempty. By Condition 2 in Lemma III.5, q(K) ≥ q(K ′) for every
K ′ ∈ R(K) because K ⊂ S+ and K ′ ⊂ S−. Suppose q(K) > maxκ∈R(K) q(κ). Construct q˜
that differs from q only in that q(K) = maxκ∈R(K) q(κ). Using a similar argument as in the
previous case we can show that q˜ is EPIC and gives DM a higher payoff, a contradiction.
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Thus q(K) = maxκ∈R(K) q(κ).
Similarly, for any K ∈ K where sgn(K) = − we can establish that q(K) = 1 if R(K)
is empty, or q(K) = minκ∈R(K) q(κ) otherwise.
Define a relation ≈ on K such that K ≈ K ′ if there is a finite sequence (K0, ..., Kn) of
elements in K where (1) K0 = K and Kn = K ′, (2) Kk ∈ R(Kk−1) for k = 1, ..., n. It is
straightforward to verify that ≈ is an equivalent relation, and hence it partitions K into a
set B of equivalence classes.
Consider any B ∈ B where B = {K} for some K ∈ K . Observe that sgn(K) = +, for
otherwise K would be a Type A cluster. It then immediately follows that q(K) = 0.
Now consider any B ∈ B where B is not a singleton. It follows that {K ∈ B :
sgn(K) = −} is nonempty. Fix some K∗ ∈ {K ∈ B : sgn(K) = −} where q(K∗) =
maxK∈B:sgn(K)=− q(K). Denote N0 = {K∗}. For any i ≥ 1, define N i :=
{
K ∈ B −⋃i−1
j=0 N
j : K ∈ R(K ′) for some K ′ ∈ N i−1
}
if i is odd, or N i =
{
K ∈ B − ⋃i−1j=0N j :
K ∈ R(K ′) for some K ′ ∈ N i−1 and q(K) = q(K∗)
}
if i is even. It is straightforward to
verify that for any K ∈ N i, sgn(K) = − if i is even or sgn(K) = + if i is odd, and that
N i ⊂ B for any i. Let k be the highest number where Nk is nonempty. Observe that by
definition q(K) = q(K∗) for any K ∈ N i where i is even. Fix i ≤ k where i is odd, and
pick any K ∈ N i. By definition K ∈ R(K ′) for some K ′ ∈ N i−1. Since i is even, we have
sgn(K) = + and sgn(K ′) = −. Thus q(K) ≥= q(K ′) = q(K∗). Since R(K) ⊂ B, we have
q(K) = maxκ∈R(K) q(κ) ≤ maxκ∈B,sgn(κ)=− q(κ) = q(K∗). Therefore q(K) = q(K∗). We have
thus established that q(K) = q(K∗) for every K ∈ N0 ∪ ... ∪Nk.
Define M :=
{
s : s ∈ K for some K ∈ N0 ∪ ... ∪Nk
}
. Observe that by construction
there is no s ∈ M ∩ S− that is close to some s′ ∈ (Sp −M) ∩ S+. Therefore v(M) ≤ 0,
for otherwise M would be a Type A cluster. Define L :=
{
K ∈ B − ⋃kj=0Nk : K ∈
R(K ′) for some K ′ ∈ Nk
}
. If S is empty then v(M) ≤ 0 implies there is an optimal EPIC
mechanism q˜ where q˜(s) = 0 if s ∈ M or q˜(s) = q(s) if s ∈ Sp −M . If S is nonempty
then sgn(K) = − and q(K) < q(K∗) for every K ∈ L. Consider mechanism qˆ where qˆ(s) =
maxK∈L q(K) if s ∈ M or qˆ(s) = q(s) otherwise. Clearly qˆ(s) is also EPIC, and moreover
DM’s payoff from qˆ(s) is equal to his payoff from q(s) plus
(
q(K∗) −maxK∈L q(K)
)
v(M).
That q is optimal implies v(M) = 0. Thus qˆ is also an optimal EPIC mechanism. Moreover
note that qˆ(K∗) = maxK∈B:sgn(K)=− qˆ(K). Applying the same argument used in the previous
paragraph and this paragraph on qˆ still starting with K∗, we can show that there is a subset
of B that is strictly larger than N0 ∪ ... ∪Nk (because there is now some K ′ ∈ L such that
q˜(K ′) = q˜(K∗)) such that q(K) = q(K∗) for every K in that subset. Repeatedly applying
the argument and we will eventually reach some optimal EPIC q where q(K) = q(K∗) for
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every K ∈ B. Define M := {s : s ∈ K for some K ∈ B}. Observe that v(M) ≤ 0 for
otherwise M would be a Type A cluster. Thus there is some optimal EPIC q˜ where q˜(s) = 0
if s ∈ M or q˜(s) = q(s) if s ∈ Sp −M . Applying the same argument to every B ∈ B, we
have established the existence of an optimal EPIC mechanism that is equal to 0 on Sp. Thus
DM cannot beat the benchmark. The proof for the case where v(Sp) ≥ 0 and there does not
exist a Type B cluster is similar.
III.6.7 Proof of Proposition III.3
Proof. “If”. Suppose the environment is not rich. If N = 2 then non-richness implies in
all states that have positive probability the optimal option is always the same. Thus always
choosing that optimal option is first-best and is trivially thruthfully implementable.
Consider N > 3. Take any choice rule q∗ such that:
• For positive-probability s: q∗(s) = 1 if e(s) < 0 or q∗(s) = 0 if e(s) > 0.
• For zero-probability s: If s differs from some positive-probability s′ only in one signal
then q∗(s) = q∗(s′).
Non-richness implies that if positive-probability states sˆ and s˜ are in the one-signal-difference
neighborhood of a zero-probability state s then sgn(e(sˆ)) = sgn(e(s˜)) and hence q∗(sˆ) =
q∗(s˜). Thus q∗ is well-defined. q∗ is also first best by construction. Clearly q∗ is truthfully
implementable because any expert i is indifferent between all messages regardless of his
signal.
“Only if”: We show the contrapositive. Pick any first-best rule q∗. Suppose the
environment is rich. There are s and s′ such that p(s) > 0, p(s′) > 0, e(s) > 0, e(s′) < 0,
and s is different from s′ only in one or two signals. It follows that q∗(s) = 0 and q∗(s′) = 1.
First consider the case that s and s′ differ only in the ith signal. Suppose all players are
truthful except i who deviates from being truthful to always reporting si regardless of his
signal. It follows that in s′ the inferior option8 B is chosen, which in turn implies the
deviation strictly decreases DM’s payoff (since p(s′) > 0), or equivalently strictly increases
expert i’s payoff. Thus q∗ is not truthfully implementable.
Now suppose s and s′ differ only in the signals of experts i and j. Let s−ij denote the
signals of experts other than i and j under s. Consider Q := q∗(s′i, sj, s−ij). Suppose Q > 0,
then if expert i unilaterally deviates from being truthful to always reporting s′i then in state
s the inferior option A is chosen with positive probability, implying a strict decrease in DM’s
8Inferior by DM’s preference.
129
payoff from its first-best level and hence a strict increase in expert i’s payoff. Similarly, if
Q < 1 then expert j unilaterally deviating to always reporting sj has the same effect since
in state s′ the inferior option B is chosen with positive probability. Thus q∗ is not truthfully
implementable.
III.6.8 Proof of Lemma III.6
Proof. “If” direction: Fix expert i. Suppose the other experts use the correlated strategy
of jointly reporting s−i with probability z(s−i|sˆ−i) conditional on true signal profile sˆ−i.
Given signal si, expert i’s expected payoff from truth-telling is equal to∑
sˆ−i∈S−i
h(si, sˆ−i)
∑
s−i∈S−i
z(s−i|sˆ−i)q(si, s−i)
whereas his payoff from misreporting as having signal s′i is∑
sˆ−i∈S−i
h(si, sˆ−i)
∑
s−i∈S−i
z(s−i|sˆ−i)q(s′i, s−i).
The change in payoff from deviating from truth-telling to misreporting is thus
D = −
∑
sˆ−i∈S−i
h(si, sˆ−i)
∑
s−i∈S−i
z(s−i|sˆ−i)
(
q(si, s−i)− q(s′i, s−i)
)
. (III.1)
Choose s−i ∈ argmins−i∈S−i
(
q(si, s−i) − q(s′i, s−i)
)
and s−i ∈ argmaxs−i∈S−i
(
q(si, s−i) −
q(s′i, s−i)
)
. Observe D is the highest when z(s−i|sˆ−i) = 1 for any sˆ−i where h(si, sˆ−i) < 0
and z(s−i|sˆ−i) = 1 for any sˆ−i where h(si, sˆ−i) > 0. Thus
D ≤ −
(
q(si, s−i)− q(s′i, s−i)
) h(si,sˆ−i)<0∑
sˆ−i∈S−i
h(si, sˆ−i)
−
(
q(si, s−i)− q(s′i, s−i)
) h(si,sˆ−i)≥0∑
sˆ−i∈S−i
h(si, sˆ−i)
= −
(
q(si, s−i)− q(s′i, s−i)
)
αi(si)−
(
q(si, s−i)− q(s′i, s−i)
)
αi(si)
≤ 0
where the last inequality is by assumption. It follows that truth-telling is best responding.
Since i, si, s
′
i and z are arbitrarily chosen, we conclude that q is interim dominant strategy
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incentive compatible.
“Only if” direction: Suppose q is interim dominant strategy incentive compatible.
Pick any expert i, si, s
′
i ∈ Si and s−i, s′−i ∈ Sj. Suppose experts other than i use the
(correlated) strategy profile of reporting s−i with probability z(sˆ−i) and s′−i with probability
1− z(sˆ−i) conditional on joint signal profile sˆ−i.
Since q is strategy proof, reporting si instead of s
′
i given signal si is a best response for
i. Thus ∑
sˆ−i∈S−i
h(si, sˆ−i)
(
z(sˆ−i)q(si, s−i) + (1− z(zˆ−i))q(si, s′−i)
)
≥
∑
sˆ−i∈S−i
h(si, sˆ−i)
(
z(sˆ−i)q(s′i, s−i) + (1− z(zˆ−i))q(s′i, s′−i)
)
Denote y := q(si, s−i) − q(s′i, s−i) and y′ := q(si, s′−i) − q(s′i, s′−i). The above inequality can
be rearranged as:
y
∑
sˆ−i∈S−i
h(si, sˆ−i)z(sˆ−i) + y′
∑
sˆ−i∈S−i
h(si, sˆ−i)(1− z(sˆ−i)) ≥ 0. (III.2)
interim dominant strategy incentive compatibility requires that this inequality holds for any
(z(sˆ−i))s−i∈S−i ∈ [0, 1]|S−i|. Observe that
∑
sˆ−i∈S−i h(si, sˆ−i)z(sˆ−i) can take any value that is
between αi(si) and αi(si) given the appropriate choice of z. It follows that inequality III.2
holds if and only if
yk + y′(βi(si)− k) ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ [αi(si), αi(si)]. (III.3)
An immediate implication is that αi(si)y+αi(si)y
′ ≥ 0 by setting k = αi(si). This concludes
the proof.
III.6.9 Proof of Proposition III.4
We first state and prove a lemma that is helpful for the proof of the proposition. For expert i,
let S+i denote the set of si ∈ Si where βi(si) ≥ 0 and S−i the analogous set where βi(si) < 0.
Let Σ denote {+,−}n. Impose a (partial) ordering ≥ on Σ such that σ ≥ σ′ if σ′i = −
for any i where σi = −. For σ ∈ Σ let S(σ) denote ×iSσii . Note that {S(σ)
∣∣∣σ ∈ Σ} is a
partition of S.
Lemma III.11. For any interim dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism q there
is another interim dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism r which gives the ex-
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perts the same payoff and moreover:
1. r(s) = r(s′) if s, s′ ∈ S(σ) for some σ ∈ Σ.
2. r(s) ≥ r(s′) if s ∈ S(σ) and s′ ∈ S(σ′) where σ ≥ σ′.
Proof. Pick any i, si ∈ Si where βi(si) > 0. For any s′i ∈ Si and s−i ∈ S−i, Lemma III.6
implies (by setting s−i = s′−i) that βi(si)
(
q(si, s−i) − q(s′i, s−i)
)
≥ 0, which in turn implies
q(si, s−i) ≥ q(s′i, s−i). If in addition βi(s′i) > 0 then by symmetry the reverse inequality
also holds, implying q(si, s−i) = q(s′i, s−i). Similarly if βi(si) < 0 and βi(s
′
i) < 0 then
q(si, s−i) = q(s′i, s−i) for any s−i.
For each i let S>i /S
=
i /S
<
i be the set of si ∈ Si where βi(si) >=< 0. Note that S<i = S−i
and S+i = S
>
i ∪ S=i . We have shown in the previous paragraph that for any s−i,
a. If si ∈ S>i then q(si, s−i) is a constant which we denote as qi(s−i).
b. If si ∈ S<i then q(si, s−i) is a constant which we denote as qi(s−i).
c. qi(s−i) ≥ qi(s−i)
Now we construct a sequence of mechanisms, starting with r0 = q, such that for any
i ≤ n, ri is obtained from ri−1 by the following protocol:
• If si /∈ S=i : ri(s) = ri−1(s) .
• If si ∈ S=i and S>i 6= ∅: ri(s) = ri−1(s′i, s−i) where s′i is chosen from S>i independent of
si and s−i.
• If si ∈ S=i , S>i = ∅ and S<i 6= ∅: ri(s) = ri−1(s′i, s−i) where s′i is chosen from S<i
independent of si and s−i.
• If si ∈ S=i , S>i = ∅ and S<i = ∅: ri(s) = ri−1(s′i, s−i) for some s′i chosen independent of
si and s−i.
Stop at rn = r.
Consider the inductive hypotheses for S:
(H1) For every i ≤ l and s−i,
(a) rl(·, s−i) is constant over S>i ∪ S=i .
(b) rl(·, s−i) is constant over S<i .
(c) rl(si, s−i) ≥ rl(s′i, s−i) if si ∈ S>i ∪ S=i and s′i ∈ S<i .
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(H2) For every i > l, and s−i,
(a) rl(·, s−i) is constant over S>i .
(b) rl(·, s−i) is constant over S<i .
(c) rl(si, s−i) ≥ rl(s′i, s−i) if si ∈ S>i and s′i ∈ S<i .
(H3) The experts’ payoff from rl is the same to that from q.
(H4) rl is interim dominant strategy incentive compatible.
Consider l = 0. H3 and H4 are true by assumption. H1 is vacuously true. For any i = 1, ..., n
and s−i, r0(si, s−i) = qi(s−i) if si ∈ S>i , or r0(si, s−i) = qi(s−i) if si ∈ S<i . Moreover
qi(s−i) ≥ qi(s−i). Thus H2 is true for j = 0.
Suppose H1-H4 are true for some l = j < n. We first show that H1 holds for l = j + 1.
Fix any i < j+ 1 and s−i. Let sk−i denote the signal of expert k 6= i under s−i. If sj+1−i /∈ S=j+1
then rj+1(·, s−i) = rj(·, s−i), which immediately implies H1 for l = j + 1 in this case,
given that H1 holds for l = j. If sj+1−i ∈ S=j+1 and S>j+1 6= ∅, then for any si, rj+1(si, s−i) =
rj(si, s
′
j+1, s−(i,j+1)) where s
′
j+1 is chosen from S
>
j+1. Since by H1 for l = j, r
j(·, s′j+1, s−(i,j+1))
is constant over S>i ∪ S=i or S<i , and moreover rj(si, s′j+1, s−(i,j+1)) ≥ rj(s′i, s′j+1, s−(i,j+1)) if
si ∈ S>i ∪ S=i and s′i ∈ S<i , H1 for l = j + 1 follows in this case. Similarly H1 for l = j + 1
follows in the case sj+1−i ∈ S=j+1, S>j+1 = ∅ and S<j+1 6= ∅. If sj+1−i ∈ S=j+1 and S>j+1, S<j+1
are both empty, then rj+1(si, s−i) = rj(si, s′j+1, s−(i,j+1)) for some s
′
j+1. Note that, by H1
for l = j, for any s′j+1, r
j(·, s′j+1, s−(i,j+1)) is constant over S>i ∪ S=i or S<i , and moreover
rj(si, s
′
j+1, s−(i,j+1)) ≥ rj(s′i, s′j+1, s−(i,j+1)) if si ∈ S>i ∪ S=i and s′i ∈ S<i . This consequently
implies H1 for l = j + 1 in this case.
Now consider i = j + 1. Fix any s−j+1. Since by H2 for l = j, rj(·, s−j) is constant over
S>j+1 or S
<
j+1 and moreover r
j(si, s−i) ≥ rj(s′i, s−i) if si ∈ S>i and s′i ∈ S<i . the construction of
rj+1 from rj immediately implies that rj(·, s−i) is constant over S>i ∪S=i or S<i , and moreover
rj+1(si, s−i) ≥ rj+1(s′i, s−i) if si ∈ S>i ∪ S=i and s′i ∈ S<i . We have thus fully established H1
for l = j + 1.
H2 for l = j + 1 is is established using a similar argument to how H1 for l = j + 1 is
established in cases where i < j+ 1, except that S>i ∪S=i is correspondingly replaced by S>i .
To show that H3 holds for l = j + 1 it is sufficient to show that the experts’ common
payoff pij+1 from rj+1 is the same from their common payoff pij from rj. Observe that
pij+1 − pij
=
∑
sj+1∈S=j+1
∑
s−(j+1)∈S−(j+1)
h(sj+1, s−(j+1))
(
rj+1(sj+1, s−(j+1))− rj(sj+1, s−(j+1))
)
. (*)
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Since H4 holds for l = j, Lemma III.6 implies that for any sj+1 ∈ S=j+1, s′j+1 ∈ Sj+1,
and s−(j+1), s′−(j+1) ∈ S−(j+1),
αj+1(sj+1)
(
rj(sj+1, s−(j+1))− rj(s′j+1, s−(j+1))
)
+ αj+1(sj+1)
(
rj(sj+1, s
′
−(j+1))− rj(s′j+1, s′−(j+1))
)
≥ 0.
Since αj+1(sj+1) = −αj+1(sj+1) > 0, the above inequality simplifies to
rj(sj+1, s−(j+1))− rj(s′j+1, s−(j+1)) ≤ rj(sj+1, s′−(j+1))− rj(s′j+1, s′−(j+1)).
By symmetry between s−(j+1) and s′−(j+1) we also have the reverse inequality. Therefore we
have
rj(s′j+1, s−(j+1))− rj(sj+1, s−(j+1)) = rj(s′j+1, s′−(j+1))− rj(sj+1, s′−(j+1)).
It follows that rj(s′j+1, s−(j+1))−rj(sj+1, s−(j+1)) is independent of s−(j+1); we can thus denote
the difference as δ(s′j+1, sj+1).
Observe that for any sj+1 ∈ S=j+1, by construction rj+1(sj+1, s−(j+1)) = rj(s′j+1, s−(j+1))
for some s′j+1 that is independent of sj+1 and s−(j+1). Therefore equation (*) becomes
pij+1 − pij
=
∑
sj+1∈S=j+1
δ(s′j+1, sj+1)
∑
s−(j+1)∈S−(j+1)
h(sj+1, s−(j+1))
=
∑
sj+1∈S=j+1
δ(s′j+1, sj+1)× 0
=0.
Thus H3 holds for l = j + 1.
Now we show that H4 holds for l = j+1. Pick any expert i, si, s
′
i ∈ Si and s−i, s′−i ∈ S−i.
By Lemma III.6 it is sufficient to verify:
αi(si)
(
rj+1(si, s−i)− rj+1(s′i, s−i)
)
+ αi(si)
(
rj+1(si, s
′
−i)− rj+1(s′i, s′−i)
)
≥ 0. (III.4)
If i = j+ 1 and si, s
′
i /∈ S=j+1, then rj+1(sˆ) = rj(sˆ) for any sˆ ∈ {si, s′i}×{s−i, s′−i}. Thus
inequality III.4 holds because the analogous inequality holds for these states under rj due
to H4 holding for l = j. Now suppose i = j + 1 and si ∈ S=j+1. If s′i ∈ S>j+1 ∪ S=j+1 then
rj+1(si, sˆ−i) = rj+1(s′i, sˆ−i) for any sˆ−i ∈ S−i by construction and H1 or H2, implying that the
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LHS of inequality III.4 is 0. Thus the inequality holds. If s′i ∈ S<j+1 and S>j+1 is empty then
again rj+1(si, sˆ−i) = rj+1(s′i, sˆ−i) for any sˆ−i ∈ S−i by construction and H1 or H2, implying
that inequality III.4 holds. If s′i ∈ S<j+1 and S>j+1 is nonempty, then rj+1(si, s−i) = rj(s′′i , s−i)
and rj+1(si, s
′
−i) = r
j(s′′i , s
′
−i) for some s
′′
i ∈ S>j+1. Recall that we have shown (in the proof
of H3) that rj(si, ·)− rj(sˆi, ·) for any given sˆi ∈ Sj+1 is constant over S−(j+1). Thus we have
rj+1(si, s−i)− rj+1(s′i, s−i) = rj(s′′i , s−i)− rj(s′i, s−i)
=
(
rj(s′′i , s−i)− rj(si, s−i)
)
+
(
rj(si, s−i)− rj(s′i, s−i)
)
=
(
rj(s′′i , s
′
−i)− rj(si, s′−i)
)
+
(
rj(si, s
′
−i)− rj(s′i, s′−i)
)
= rj(s′′i , s
′
−i)− rj(s′i, s′−i)
= rj+1(si, s
′
−i)− rj+1(s′i, s′−i).
It follows that, also substituting in αi(si) = −αi(si) > 0, that the LHS of inequality
III.4 is equal to 0. Thus the inequality always holds if i = j + 1.
Suppose i 6= j + 1. It follows from the construction that rj+1(si, s−i) = rj(si, sˆ−i) and
rj+1(s′i, s−i) = r
j(si, sˆ−i) for some sˆ−i. Similarly rj+1(si, s′−i) = r
j(si, s˜−i) and rj+1(s′i, s
′
−i) =
rj(si, s˜−i) for some s˜−i. Thus we have
αi(si)
(
rj+1(si, s−i)− rj+1(s′i, s−i)
)
+ αi(si)
(
rj+1(si, s
′
−i)− rj+1(s′i, s′−i)
)
=αi(si)
(
rj(si, sˆ−i)− rj(s′i, sˆ−i)
)
+ αi(si)
(
rj(si, s˜−i)− rj(s′i, s˜−i)
)
≥ 0
where the inequality is due to rj being interim dominant strategy incentive compatible by
the inductive hypothesis H4 for l = j.
We have thus proved by induction that H1-H4 hold for l = n. Therefore r = rn is
interim dominant strategy incentive compatible and expert-payoff equivalent to q.
Given H1, for every i and s−i, r(·, s−i) = rn(·, s−i) is constant over S+i = S>i ∪ S=i or
S−i = S
<
i , and moreover r(si, s−i) ≥ r(s′i, s−i) if si ∈ S+i and s′i ∈ S−i . Pick any s, s′ ∈ S.
There is a sequence of states s = s0, s1, ..., sn = s′ where si and si−1 can only possibly differ in
that sii = s
′
i and s
i−1
i = si. If there is some σ ∈ Σ where s, s′ ∈ S(σ) then for any i = 1, ..., n, si
and s′i are both in S
+
i or S
−
i , implying r(s
i−1) = r(si, si−i) = r(s
′
i, s
i
−i) = r(s
i). It follows that
r(s) = r(s′). If s ∈ σ and s′ ∈ σ′ where σ ≥ σ′ then for any i = 1, ..., n, either si and s′i are
both in S+i or S
−
i , or si ∈ S+i and s′i ∈ S−i , implying r(si−1) = r(si, si−i) ≥ r(s′i, si−i) = r(si),
which in turn implies r(s) ≥ r(s′). We have thus established conditions 1 and 2 from the
statement of the lemma.
Now we are read to Prove the Proposition.
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Proof. Let q be an interim dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism and r the
mechanism that is payoff-equivalent to q as specified in Lemma III.11. It is sufficient to
show that the experts achieve at least the benchmark payoff from r. Since r is constant on
each σ ∈ Σ we can denote (by abusing notation when no confusion arises) that constant as
r(σ). Also define H(σ) :=
∑
s∈S(σ) h(s).
First suppose S+i and S
−
i are nonempty for every i. For any i = 1, ..., n and σ ∈ Σ let
µi(σ) denote the resulting vector by changing the ith entry of σ to +. (If σi = + already
then µi(σ) = σ). For each i = 0, ..., n define functions λi : Σ→ Σ such that:
1. λ0(σ) = (−, ...,−) for every σ ∈ Σ.
2. For i > 0,
(a) λi(σ) = λi−1(σ) if σi = −.
(b) λi(σ) = µi(λi−1(σ)) if σi = +.
For each i = 0, ..., n define mechanism ri such that ri(s) = r(λi(σ)) where s ∈ S(σ).
Note r0 is a constant mechanism. Clearly the experts get a weakly higher payoff from
this mechanism than the benchmark, because the benchmark is obviously the lowest payoff
that the experts can get in any constant mechanism. Therefore, to prove the proposition it
is sufficient to show that: (1) rn = r, and (2) The experts get a weakly higher payoff in ri
than in ri−1 conditional on truth-telling.
To establish rn = r, consider the following inductive hypothesis:
L1 For any σ, the first j entries of λj(σ) and σ agree; the other entries of λj(σ) are “−”.
L1 is clearly true for j = 0. Suppose it is true for j = i − 1 for some i ≤ n. Note that
λi(σ) and λi−1(σ) may only differ at the ith entry. Moreover, L1 for j = i − 1 implies the
ith entry of λi−1(σ) is “−”, thus by constructions the ith entry of λi(σ) is “+” if and only
if σi = +, that is, the ith entries of λ
i(σ) and σ agree. This observation combined with L1
for i = j − 1 implies L1 for i = j. Therefor, L1 is true for j = n by induction, which implies
that λn(σ) = σ. It immediately follows that rn = r.
Let pii denote the experts’ common payoff from mechanism ri conditional on truth-
telling. We have
pii − pii−1 =
∑
σ:σi=+
H(σ)
(
r(λi(σ))− r(λi−1(σ))
)
. (III.5)
To show that expression III.5 is nonnegative, we go back temporarily to the interim
dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism r. Suppose experts other than i do the
following: Expert j < i report the signal; expert j > i always reports some sj ∈ S−j . It is
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easy to verify, using L1, that if s obtains where s ∈ S(σ) for some σ ∈ Σ and si ∈ S+i , then
if i reports the true signal si the reported state is in λ
i(σ), whereas if i deviates to reporting
some s′i ∈ S−i the reported state is in λi−1(σ). Given any σ−i ∈ Σ−i let S−i(σ−i) denote
×j 6=iSσ−i(j)j where σ−i(j) denotes the entry correspond to expert j. Since deviating is not
given r is strategy proof, for any si ∈ S+i we have∑
σ:σi=+
∑
s−i∈S−i(σ−i)
h(si, s−i)
(
r(λi(σ))− r(λi−1(σ))
)
≥ 0.
It follows that
0 ≤
∑
σ:σi=+
∑
si∈S+i
∑
s−i∈S−i(σ−i)
h(si, s−i)
(
r(λi(σ))− r(λi−1(σ))
)
=
∑
σ:σi=+
H(σ)
(
r(λi(σ))− r(λi−1(σ))
)
where the RHS is exactly expression III.5. Therefor pii − pii−1 is nonnegative for every
i = 1, ..., n. This completes the proof for the case that S+i and S
−
i are nonempty for every i.
If S+i or S
−
i is empty for some experts, then we reindex the experts so that these experts
are assigned the highest indices m + 1, ..., n. The proof needs to be modified in two places:
First, the first m entries of λ0(σ) are still “−”, but the ith entry where i > m is φ ∈ {+,−}
where Sφi is not empty. Second, the construction of λ
i stops at λm. We can show that rm = r
and each ri gives the experts a higher payoff than ri−1 using essentially the same argument
as above. This completes the proof.
III.6.10 Proof of Proposition III.5
Proof. Suppose for environments (S, e, p) and (S, e′, p′), p(s)e(s) = p′(s)e′(s) for every s ∈ S.
Let mechanism q be a BIC mechanism that extracts information in (S, e, p), then
−
∑
s∈S
p(s)e(s)q(s) > max{0,−
∑
s∈S
p(s)e(s)} (III.6)
and for any i = 1, ..., N and si, s
′
i ∈ Si,∑
s−i∈S−i
p(si, s−i)∑
sˆ−i∈S−i
p(si, sˆ−i)
e(si, s−i)q(si, s−i) ≥
∑
s−i∈S−i
p(si, s−i)∑
sˆ−i∈S−i
p(si, sˆ−i)
e(si, s−i)q(s′i, s−i)
(III.7)
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where Pr(s−i|si) is the probability of s−i conditional si in (S, e, p). It follows from inequality
III.6 that
−
∑
s∈S
p′(s)e′(s)q(s) = −
∑
s∈S
p(s)e(s)q(s)
> max{0,−
∑
s∈S
p(s)e(s)} = max{0,−
∑
s∈S
p′(s)e′(s)}.
Thus q extracts information in (S, e′, p′).
It follows from inequality III.7 that for any i = 1, ..., N and si, s
′
i ∈ Si,∑
s−i∈S−i
p′(si, s−i)∑
sˆi∈Si p
′(sˆi, s−i)
e′(si, s−i)q(si, s−i)
=
∑
sˆi∈Si p(sˆi, s−i)∑
sˆi∈Si p
′(sˆi, s−i)
∑
s−i∈S−i
p(si, s−i)∑
sˆ−i∈S−i
p(si, sˆ−i)
e(si, s−i)q(si, s−i)
≥
∑
sˆi∈Si p(sˆi, s−i)∑
sˆi∈Si p
′(sˆi, s−i)
∑
s−i∈S−i
p(si, s−i)∑
sˆ−i∈S−i
p(si, sˆ−i)
e(si, s−i)q(s′i, s−i)
=
∑
s−i∈S−i
p′(si, s−i)∑
sˆi∈Si p
′(sˆi, s−i)
e′(si, s−i)q(s′i, s−i).
Thus q is BIC in (S, e′, p′).
III.6.11 Proof of Lemma III.8
The following two results will be useful for the proof of Lemma III.8.
Lemma III.12. For a symmetric mechanism q, let qk denote q(s) where (s) = k, and dk
denote
(
N−1
k
)
(qk − qk+1). q is BIC if and only if
N−1∑
k=0
hkdk ≥ 0,
N−1∑
k=0
hk+1dk ≤ 0. (III.8)
Proof. In a BIC symmetric mechanism, no experts wishes to over-report, thus
N−1∑
k=0
Pr((s−i) = k|si = 0)e(k)qsym(k) ≥
N−1∑
k=0
Pr((s−i) = k|si = 0)e(k)qsym(k + 1)
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Multiplying both sides by Pr(si = 0), we have
N−1∑
k=0
(
N − 1
k
)
pkekqsym(k) ≥
N−1∑
k=0
(
N − 1
k
)
pkekqsym(k + 1).
Rearranging, we have
h0qsym(0) +
N−1∑
k=1
[(N − 1
k
)
hk −
(
N − 1
k − 1
)
hk−1
]
qsym(k)− hN−1qsym(N) ≥ 0.
Similarly, the absence of profitable under-reporting opportunity implies
−h1qsym(0) +
N−1∑
k=1
[(N − 1
k − 1
)
hk −
(
N − 1
k
)
hk+1
]
qsym(k) + hNqsym(N) ≥ 0.
For k = 0, ..., N define
v(k) :=
(
N − 1
k
)
hk −
(
N − 1
k − 1
)
hk−1
and
w(k) =
(
N − 1
k − 1
)
hk −
(
N − 1
k
)
hk+1
where
(
0
−1
)
and
(
N−1
N
)
are set to be 0, then a mechanism is BIC if and only if
N∑
k=0
v(k)qsym(k) ≥ 0
N∑
k=0
w(k)qsym(k) ≥ 0. (III.9)
Plugging in the definitions of qk and dk, Conditions (III.9) become Conditions (III.8).
Lemma III.13. There exists a BIC decreasing mechanism if and only if there exists a non-
negative and non-constant vector (dk)
N−1
k=0 that satisfies Conditions (III.8).
Proof. The only if direction is immediate. To show the if direction, let (dk) be a non-
negative and non-constant vector that satisfies Conditions III.8. Let K :=
∑N−1
k=0
dk
(N−1k )
.
Clearly (dk/K) is also a non-negative and non-constant vector that satisfies Condition III.8.
Consider mechanism q where q0 = 1 and qk+1 = qk −
[
1/
(
N−1
k
)]
(dk/K). It is straight-
forward to verify that q is a well-defined decreasing mechanism, that is, (qk) is non-increasing
and non-constant, and that qk ∈ [0, 1] for every k = 0, ..., N . Observe that
∑N−1
k=0
(
N−1
k
)
hk(qk−
qk+1) =
∑N−1
k=0 hk(dk/K) and
∑N−1
k=0
(
N−1
k
)
hk+1(qk+1 − qk) =
∑N−1
k=0 hk+1(−dk/K). Thus that
(dk/K) satisfies Condition III.8 implies q is BIC.
Now we are able to prove Lemma III.8.
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Proof. Denote ηk := (hk, hk+1). By Lemma III.13, there exists a BIC decreasing mechanism
if and only if there is a non-zero conical combination of ηk, k = 0, ..., N − 1 that lies in the
fourth quadrant of the two-dimensional Cartesian plane. By assumption none of ηk is in the
fourth quadrant, therefore a non-zero conical combination of ηk, k = 0, ..., N − 1 lies in the
fourth quadrant if and only if there are i, j ∈ {0, ..., N} where ηi is in the third quadrant, ηj
is in the first quadrant, and the convex cone spanned by ηi and ηj is either a line or contains
the fourth quadrant, which holds, as can be easily verified, if and only if hi+1
hi
≥ hj+1
hj
.
III.6.12 Proof of Proposition III.6
Proof. It is easy to see that no symmetric increasing BIC mechanism that extracts infor-
mation. So we want to show that no symmetric decreasing BIC mechanism that extracts
information.
Recall hk = pkek where pk is the probability where some given state s where (s) = k
obtains, and ek is the expected payoff from conviction in that state. Hence,
hk = Pr(s)
(
x
Pr(guilty and s)
Pr(s)
− yPr(innocent and s)
Pr(s)
)
= xpiαk(1− α)N−k − y(1− pi)βk(1− β)N−k.
It is straightforward to verify that hk is increasing in k. Thus for any i, j where hi, hi+1 <
0, hj, hj+1 > 0 we have hi+1/hi < 1 < hj+1/hj. Thus by Lemma III.8 there does not exist a
decreasing BIC mechanism for the classical Condorcet Jury model.
III.6.13 Proof of Proposition III.7
Proof. Consider a general symmetric voting rule where the probability of conviction is qˆk if
there are k guilty reports. Consider the strategy profile where juror i reports guilty with
probability ai given a guilty signal and bi given an innocent signal. Fix any s, s
′ that differ
only at the ith component where s′i = 1 and si = 0. Let Qs′ and Qs respectively denote the
implied probability of conviction in states s′ and s, and p˜k the probability that jurors other
than i report exactly k guilty signals given s−i. Thus we have
Qs′ =
N−1∑
k=0
p˜k
(
aiqˆk+1 + (1− ai)qˆk
)
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and similarly
Qs =
N−1∑
k=0
p˜k
(
biqˆk+1 + (1− bi)qˆk
)
.
Thus
Qs′ −Qs = (ai − bi)
N−1∑
k=0
p˜k(qˆk+1 − qˆk).
If qˆ is weakly monotone and ai − bi has the same sign for all i then Qs′ −Qs have the same
sign for any s, s′ that differ only at the ith component where s′i = 1 and si = 0.
For any s let X(s) denote the set of all s′ obtained from flipping an innocent signal in
s to a guilty signal, and let X−1(s) denote the set of all s′ obtained from flipping a guilty
signal in s to an innocent signal. It follows from the previous paragraph that if qˆ is weakly
monotone and ai− bi has the same sign for all i then Qs′ −Qs has the same sign for any s, s′
where s′ ∈ X(s). Suppose WLOG Qs′ −Qs ≥ 0 for any s, s′ where s′ ∈ X(s). Thus
1
|X(s)|
∑
s′∈X(s)
Qs′ −Qs ≥ 0,
where, clearly, |X(s)| = N − k. Thus∑
s′∈X(s)
Qs′ ≥ (N − k)Qs.
Also observe ∑
s:(s)=k
∑
s′∈X(s)
Qs′ = (k + 1)
∑
s′:(s′)=k+1
Qs′ .
It follows that
1(
N
k+1
) ∑
s′:(s′)=k+1
Qs′ =
1
(k + 1)
(
N
k+1
) ∑
s:(s)=k
∑
s′∈X(s)
Qs′
≥ 1
(k + 1)
(
N
k+1
) ∑
s:(s)=k
(N − k)Qs
=
1(
N
k
) ∑
s:(s)=k
Qs.
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If (ai, bi) constitutes an equilibrium, then (Qs) is a BIC direct mechanism. Then by Lemma
III.7, the symmetric mechanism qk =
1
(Nk)
∑
s:(s)=kQ(s) is also BIC. The above inequality
shows that if qˆ is monotone and ai − bi has the same sign for all i then qk must also be
monotone, but we earlier observe that qk cannot be decreasing. It follows that qk must be
increasing, in which case the equilibrium of the original voting game is not worse than no
voting. We have thus shown that as long as the voting rule is monotone (not necessarily
increasing) and players follow relatively “similar” strategies (ai− bi having the same sign for
all i) then no equilibrium can be worse no voting.
Now think about any equilibrium (ai, bi) of a voting game with monotone rule qˆk. Fix
juror i. Let p˜k(s−i) denote the probability that the other jurors report exactly k guilty signals
in equilibrium given s−i. Conditional on si = 0, the difference in payoff between reporting 1
and reporting 0 for i is
Π(1|si = 0)− Π(0|si = 0)
=
∑
s−i
Pr(s−i|si = 0)
N−1∑
k=0
p˜k(s−i)qˆk+1e(si = 0, s−i)−
∑
s−i
Pr(s−i|si = 0)
N−1∑
k=0
p˜k(s−i)qˆke(si = 0, s−i)
=
∑
s−i
Pr(s−i|si = 0)e(si = 0, s−i)
[N−1∑
k=0
p˜k(s−i)qˆk+1 −
N−1∑
k=0
p˜k(s−i)qˆk
]
=
∑
s−i
Pr(s−i|si = 0)e(si = 0, s−i)
N−1∑
k=0
p˜k(s−i)(qˆk+1 − qˆk)
=
∑
s−i
Pr(si = 0, s−i)
Pr(si = 0)
e(si = 0, s−i)
N−1∑
k=0
p˜k(s−i)(qˆk+1 − qˆk)
=
1
Pr(si = 0)
∑
s−i
h(si = 0, s−i)
N−1∑
k=0
p˜k(s−i)(qˆk+1 − qˆk)
=
1
Pr(si = 0)
∑
s−i
h(si = 0, s−i)∆(s−i)
where ∆(s−i) :=
∑N−1
k=0 p˜k(s−i)(qˆk+1 − qˆk). Since qˆk is monotone, ∆(s−i) has the same sign
for all s−i. Similarly, we have
Π(1|si = 1)− Π(0|si = 1) = 1
Pr(si = 1)
∑
s−i
h(si = 1, s−i)∆(s−i).
Suppose ∆(s−i) is non-negative. We have shown earlier that h(si = 1, s−i) > h(si =
0, s−i). Thus
∑
s−i h(si = 1, s−i)∆(s−i) >
∑
s−i h(si = 0, s−i)∆(s−i) for any equilibrium that
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is non-trivial. (An equilibrium is trivial if the same verdict is reached with certainty. If an
equilibrium is non-trivial and the voting rule qˆk is symmetric then it can be shown that for
any i there is s−i where ∆(s−i) 6= 0.) For a non-trivial equilibrium there are the following
two cases:
1. If Π(1|si = 0) − Π(0|si = 0) ≥ 0 then Π(1|si = 1) − Π(0|si = 1) > 0. In this cases
juror i has a strict incentive to report guilty (“1”) given a guilty signal (“1”). Thus
ai = 1 ≥ bi.
2. If Π(1|si = 0)−Π(0|si = 0) < 0 then the juror has strictly no incentive to report guilty
given an innocent signal. Thus ai ≥ bi = 0.
Observe that regardless of which case obtains, ai ≥ bi. Since the argument does not depend
on the identity of the juror, it follows that ai ≥ bi for all i, or in other words ai − bi has the
same sign for all i. A similar argument holds when ∆(s−i) is non-positive. Thus we have
shown that for any non-trivial equilibrium of a voting game with a monotone rule, ai − bi
must has the same sign for all i, and hence the equilibrium payoff cannot be worse than no
voting. On the other hand, a trivial equilibrium is not worse than no voting either clearly.
Hence, no such voting can extract information for DM.
III.6.14 Proof of Proposition III.8
Proof. Suppose q beats the benchmark. Claim that the following strategy profile constitutes
a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in Γ(q):
• Every expert sends the message that is the same as his signal.
• DM chooses the option that is the same as the intermediator’s message.
It is clear that the strategy profile is outcome-equivalent to truthtelling under q. We now
show the strategy profile is incentive compatible. For the experts, that truthtelling is incen-
tive compatible under q immediately implies truthtelling is incentive compatible under Γ(q)
because of outcome equivalence. Consider DM. Upon receiving message “R′′ the expected
payoff from choosing option R is
1∑
s∈S p(s)q(s)
(∑
s∈S
p(s)d(s)q(s)
)
> 0
since the term in the brackets is positive due to q beating the benchmark. Thereofre choosing
R upon message “R” is best responding. If choosing S upon signal “S” is not best respond-
ing then deviating to choosing R upon signal “S” is for DM. It follows that always choosing
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R regardless of the message gives DM a higher payoff than following the prescribed strat-
egy. However, always choosing R yields a payoff no higher than the benchmark B whereas
following the strategy yields a payoff higher than R given that q beats the benchmark, a
contradiction. Therefore the strategy is also incentive compatible for DM.
III.6.15 Proof of Lemma III.10
Proof. It is sufficient to show that Z represents a garbling probability function that translates
(d, e, p, S) into an environment equivalent to (d′, e′, p′, S ′) where z(s′(j)|s(k)) = Z(j, k). That
Z is non-negative and ZT1|S′| imply that indeed entries in the kth column of Z constitute a
probability function z(·|s(k)). Let (d∗, e∗, p∗, S ′) denote the resulting environment from the
information manipulation implied by Z. Thus for any s′(j) ∈ S ′ we have
p∗(s′(j))e∗(s′(j)) = p∗(s′(j))
∑
s∈S
p(s)z(s′(j)|s)
p∗(s′(j))
e(s)
=
∑
s∈S
z(s′(j)|s)[p(s)e(s)] = Zjg
where Zj denotes the jth row of Z. On the other hand we have
Zjg = g
′
j = p
′(s′(j))e′(s′(j))
by assumption. Thus p∗(s′(j))e∗(s′(j)) = p′(s′(j))e′(s′(j)) for every s′(j) ∈ S ′. Similarly
we have p∗(s′(j))d∗(s′(j)) = p′(s′(j))d′(s′(j)) for every s′(j) ∈ S ′. Thus (d∗, e∗, p∗, S ′) is
equivalent to (d′, e′, p′, S ′).
III.6.16 Proof of Proposition III.9
Proof. We first show the “only if” direction. Suppose (d, e, p, S) can be translated into
(d′, e′, p′, S ′) by information manipulation. By Lemma III.10 there is a matrix Z such that
Zh = h′ and ZT1|S′| = 1|S|. Thus we have
∑
s′∈S′
h′(s′) =
|S′|∑
i=1
|S|∑
j=1
Zijh(s(j)) =
|S|∑
j=1
h(s(j))
|S′|∑
i=1
Zij =
|S|∑
j=1
h(s(j)) =
∑
s∈S
h(s).
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Similarly we have
∑
s∈S g(s) =
∑
s′∈S′ g
′(s′). To show part 2, denote K := {k = 1, ..., |S| :
h(s(k)) > 0} and K ′ := {k = 1, ..., |S ′| : h′(s′(k)) > 0}. Observe that
∑
i∈K′
h′(s′(i)) =
∑
i∈K′
|S|∑
j=1
Zijh(s(j)) ≤
∑
i∈K′
∑
j∈K
Zijh(s(j))
=
∑
j∈K
h(s(j))
∑
i∈K′
Zij ≤
∑
j∈K
h(s(j)),
which is equvalent to
∑
s∈S,h(s)>0 h(s) ≥
∑
s′∈S′,h′(s)>0 h
′(s′). Similarly we have
∑
s∈S,g(s)>0 g(s) ≥∑
s′∈S′,g′(s′)>0 g
′(s′).
Now we show the “if” direction. Suppose conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied. Construct
|S ′| × |S| matrix Z such that for any i = 1, ..., |S ′| and j = 1, ..., |S|:
• If h′(s′(i)) > 0 and h(s(j)) > 0:
Zij =
h′(s′(i))∑
s∈S,h(s)>0 h(s)
+
1
|S ′|
(
1−
∑
s′∈S′,h′(s′)>0 h
′(s′)∑
s∈S,h(s)>0 h(s)
)
.
• If h′(s′(i)) > 0 and h(s(j)) < 0:
Zij =
1
|S ′|
(
1−
∑
s′∈S′,h′(s′)<0 h
′(s′)∑
s∈S,h(s)<0 h(s)
)
.
• If h′(s′(i)) < 0 and h(s(j)) > 0:
Zij =
1
|S ′|
(
1−
∑
s′∈S′,h′(s′)>0 h
′(s′)∑
s∈S,h(s)>0 h(s)
)
.
• If h′(s′(i)) < 0 and h(s(j)) < 0:
Zij =
h′(s′(i))∑
s∈S,h(s)<0 h(s)
+
1
|S ′|
(
1−
∑
s′∈S′,h′(s′)<0 h
′(s′)∑
s∈S,h(s)<0 h(s)
)
.
Note that conditions 2 implies
∑
s′∈S′,h′(s′)>0 h
′(s′)∑
s∈S,h(s)>0 h(s)
∈ [0, 1] if there exists s ∈ S such that
h(s) > 0. Conditions 1 and 2 imply that
∑
s′∈S′,h′(s′)<0 h
′(s′) >
∑
s∈S,h(s)<0 h(s), which in
turn implies that
∑
s′∈S′,h′(s′)<0 h
′(s′)∑
s∈S,h(s)<0 h(s)
∈ [0, 1] if there exists s ∈ S such that h(s) < 0. Given
these observations it is straightforward to verify that Zij is non-negative for any i, j.
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For any i where h′(s′(i)) > 0 we have
|S|∑
j=1
Zijh(s(j)) =
h(s(j))>0∑
j∈{1,...,|S|}
h(s(j))∑
s∈S,h(s)>0 h(s)
h′(s′(i))
+
1
|S ′|
h(s(j))>0∑
j∈{1,...,|S|}
(
h(s(j))−
∑
s′∈S′,h′(s′)>0 h
′(s′)∑
s∈S,h(s)>0 h(s)
h(s(j))
)
+
1
|S ′|
h(s(j))<0∑
j∈{1,...,|S|}
(
h(s(j))−
∑
s′∈S′,h′(s′)<0 h
′(s′)∑
s∈S,h(s)<0 h(s)
h(s(j))
)
=h′(s′(i)) +
1
|S ′|
( h(s)>0∑
s∈S
h(s)−
h′(s′)>0∑
s′∈S′
h′(s′)
)
+
1
|S ′|
( h(s)<0∑
s∈S
h(s)−
h′(s′)<0∑
s′∈S′
h′(s′)
)
=h′(s′(i)) +
1
|S ′|
(∑
s∈S
h(s)−
∑
s′∈S′
h′(s′)
)
=h′(s′(i)).
Similarly
∑|S|
j=1 Zijh(s(j)) = h
′(s′(i)) if h′(s′(i)) < 0. Therefore, Zh = h′. That Zg = g′ is
established analogously.
For any j where h(s(j)) > 0 we have
|S′|∑
i=1
Zij =
h′(s′(i))>0∑
i∈{1,...,|S′|}
h′(s′(i))∑
s∈S,h(s)>0 h(s)
+ 1−
∑
s′∈S′,h′(s′)>0 h
′(s′)∑
s∈S,h(s)>0 h(s)
= 1.
Similarly
∑|S′|
i=1 Zij = 1 for any j where h(s(j)) < 0. Thus Z
T1|S′| = 1|S|.
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III.6.17 Proof of Lemma III.7
Proof. Af first, we show that q∗ gives the same expected payoff as q .∑
s∈S
p(s)e(s)q∗(s)
=
∑
s∈S
p(s)e(s)
1
n!
n!∑
k=1
q(σk(s))
=
1
n!
∑
s∈S
n!∑
k=1
p(σk(s))e(σk(s))q(σk(s))
=
1
n!
n!∑
k=1
∑
s∈S
p(σk(s))e(σk(s))q(σk(s))
=
1
n!
n!
∑
s∈S
p(s)e(s)q(s)
=
∑
s∈S
p(s)e(s)q(s)
Secondly, we want to show that q∗ is feasible. It is straightforward to see q∗(s) ∈ [0, 1]
for all s. The key step is checking ICs.
∑
s−i
p(si, s−i)e(si, s−i)q∗(si, s−i)
=
∑
s−i
p(si, s−i)e(si, s−i)
1
n!
n!∑
k=1
q(σk(si, s−i))
=
1
n!
∑
s−i
n!∑
k=1
p(si, s−i)e(si, s−i)q(σk(si, s−i))
=
1
n!
n!∑
k=1
∑
s−i
p(σk(si, s−i))e(σk(si, s−i))q(σk(si, s−i))
=
1
n!
n∑
j=1
(n− 1)!
[∑
s−j
p(sj = si, s−j)e(sj = si, s−j)q(sj = si, s−j)
]
=
1
n
n∑
j=1
∑
s−j
p(sj = si, s−j)e(sj = si, s−j)q(sj = si, s−j).
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Similarly, ∑
s−i
p(si, s−i)e(si, s−i)q∗(s′i, s−i)
=
1
n
n∑
j=1
∑
s−j
p(sj = si, s−j)e(sj = si, s−j)q(s′j = s
′
i, s−j).
Thus, ICs under q∗ is guaranteed by the fact q satisfies ICs.
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